









The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 











A TRANSACTION ASSURANCE FRAMEWORK FOR WEB SERVICES 
A dissertation submitted to the Department of Computer Science, 
Faculty of Science at the University of Cape Town 
in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
in 
Computer Science 
- Reinhardt van Rooyen -
Supervisor 






















Trust assurances for customers of online transactions is an important, but not well implemented 
concept for the growth of confidence in electronic transactions. In an online world where cus-
tomers do not personally know the companies they seek to do business with, there is real risk 
involved in providing an unknown service with personal information and payment details. The 
risks faced by a customer are compounded when multiple services are involved in a single 
transaction. 
This dissertation provides mechanisms that can be used to reduce the risks faced by a client 
involved in online transactions by allowing the him/her access to information about the ser-
vices involved and control or prescribe how the transaction uses the services. The dissertation 
uses electronic transactions legislation to ground a trust assurance protocol and minimize the 
assumptions that have to be made. By basing the protocol on legislation, no information that 
isn't already required by law is used in the protocol. 
A trust assurance protocol is presented so that the client can establish which services are in-
volved in a transaction so that the he/she can begin to determine whether or not he/she is will-
ing to conduct business with the services. A trust model that calculates an assurance measure 
for services is developed so that the client can automatically establish a measure of trust for a 
service based on the external perceptions of a service, and his/her own personal experience. A 
simulation environment was created and used to monitor the services involved in a transaction 
to evaluate the trust assurance protocol and gain experience with the trust calculation that the 
client computes. 
Vocabularies that simplify and standardize descriptions of personal information, business types 
and the legal structure imposed on Web services offering goods or services online are presented 
to reduce the ambiguity involved in gathering information from different online sources. The 
vocabularies also provide a cornerstone of the trust assurance protocol by providing information 
that is necessary to compute the trust value of a Web service. 
Results of the trust assurance protocol are obtained and evaluated against the qualitative re-
quirements of providing assurances to clients, and confirms that the protocol is feasible to be 
deployed, in terms of the overhead placed on a transaction. This dissertation finds that a trust 
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A customer in online transactions locates a service that offers the goods or services he/she 
wants and pays for the goods or services with his/her credit card. The client provides personal 
information to the service regarding his/her name, address, telephone numbers and even identity 
numbers. A few days or weeks later, the client receives his goods or services as advertised by 
the service. The convenience of online shopping is obvious. However, the scenario above is 
the ideal, best possible outcome. There are many more sinister chains of events that could 
cause the customer to have a bad experience conducting online shopping: A few weeks after 
the successful transaction, the client receives spam email; the goods arrive and are not in the 
condition advertised; the goods do not arrive. These outcomes to the transaction will prohibit 
customers from entering the online market place for fear that they will be exploited, that they 
will not be able to control what happens to their personal information, or that they have no 
guarantee that the goods that they paid for will arrive. 
Assurances address these concerns, putting the customer at ease despite these risks existing. 
Being able to establish trust in a transaction is crucial to having a positive experience online 
and provides a safety net to customers who shop online. This dissertation focuses on providing 
the end user with assurances about the transaction and the usage of his/her personal information 
during and after a transaction in a Web services world. This chapter introduces online transac-
tions, personal information, trust, Web services and highlights how the rest of the dissertation 
is structured. 
1.0.1 Online transactions 
Buying goods and procuring services over the Internet has become a viable alternative to buying 
goods and services in the physical world. Electronic commerce offers several advantages that 
shopping in the real world cannot. With E-commerce, it is possible to buy goods from different 
countries and from vendors that cannot or do not supply local stores. E-commerce makes it easy 
to be more informed about the products or services before paying for them [29], by allowing 
the user to search and browse through vast amounts of information about specific and related 
information quickly and easily. Potential customers have at their disposal technical information, 
user reviews, complaints and opinions, which are not all readily available in the real world. 
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knowledge that a customer generally has regarding the pricing of the identical product else-
where. This price difference might be a result of legitimate expenses, such as the transportation 
of the goods to the store or it could be a result of a store owner's knowledge that no other store 
in the area supplies the same product. In an online world, it is much easier for users to compare 
prices of identical products from different online stores, and there are many search engines, such 
as froogle 1 and pricegrabber2, that allow users to easily search for the store selling a particular 
product at the best price. 
However, E-commerce, while promising an enhanced shopping experience, also has disadvan-
tages when compared to conducting transactions in the real world. Customers who purchase 
goods online cannot physically inspect the quality of the items before purchasing them and the 
customer has to pay for the goods before he/she receives them [36]. The customer accepts a 
great deal of the risk of the transaction in order to facilitate the transaction. In the physical 
world, these risks are mitigated by the customer's ability to inspect the goods before purchase 
and being able to walk away with the goods as soon as the items are paid for. Even when the 
transaction is anonymous to both parties, i.e. the customer has never purchased items from the 
seller before, the risk involved in the transaction does not become as great as a comparable 
transaction online, as the customer can inspect the goods, and can identify the company that 
sold the goods to him/her, allowing the customer to complain should the goods or services be 
deficient in any way. 
1.1 PERSONAL INFORMATION 
Another threat that online shopping and transactions expose customers to is the safety of the 
customer's personal information. In the physical world, the collection of personal information, 
and personally identifying information (PH) is not as easy as it is in the online world. It is 
costly to capture and analyze the data and requires significant data-capturing and other time-
consuming human involvement. As an illustration, consider a book-store in the physical world 
compared to the online world. In the online world, the bookstore can collect information on the 
books a user browsed before ultimately making a purchase. It can then use this information to 
provide a better service to potential customers by telling them that other people who browsed 
the same book, ultimately bought another book. This information would be very difficult to 
collect in a physical book-store. An ethnomethodological study would have to be conducted 
by trained personnel that could be affect the shopping experience and could be considered an 
invasion of a customer's privacy. 
In the online world, however, the collection, storage and dissemination of personal information 
and usage information add virtually no cost to the service provider [17]. The infrastructure that 
provides the service is already able to handle the additional data collection and analysis. The 
service provider then has the ability to leverage the information that has been collected as a 
business asset. It is much easier to collect more data from more people than it is possible to do 
in the physical world. By disseminating and analyzing the data collected from customers and 
potential customers, the company can tailor the shopping experience that it offers, but it can 
just as easily sell or exploit the data for commercial gain[ 17]. The data collected can be about 
1 froogle : http://froogle.google.com 
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the browsing behaviors of customers, geographical information, demographical information 
and can extend to personally identifiable information, such as information collected in most 
registration processes. 
1.2 TRUST 
The ease of establishing an electronic store or service makes the risk of fraud much more likely 
in the electronic environment than in the physical world [4]. In addition, the lack of sufficient 
laws governing electronic transactions makes it easier for an unscrupulous service provider to 
get away with offering sub-standard service. 
Due to the greater risks that customers face in Internet transactions, customers should be entitled 
to greater assurances to offset the increased risks. Basic assurances of the seller or service 
provider's identity have launched the Internet as a place where business could conducted in a 
trusting environment. Certificate authorities such as Verisign and Thwate provide assurances 
to customers on a website that the company is legitimate, enabling customers to confidently 
enter into a transaction where personal and financial details are disclosed [28]. However, the 
certificate provided by certificate authorities provides very few details about a company, and is 
used mainly as a way to pass the public key of a company to a customer to facilitate the setting 
up of a secure session between the two parties. The certificate does not provide the customer 
with any assurances other than the basic authentication about the service provider. 
Certificates issued by a certificate authority, used by current web browsers, conform to the 
X.S09 v3 certificate standard. This standard is outline in RFC 3280 [21] and is commonly re-
ferred to as Public Key Infrastructure X.S09 group (PKIX). The certificate contains information 
on the issuer of the certificate, the time period for which the certificate is valid, the name of the 
subject of the certificate, its public key and a signature of the certificate that can be validated by 
re-signing the certificate using the certificate authority's public key. 
The information in the certificate gives the customer no more information about a service 
provider other than its name and domain name, and the public key to which the company has 
the corresponding private key. The information does not provide the customer with sufficient 
assurances that hislher transaction will proceed as expected and provides no means by which 
the customer can relay his/her preferences to the service provider. 
This dissertation introduces a mechanism to allow for finer-grained assurances that will assure 
the client about more than just the identity of a company. It provides the customer with assur-
ances about the proper use of their financial, personal and transactional information. Specif-
ically, this dissertation focuses on the Web services environment, where transactions can be 
made up of connections between modular software components from various vendors. This 
dissertation investigates and establishes a measure of trust that can be built to provide the client 
with the necessary trust in the company that he/she is dealing with. 
1.3 WEB SERVICES 
Web services is an emerging message oriented middleware architecture that enables companies 
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platform independent, well formed text messages that enable two companies to convey infor-
mation in a way that another company can automatically disseminate. Companies can expose 
their internal systems to external users. These services provide functionality that can be used by 
other services and a fee may be charged for its use. The modularity of the composition of Web 
Services offers an unique environment in which different Web services can be grouped together 
to perform a single business transaction. 
In this dissertation, Web services are viewed as modular services, such that many companies 
may offer the same service to clients or other services. An example of this would be different 
travel agencies looking up available flight times at a client's request, or many different compa-
nies each offering a currency convertion service. In a world where many different services can 
perform the same functionality, assurances and benefits become an alluring prospect for clients. 
Clients can choose a particular service because it is less expensive to use, or they can use a 
service because it offers a better privacy protection policy than any other service that provides 
similar functionality. 
Whilst the ability to compose a single transaction from multiple companies' services in a dy-
namic environment introduces great opportunities for both service providers and customers, the 
risks involved in transactions also become more prevalent. It only takes one service with access 
to the client's personal information to undermine the entire transaction and misuse the infor-
mation received. No one party involved in the transaction is responsible for the proper use of 
information and it is therefore up to every service to act in an honest manner and adhere to the 
customer's request regarding the proper use of hislher personal information. 
Web services has received significant attention from both industry and academia. As a result, 
a plethora of specifications and standards have emerged to address a multitude of scenarios at 
different levels of the Web services stack. The standards and specifications deal more with 
the functional aspects of Web services. Specifications regarding the atomicity of distributed 
transactions exist to control a transaction involving multiple parties at a functional level, but they 
do not address the privacy concerns that users should have towards the misuse of their personal 
information. The relevant standards and specifications to this dissertation will be covered in 
greater detail in Chapter 2. This dissertation provides a specification for the Web Services 
environment, in which aspects beyond the functional requirements of Web Services can be 
negotiated so that the customer can be assured that the transaction and usage of his/her personal 
information proceeds only as agreed upon. 
1.4 COMPOSITE WEB SERVICES TRANSACTION CHAINS 
Web services can be connected to create a virtual chain of services where each service in the 
chain adds value or provides a service to enable the successful completion of a business trans-
action. The service provider with which the client is directly in contact may use other service 
providers to find information on a particular product, find the cheapest price for a product, 
purchase a part of machinery or anything that the service provider needs to complete hislher 
transaction with the client. These services mayor may not require remuneration, and payment 
Web services may be involved in the transaction to facilitate the transaction. These services 
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conditions of operation and might require information about the client of the transaction in or-
der to fulfil its service. This service might really need to use this information or might just wish 
to collect data about users for its own purposes. 
Figure 1.1: A Web Services Transaction Chain example 
The problem with the scenario depicted in Figure 1.1 is that the client has little control in what 
happens in the transaction beyond the service provider that the customer is directly dealing with. 
In this scenario, the service provider may require to contact and deal with two additional service 
providers, with each one charging a fee for their part in the transaction. Furthermore, each of 
the two service providers include credit-checking companies to validate that they will be paid 
for their services. Provider 1 can deal with either 123 Credit or ABC Credit and Provider 2 only 
has the ability to deal with ABC Credit. If is was known that ABC Credit was more trustworthy 
than 123 Credit, it might be in the client's best interests to pay a premium so that Provider 1 
would deal with ABC Credit rather than 123 Credit. 
The client's preference for a certain company to be involved in the transaction over another 
spans many different requirements and conditions. The client may want to deal only with com-
panies certified by a certificate authority. The client may prefer to enter into a transaction only 
with companies that operate within countries that have amicable internet transaction legislation 
or trading agreements with the customer's country of residence. The reasons for a customer's 
preference lie beyond the functional requirements of a service and need to be addressed at a 
higher level than functional requirements. 
The client has no say about what companies are involved in the transaction, has no control over 
what companies have access to some or all of its personal information and has no agreement in 
place with the third-party service providers regarding the consumption, storage and ownership 
of hisfher personal information. This presents a challenging stumbling block to using Web 
services for transactions that involve any risk. If a customer knew that other companies were 
involved in the transaction and that they used hisfher personal information in any way, he/she 
might want assurances that the information would not be sold to an information-harvesting 
company. In the scenario shown above, the client has no control and cannot specify hisfher 
wishes to all the parties involved in the transaction. 
A customer concerned with the protection of his/her personal information may not be willing to 
engage in a transaction in which the protection and proper use of hisfher personal information 
can be assured. 
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customer and the service providers can engage in transactions with the least amount of risk pos-
sible. With a reduced risk, a customer will be more willing to engage in a business transaction 
with the service provider and thus provide the service provider with remuneration for services 
rendered. 
The goals of this dissertation are to investigate the trust assurances that customer's desire in 
order to confidently enter into online transactions with unknown service providers. The disser-
tation also presents a protocol designed to streamline the assurance negotiation and agreement 
processes. This dissertation investigates the trust measures that are available to clients in online 
transactions, establishes a trust model to use in a trust assurance protocol and creates a simula-
tion environment in which the protocol, and trust calculation can be executed and monitored. 
1.5 POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS 
Transactions involving multiple partners can be confusing. Add the fact that Web services are 
modular and complex Web services may be composed of multiple Web services, there is a 
need to provide the customer in these transaction with the opportunity to become involved in 
the setup of a transaction. The customer needs to be aware of all the risks facing himlher and 
should be able to choose the transactions involved in the transaction if two services can offer the 
same service in the overall transaction. The trust assurance protocol can complement business 
protocols by first evaluating the entire transaction in terms of the safety issues involved from the 
end customer's perspective, and then proceed onto the actual business protocol or transaction. 
Furthermore, the vocabularies, definitions and documents, including the trust model, could be 
used to standardise the messages passed between transactions to minimize the problem of am-
biguity and to provide a standard base for future trust models and protocols from which to start. 
1.6 THESIS OUTLINE 
This dissertation investigates the need for trust assurances and establishes the requirements for 
providing a trust assurance protocol. The Background chapter investigates relevant technologies 
and academic literature concerning trust in an online environment and looks at the legislation 
surrounding electronic transactions. A trust model, a protocol to establish trust assurances and 
a trust measure is developed and presented in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 builds on the trust assurance 
chapter by implementing the protocols and trust model to create a trust assurance protocol. A 
transaction execution framework is also presented to execute the protocol so that the protocol 
may be evaluated. The vocabularies used in this dissertation are also discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter 5 discusses the evaluation of the trust assurance protocol and trust model and presents 
the results of this dissertation. Lastly, the conclusion provides a summary of the work presented 













Web services is an emerging extensible messaging framework in which messages can be sent 
between two network interfaces across any network. In contrast to previous middle-ware mes-
saging systems, Web services provides a light-weight framework that uses well-formed text 
messages to transmit data and instructions across network boundaries and between disparate 
computer systems. Web services is based on existing standards to lower the barriers to adoption 
and increase the rate and ease of adoption. Web services messages are written in SOAP which 
is itself described in the eXtended Markup Language (XML). These and other base standards 
are discussed later in this chapter. In a similar manner, many other standards are based on the 
core Web services standards to provide specific functionality to Web services. This allows func-
tionality to be added to Web services in an evolutionary manner, and allows new interchange 
methods to be developed as they become desirable. 
The ease of using Web services has allowed companies, sole proprietors and even individuals to 
create and publish Web services which can be found and used over the Internet. However, the 
ease of creating a Web service means that unscrupulous individuals can also easily create Web 
services that look no different from any other Web service. Transactions taking place between 
two computer agents now carry real risks for the owners of companies and involve real money 
[4 ]. 
The capabilities created by the flexibility of the Web services technology provide both opportu-
nities and problems. Companies are able to create and publish small autonomous services that 
interact directly with customers and with other Web services. These services could be small and 
modular, allowing customers and other services to make use of the service for a fee or without 
charge. If a charge is levied for the use of a service, the service could in turn use the Web service 
of a merchant bank to process the payment. The modularity of the Web services environment 
allows for exciting new business models, where hundreds of services from different companies 
around the world could offer the same service to a customer anywhere in the world [46]. The 
problems that arise from this scenario is the risk of choosing the right services for the transac-
tion. If there are hundreds of services offering the same service, it is likely that some services 
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Web service and it is difficult or nearly impossible to distinguish a good service from a bad 
one just by appearance as every Web service message will look exactly the same, regardless of 
the integrity of the company or individual providing the service. How can a customer of these 
services be confident that the transaction will proceed as advertised, and that his/her personal 
information will not be misused? 
In studying the problem being addressed in this dissertation, it is clear that there are many dif-
ferent fields of knowledge involved in the problem. Not only are there technical issues involved, 
but sociological and legislative issues are also tightly integrated into the problem. This chapter 
serves as a primer for the work presented in this dissertation, from the foundations of XML to 
trust models and current legislation about electronic transactions. 
2.2 EXTENSIBLE MARKUP LANGUAGE (XML) 
The eXtensible Markup Language (XML) [54] is a text format that uses tags to syntactically 
qualify text in a document. It is derived from the Standard Generalized Markup Language 
(SGML) [25]. XML was submitted to a standards body, the World Wide Web Consortium 
(W3C), in November 1996 at the SGML Conference held in Boston. XML is a language that 
allows any hierarchical structure to be easily stored in a text format that consists of using tags to 
give structure to the text. It is generally human-readable because tags usually have descriptive 
names and the document is stored and transmitted in plain text. XML does not provide a dictio-
nary of set tags that must be used, such as the restrictions of the HyperText Markup Language 
(HTML). Instead, XML allows users to define their own tags, but users are then responsible for 
creating their own applications that are capable of consuming the XML messages. A simple 


















XML is used as a convenient standard to extend and create structured messages and documents. 
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Wide Web [11]. Standards and specifications built upon XML utilize the language's expres-
sive capabilities to easily form new document types that can be created and consumed on any 
computing platform. XML parsers allow for efficient and consistent creation and dissemination 
of XML documents and can be included in other applications, allowing developers to use ex-
isting parsers and libraries to speed up the development and increase the quality of their own 
applications. 
Because XML allows users to create their own tags, ambiguity can creep into XML documents, 
as the meaning of tags is not always clear. As an example, the tag <desktop> could both mean 
a physical top of a desk, or the virtual desktop of a graphical user interface. XML namespaces 
were created to deal with this ambiguity. 
2.2.1 XML namespaces 
XML namespaces is a standard created by the W3C to provide XML with the ability to create 
unique identifiers and to associate tags with these identifiers. If a tag is given a namespace, then 
the tag can be distinguished from other tags with the same name. A namespace is a reference 
to a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI). This URI is usually not read by a parser, it is merely 
used as a string to identify a particular XML element in an XML document. URI's have been 
used due their uniqueness, as opposed to a descriptive name, such as "myOwnNamespace". It 
is common practice to make the namespace URI more useful than just a unique string identifier. 
The URI could point to a DTD or XML Schema which defines the data structure governing the 
use of the XML elements in the specific namespace. 
2.2.2 Document Type Definitions and XML Schema 
A Document Type Definition (DTD) is a file containing rules that define how an XML document 
has to be structured in order to be a valid XML document for that particular DTD. It is defined in 
the HTML 4.01 specification[38]. The following is a very simple example of a DTD document: 
<?xml version="l.O" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!ELEMENT Fruit_Basket (fruit)*> 
<!ELEMENT fruit (name, colour?» 
<!ELEMENT name (#PCDATA) > 
<!ELEMENT colour (#PCDATA) > 
The DTD defines Fruit-Basket as the root element of the DTD. This means that any XML docu-
ment based on the DTD must begin with a Fruit-Basket element. It states that the only element 
a FruiU3asket can contain is fruit element and indicates that any number of fruit elements can 
be contained by the Fruit-Basket element, by virtue of the "*,, operator. The fruit element is 
defined as a element consisting of the name and colour elements. The colour element is op-
tional due to the "?" operator. Both the name element and the colour element is defined to be of 
the type "#PCDATA", which stands for printable character data. This means that the name and 
colour elements contain text and not more elements. 
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DTDs allows users of XML data to ensure that their XML messages are well formed and that 
they will be compatible with applications using the DTD. DTDs, however, have become more or 
less obsolete due to limitations in the description language. DTDs cannot express namespaces, 
and as described above, have become an integral part of the XML language. DTDs have also 
been ecplised by a new definition language, namely XML schema [53]. The definition of XML 
Schemas by the W3C is that XML Schemas " ... express shared vocabularies and allow machines 
to carry out rules made by people. They provide a means for defining the structure, content and 
semantics of XML documents." XML schemas are valid XML documents themselves so that 
they can be parsed by XML parsers without any additional work requiring to be done to specify 
how an XML document has to be formed in order to comply with the schema definition. 









<xs:element name="Fruit" minOccurs="O" maxOccurs="unbounc 
<xs:complexType> 
<xs:sequence> 
<xs:element name="name" type="xs:string"/> 


















This XML file described earlier will also be valid for the schema presented above. 
2.2.3 XML in this dissertation 
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XML is currently the defacto standard of formatting complex information so that it can be trans-
ported between two endpoints over the Internet. In this dissertation, XML will be used to mark 
up all messages passed between two communicating parties. In part, this is a requirement of 
the underlying communication mechanism, SOAP, but it is also a convenient way of displaying 
and storing information. 
2.3 SOAP 
SOAP[ 19] is a lightweight XML specification to specify messages independently of transport 
mechanisms and protocols. SOAP is independent of any programming architecture or platform, 
allowing different platforms the capability to create and consume SOAP messages created in 
disparate environments. 
SOAP, originally an acronym for "Simple Object Access Protocol" was developed by Dave 
Winer, Don Box, Bob Atkinson and Mohsen Al-Ghosein in 1998. The purpose of SOAP was to 
allow access to objects on disparate connected computing platforms. The current version of the 
SOAP protocol, version 1.2, has dropped the meaning of the original acronym due to the belief 
that the acronym is confusing[ 19]. 
The SOAP protocol is a structured message format in which messages can be sent from one 
computing service to another. SOAP provides the mechanisms to format a message and attach 
header information containing information about the message itself. SOAP does not place re-
strictions on the protocols or the message contents that it transports, making it a light-weight, 
highly agile and protocol-neutral messaging system. Messaging paradigms, such as asynchro-
nous one-way messages and synchronous request/response type messaging, can easily be cre-
ated by passing single messages in a predefined way between parties who both know the manner 
in which multiple SOAP messages can create more complex messaging paradigms in order to 
achieve a higher level transport protocol. SOAP itself does not provide different messaging 
mechanisms, but rather only formats an individual message. SOAP is designed to allow other 
protocols or protocol extensions to support different messaging mechanisms. As an illustration, 
consider two popular messaging systems, the send-and-forget mechanism, where a message will 
be sent and the sender will not wait for a response. The synchronous send-and-receive mecha-
nism forces the sender to halt its computations to wait for a return message from the responder. 
The SOAP message in these two instances could be identical. There is nothing inherent in a 
SOAP message to state how a messaging system should work. By avoiding complex details 
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to use, but can be extended to accommodate more complex interactions[19]. 
SOAP Message Security 
The SOAP protocol is independent of any transport mechanism, leaving it up to a transport 
protocol to define the intricacies of transporting SOAP messages. This is why transport level 
security is not necessarily enough to protect SOAP messages. Currently, it is common to trans-
port SOAP messages using the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) over the internet, but 
SOAP can just as easily be sent over the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP). The elegance 
of SOAP is that nothing in the SOAP message has to be changed to be sent over different trans-
port protocols, and can thus switch between different protocols seamlessly, allowing greater 
proliferation of SOAP messages. By using security capabilities of the transport protocol, SOAP 
becomes tied to a particular transport protocol, and has to undergo a message transformation at 
a network boundary in order to be transmitted over a different transport mechanism or protocol. 
This may compromise the secured message or might not even be possible if the network bound-
ary interface does not support message level processing or the encryption techniques required 
to transform the message. 
SOAP Messages 
SOAP messages consists of a SOAP envelope, an optional header and a body. 
SO/\P F"vclopc 
o 
Figure 2.1: A graphical representation of a SOAP message 
<lxml version;;-'l O'?> 





.,.. lerw:Envelope > 
Figure 2.2: A skeleton XML representation of a SOAP message 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 above are both representations of a SOAP message. Figure 2.1 shows 
conceptually how a SOAP message's header and body elements are contained within the SOAP 
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2.4 RELATED WEB SERVICES STANDARDS 
In addition to the fundamental building blocks provided by XML and SOAP, more standards are 
needed to make Web services accessible and discoverable. The Web Services Description Lan-
guage (WSDL) [50] and the Universal Description, Discovery, and Integration (UDDI) standard 
[8]. 
:, ,:1 (iJ( It 
Figure 2.3: The standards forming the basis of Web Services 
In Figure 2.3 the basic stack of standards and protocols is shown. Each level of the stack builds 
onto the level below it to provide additional functionality to that provided in the previous level. 
The transport level consists of the protocol that enables messages to be transported over physical 
network protocols, e.g. HTTP, FTP, SMTP, and any other protocol that allows the transmission 
of text over the communication channel. XML provides the format for all the SOAP messages 
that enable the message to be split into its body information and its headers so that the message 
can be effectively routed and delivered to the correct party. WSDL describes a Web service and 
how to use it. A UDDI registry can then be used to locate the Web service that meets the service 
requirements. WSDL and UDDI are described below. 
2.4.1 WSDL 
The Web Services Description Language (WSDL) is a standard that allows the functional para-
meters of a Web service to be described so that users may know how to invoke the service[13]. 
According to the standard, "WSDL is an XML format for describing network services as a set 
of endpoints operating on messages containing either document-oriented or procedure-oriented 
information." The WSDL document thus lets clients know how they can engage in a Web ser-
vices transaction with a Web service defined in the WSDL document and also which parameters 
the Web service endpoint requires. WSDL is only concerned with providing details about the 
functional requirements of a Web service, and cannot express more complex business policies 
or requirements. WS-PolicyAttachment [23] is a specification that describes how a WS-Policy 
document can be accessed from a WSDL document. 
2.4.2 UDDI 
The Universal Description, Discovery, and Integration (UDDI) standard was created to create 






















Table 2.1: Table of Web Services standards and specifications 
service based on the functionality advertised by a Web Service. The UDDI standard is endorsed 
by the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS). 
UDDI registries can be accessed by SOAP messages to find suitable services to interact with. 
Without a registry where service providers could list their services and what they do, it would 
be practically impossible to locate a previously unknown service. The main function of UDDI 
registries is to provide the location of a service as well the location of a particular service's 
WSDL document to allow SOAP messages to be created to that the user may interact with the 
Web Service. 
2.5 WEB SERVICES STANDARDS 
The extensible nature of the Web Service's architecture has caused an explosion of Web Ser-
vices standards and specifications, as standards bodies and companies attempt to leverage Web 
Services. Specifications are created to allow new functionality for Web Services, and these 
specifications are then submitted to standardization bodies, such as the W3C or OASIS, to be 
standardized. Standardization is necessary so that different implementations of Web services 
engines can engage each other seamlessly and thus fulfil the objective that Web services were 
created to achieve. 
The recent hive of activity has created a mass of standards and specifications in many different 
spheres of Web Services. Whilst there are many standards and even more specifications, only 
some are relevant to this thesis. The main Web services standards and specifications are listed 
below and the most relevant standard are investigated in greater detail. Table 2.1 shows the 
notable and relevant standards and specifications: 
2.5.1 WS-Security 
The WS-Security standard [35], adopted by OASIS and first released as a standard in 2004, rep-
resents a major component for almost any other Web services standard or specification dealing 
with security. Currently at version 1.1 as of February 2006, the specification continues to form 
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propose any security protocols, and does not enforce a particular encryption protocol or sig-
nature hashing algorithm, but rather provides a framework within which messages or parts of 
messages can be secured with any security mechanisms. As such, WS-Security does not pro-
vide a all-encompassing security product, but rather allows other protocols and even application 
logic to allow the creation of more advanced security features. 
The WS-Security standard is itself a collection of standards: 
• WS-Security Core Specification 
• Username Token Profile 
• X.S09 Token Profile 
• SAML Token Profile 
• Kerberos Token Profile 
• Rights Expression Language (REL) Token Profile 
• SOAP with Attachments Profile 
The WS-Security Core Specification is a standard that introduces extensions to SOAP 1, 1.1 
and 1.2 to allow for message content integrity and also provide mechanisms for confidentiality. 
The core standard allows multiple types of token to be attached to a SOAP message, but doesn't 
elaborate on what these tokens are. The profiles that form part of the WS-Security standard 
provide extensions to the core specification and allows the use of X.S09 certificates, a Security 
Assertion Markup Language (SAML) token, Kerberos Tokens and REL tokens to be attached 
to SOAP messages via the WS-Security standard[43]. The aim of the core specification is to 
provide three enhancements to SOAP messages: To provide message integrity mechanisms, 
ensure message confidentiality and the ability to attach security tokens to a message. 
The Username token profile extends the core specification by providing mechanisms to allow 
consumers to authenticate themselves to a Web service producer by a username and a password. 
The X.S09 certificate token profile allows an X.S09 certificate to be added to a Web service 
message so that a Web services producer or consumer can be authenticated. X.S09 certificate 
is explained later in this chapter. Similarly, the other token profiles extends the ability to attach 
the relevant tokens to a SOAP message. The SOAP with Attachments (SWA) profile extends 
goals of the WS-Security Core specification to non-XML data that is sent in a SOAP message 
so that its integrity is maintained and it can be confidentially transmitted between two parties. 
2.S.2 WS-Trust 
WS-Trust is a specification that extends the functionality provided by WS-Security[22]. The 
specification extends the type of security tokens that can be used with SOAP messages secured 
with WS-Security. Additionally, WS-Trust provides a mechanism to exchange security tokens 
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• methods of issuing security tokens 
• methods of security renewing tokens 
• methods of validating security tokens 
• ways to establish trust relationships items methods to assess the presence of trust between 
two parties 
• methods to broker trust relationships. 
According to the specification, "The goal of WS-Trust is to enable applications to construct 
trusted [SOAP] message exchanges." In other words, if a Web service receives a message 
purporting to be from a business partner, how can the two parties authenticate themselves and 
establish a trust relationship? 
As with other building-block specifications, WS-Trust does not provide concrete protocols and 
thus does not restrict Web services to conforming to a particular mechanism. However, all this 
abstraction still leaves the entire transaction landscape without a definite manner in how trust 
relationships should be brokered. WS-Trust explicitly does not provide support for password 
authentication, token revocation, management trust policies and other goals such as key deriva-
tion between the different parties. 
The specification addresses three key issues: 
• requesting and obtaining security tokens 
• managing trusts and establishing trust relationships 
• establishing and assessing trust relationships 
2.5.3 WS-Policy 
According to the WS-Policy specification document, "WS-Policy provides a flexible and ex-
tensible grammar for expressing the capabilities, requirements, and general characteristics of 
entities in an XML Web services-based system. WS-Policy defines a framework and a model 
for the expression of these properties as policies." [44] 
WS-Policy presents a framework in which statements forming a policy can be stated and at-
tached to a SOAP message. Primarily developed to deal with security issues of SOAP messages, 
WS-Policy can be used as a general framework in which to describe the policies of a particular 
Web service or Web services client. 
Similar to the notion of modular and open Web services standards, WS-Policy consists of a 
number of specifications, each adding functionality to the general framework of the policy spec-
ification. 
The WS-Policy framework places a great deal of emphasis on the need for the ability to state the 
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2.5.4 WS-Transaction 
The WS-Transaction specification specifies two coordination mechanisms that extends the ca-
pability of the WS-Coordination specification [24]. The two mechanisms that are defined are 
Atomic Transaction and Business Activity. These coordination schemes allow complex busi-
ness tasks to be conducted in a manner which all parties involved understand how the transaction 
will occur. Atomic transaction represents the entire transaction as an atomic event - either the 
entire transaction succeeds or nothing does. If the last step in a transaction fails, then the entire 
transaction fails and nothing is committed. If the transaction succeeds, then and only then is the 
transaction committed and stored as a successful transaction. 
According to the WS-Transaction specification, "The Business Activity protocols handle long-
lived activities and the desire to apply business logic to handle business exceptions." [24] 
Business Activity represents transactions that need more flexibility and complexity than Atomic 
transactions can represent. Business activity allows business processes to be modelled and 
conveyed to all parties involved in the transaction. Business Activity coordinations can include 
atomic transactions. If a business activity fails, it is important to use business logic to determine 
the failure and to store the transaction for reasons beyond the scope of the individual business 
activity. Financial, regulatory and customer relationship reasons all need to be addressed when 
long-running and resource-intensive business transactions fail. 
2.5.5 WS-CDL 
WS-CDL, also known as the Web Services Choreography Description Language, is a speci-
fication that "describes peer-to-peer collarborations of participants by defining, from a global 
viewpoint, their common and complementary observable behavior; where ordered message ex-
changes result in accomplishing a common business goal." [51] 
WS-CDL is a specification for specifying how different parties interact in a particular transac-
tion, looking at the complete transaction between all the parties from a global viewpoint. The 
WS-CDL specification does not specify how those parties find each other before the choreogra-
phy can be specified. The WS-CDL specification is designed so that there is not a single point 
of control for the transaction. All the services work autonomously from one another and only 
pass messages between each other. WS-CDL is considered with ordering rules for the messages 
thus providing a sequence of messages that have to be passed in order that the WS-CDL is ad-
hered to. WS-CDL is not a executable langue and as such cannot be run to automatically run the 
choreography defined in the document. A choreography is rather a description of the processes 
that have to take place in a particular order so that all the parties involved in the transaction are 
aware of their role in the transaction [51]. 
2.6 TRUST 
Trust plays an important part in almost every activity that people do. They have trust in the 
people they are dealing with, or the object they interact with. At a subconscious level, trust 
fulfils a vital role in society and personal safety. The trust required to use an elevator is real, 
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trust lie in biological and sociological trust and permeates every situation that people encounter. 
We trust the elevator not to plunge down the elevator shaft uncontrollably, we trust that the 
button we push will take us to the desired level in the building and we trust that the door will 
open when the elevator stops. Without implicit trust in the ability and intentions of people 
or objects, society would not function because no-one would put themselves in a vulnerable 
position required to make use of someone else's services[ 17]. 
When a level of abstraction, such as computers, is introduced, the meaning and derivation of 
trust becomes more problematic. This is because there is the trust between two computers or 
computing domains, and the trust between people interacting with each other via the computer 
or a person dealing directly with a computer. It also removes the experience and instincts that 
people have about a situation or a person. In a world where only well-formed text messages are 
sent and received, it becomes very difficult to collect any implicit trust indicators. 
In the physical world, people can intrinsically evaluate a person, situation, or company based on 
previous experiences and instincts that are difficult to enumerate. In a computing world using 
Web services, the messages created and transmitted from a malicious company or person do 
not provide any intrinsic warning signs; it is just transmitted as messages that look exactly like 
any other message. Whilst this is not true for the semantic meaning of the message, it holds for 
the syntactic message format and therefore does not allow computers to consume the data and 
evaluate the trustworthiness of a message. 
Researchers from all different fields of academia have tried to define trust so that the concept of 
trust can be elegantly modelled and included into scenarios. The concept of trust is non-trivial 
because it is not possible to provide one unique definition of trust [33]. The reasons for this 
is that trust is a concept integral to almost every sphere where two or more people interact, or 
where a person interacts with an inanimate object. Trust is so deeply rooted in our sociological 
and biological being that we intrinsically know when to trust or not to trust. With the advent 
of a technology where people can engage in faceless transactions across borders of control, 
it is desirable to develop a well-formed definition of trust and how it can be computed. The 
following section briefly looks at different definitions of trust that have appeared in literature. 
2.6.1 Definition of trust 
In academic literature, especially in computer science, trust has been synonymous with terms 
such as "confidence", "reputation" and "benevolence". Whilst in certain conditions that may 
hold, it is clear that trust is a complex term to grasp. In this dissertation, a definition of trust is 
required which is capable of being measured and calculated for a specific purpose. Although 
any trust definition with these characteristics has to be a simplified, restricted view of trust, a 
computational model must exist so that it can be determined if a transaction should proceed or 
not. 
Diego Gambetta's definition[18] has been used and cited in numerous papers regarding trust, 
and is prudent to examine here. Gambetta's states that, "trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is 
a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent 
or group of agents will perform a particular action, both before he can monitor such action (or 










Chapter 2 - Background - 19 -
his own action." Gambetta asserts that being "trustworthy" implies that the probability that the 
trustee will honour his claims towards us, or in the absence of explicit claims, will act in a 
manner that is not detrimental towards the trustor, so that cooperation between the parties can 
take place. Conversely, being "untrustworthy" refers a low probability of the trustee acting in a 
favourable manner towards the trustor. 
Gambetta defines the measure of trust as a threshold point rather than an absolute measure 
of trust of distrust. In Gambetta's research, a trust level of 0 is considered to to be compete 
distrust, and a value of 1 to be complete trust. Logically it follows that the mid-point, 0.5, refers 
to uncertainty in the scale. Other researchers have developed definitions that contain discrete 
values for different levels of trust and thus do not add the complexity of a continuum to their 
trust models. In [3], Abdul-Rahman and Hailes introduce the notion of trust degrees as opposed 
to a trust continuum. They introduce four distinct degrees of trustworthiness, namely: 
• very trustworthy 
• trustworthy 
• untrustworthy 
• very untrustworthy 
Adbul-Rahman and Hailes use Gambetta's definition of trust but utilize the discrete values for 
trust in order to simplify the determination of trust in their definition. 
Apart from the initial trust determination, previous interaction is vitally important to a trust 
rating. Gambetta calls this a subjective expectation[ 18] that the trustor has about the trustee's 
future behavior based on the transaction that has taken place between the two parties. Historical 
information, personal experience as well as recommendations from other trusted parties or even 
unknown parties affect many different trust schemes. eBay's feedback system ultimately deter-
mines a seller's trustworthiness by showing potential buyers the comments and ratings made by 
other buyers who have dealt with the seller previously. In [5], Bajari and Hortacsu showed how 
a seller's reputation in the online auction site, eBay, influences the price received on a bid item 
quite significantly. A seller perceived to be more trustworthy gets paid a premium for being 
trustworthy. 
Bhattacharya et al [9] states that "Trust is an expectancy of positive (or nonnegative) outcomes 
that one can receive based on the expected action of another party in an interaction character-
ized by uncertainty." Uncertainty refers to the risk inherent in depending on someone else to 
cooperate towards the desired goal without knowing what their motives are or if the other party 
is able to produce the desired result. Risk is inherent in any situation where trust occurs. 
Mayer, Davis and Schoorman [30] define trust as the "willingness of a party to be vulnerable 
to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other party will perform a 
particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that 
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because of the position of vulnerability that the trustor places himself in to allow the trustee to 
perform the desired action. 
2.6.2 Risk 
In [4], 10sang et af state that it is the consumer who is forced to accept the risk in a transaction 
conducted in an online environment, by paying for a product before seeing or testing it. The 
consumer has to rely on the trustworthiness of the service provider and thus there exists a 
significant advantage if a service provider is perceived to be more trustworthy than another 
service provider. 
It is therefore advantageous for both the customer and the (trustworthy) service provider to be 
able to establish some evidence of trustworthiness to facilitate the transaction. 
Mayer et af [30] extends the definition of risk and how it affects trust. They claim that there is 
no risk in trusting a person, but there is risk in engaging in a trusting action with that person. 
The act of trusting a person or situation does not involve assuming risk upon oneself; it is 
when you trust the trusted party to assume a position which may have negative repercussions 
to yourself, that the risk is taken. Trust is a necessary component of being willing to assume 
the risk of relying on another party. In this dissertation, the customer places him/herself in a 
vulnerable position by allowing many service providers to act on his/her behalf to complete a 
transaction. The aim of the dissertation is to minimize the risk of such a transaction by providing 
the customer with sufficient information about the transaction and the services involved in the 
transaction to make an informed choice about the risks that he/she faces in the transaction. 
2.6.3 Trust models 
In the literature surrounding trust, many different types of trust have been mentioned. Each type 
of trust defines trust for a specific context. The list of trust definitions below is not exhaustive, 
but covers the major trust definitions appearing in trust literature, ranging from sociological 
trust to organizational trust to trust between computer systems: 
• reliability trust 
• decision trust 
• direct trust 
• recommender trust 
• weak-form trust 
• semi-strong trust 
• strong trust 
• strategic trust 
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• transitive trust 
• social control trust 
• reciprocity as trust 
• decentralized trust 
• personal trust. 
Reliability trust 
Reliability trust is simply a term used to describe the reliance of one party on another to perform 
an action on his/her behalf. It is a common definition of trust and is defined by Gambetta as the 
"subjective probability" that one party will perform an action on another's behalf. [18] 
Decision trust 
Another common type of trust is called decision trust. Decision trust is defined as the as the 
extent to which a trustor will trust an unspecified trustee because the possible positive outcomes 
outweigh the risks involved in the transaction [18]. Effectively, if the possible benefits or neces-
sity of a transaction outweigh the risks involved in the transaction, then the trustor will initiate 
the transaction with the unknown trustee and will willingly assume the risk. 
Direct trust 
Direct trust refers to trust between two parties where the trustor does not need to rely on any 
external information to calculate the trustworthiness of the trustee. In this case, the trustor 
knows everything necessary about the trustee in order to evaluate his/her suitability for the task 
to be completed. In [3], Abdul-Rahman and Hailes use their discrete values of trust to assign 
levels of direct trust. 
----------------------------+> ~service:J 
Figure 2.4: Direct trust between client and service 
In Figure 2.4, direct trust is shown. In this scenario, the trustor has previous knowledge of 
the trustee and has enough information at his/her disposal to make an informed choice about 
whether or not he can trust the trustee to perform the desired task in a trustworthy manner. 
Recommender trust 
Recommender trust refers to trust between a trustor and trustee where the trustor uses external 
parties to determine whether or not a trustee is trustworthy for a particular transaction. Recom-
mender trust is quite a broad topic, as the external resources can be trusted third parties, such 
as certificate authorities, or can consist of a society of electronic agents that propagate previ-
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determined. Abdul-Rahman and Hailes define recommender trust as trust derived from word-
of-mouth. They also caution that trusted authorities are not good enough by themselves because 




Figure 2.5: Indirect trust between client and service 
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Figure 2.6: Reputation feedback mechanism that reports historical performance of a service 
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show the different recommender trusts that can be utilized to determine the 
trustee's trustworthiness. 
Strategic trust 
In [49], Uslaner defines strategic trust to be a trust that is developed through experience with 
different people engaged in a specific transaction or act. Strategic trust is specifically defined for 
the online environment. U slaner states that strategic trust is the concern about our safety online: 
whether the site is secure, whether our personal information is stored in a correct manner and a 
myriad of other conscious decisions about the current situation against previous experiences of 
online transactions and knowledge about the potential dangers of conducting transactions in an 
online environment. 
Moralistic trust 
In [49], Uslaner defines moralistic trust as trust that is developed individually at an early age 
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generally an optimistic trust that enables people to take the initial risks online in the first place, 
before they develop any strategic trust over time by gaining experience in the online world. 
Although his paper emphasizes the importance of moralistic trust, such a trust cannot be mea-
sured or calculated with respect to individual online business transactions. In the trust model 
elaborated on in this chapter, moralistic trust effectively becomes the parameter propensity to 
trust to indicate its global influence on an individual's ability to trust a Web service or Internet 
company in the absence of previous knowledge or experience. 
Transitive trust 
Transitive trust can be considered a type of recommender trust where the trustor takes the trust 
value that the recommending party has of the trustee as his own[4]. As an illustration, if the 
trustor completely trusts the recommending party, Charlie, and Charlie completely trusts (dis-
trusts) the trustee, then the trustor will completely trust (distrust) the trustee. The transitivity 
of the trust value enables quick calculations of the trust value. In [27], l¢sang disagrees that 
trust can be modelled via transitivity, which led to a more structured view of transitivity in trust, 
namely, conditional transitivity of trust[2]. Conditional transitivity states four conditions for the 
transitivity of trust. The conditions are listed below: 
I. The trustor receives a trust value from a recommender as a recommendation about the 
trustee. 
2. The trustor must trust the recommender to recommend only suitable parties. 
3. The trustor is allowed to make judgements over the quality of the recommendation re-
ceived from the recommender. 
4. Trust is not absolute. The trustor does not have to adopt the level of trust that the recom-
mender has in the trustee. 
So, if a trustor trusts Charlie and Charlie trusts the trustee completely, then the trustor will trust 
the trustee, but not necessarily as much as Charlie does. Once again, the trust level is dependent 
upon the risks involved in the transaction and how much the trustor trusts Charlie to provide an 
accurate recommendation for the context of the transaction. 
Social control trust 
Social control refers to a feedback mechanism that is used to propagate information about a 
transaction to the rest of the potential users of a service in a community [3,45]. It is an essential 
component of the trust mechanism that is shown in Figure 2.6. Social control is known as a 
soft security mechanism, and as such eliminates the requirements for a global authority [39]. 
Social control induces cooperation because any transgression of the part of a service provider 
or trustee will be propagated throughout the entire domain of the social control. Thus, social 
control can be a self-fulfilling prophecy as any behavior that deviates from the norm in the social 
control domain, will be viewed as undermining the social control and will reflect negatively on 
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In [34], Mui and Halberstadt present a reputation model that includes permeating a reputation 
through a community of cooperating agents. Reporting a company's or person's bad reputation 
in a system proves to be pivotal to all the agents in the community wishing to conduct legitimate 
business transactions. [12] 
Reciprocity as trust 
Reciprocity is defined as "a mutual exchange of privileges" in the Mirriam-Webster English dic-
tionary. Reciprocal actions will create a greater sense of trust between two parties. A transgres-
sion or lack of reciprocal action will reduce trust between two parties. This level of trust based 
on reciprocal actions can be propagated through a community using a social control mechanism 
and can be used as a trust rating. Reciprocity has been studied by evolutionary biologists[34], 
and explain reciprocity as a possible explanation for cooperation. 
In [34], Mui et al uses reciprocity to expand on the concept of strategic trust. They use reci-
procity between two parties as a major component in their trust and reputation model. Benev-
olence is a similar concept to reciprocity when used in a trust calculation, as a high reciprocity 
will make it more appealing for a customer to engage in an transaction with a particular com-
pany. The difference between the definition of reciprocity and benevolence is that the factors 
that make up reciprocity are split between the benevolence and integrity factors in the trust 
model used in this dissertation. Whilst a reciprocity value is permeated through the entire sys-
tem and is used to calculate a possible trust or reputation value, benevolence is an individual 
factor that is not distributed throughout the network in which the transaction takes place. If 
a customer is unhappy with a transaction in which it was involved, he/she will reduce his/her 
benevolence rating towards the company in question and will also, if deemed necessary, perme-
ate information about the failed transaction or the company's transgression so that the perpetra-
tor's integrity factor may be reduced. 
This separation from an individual's dislike of a company therefore has less of an impact on 
the company, whilst still reducing the company's total rating for the individual involved in the 
original transaction such that he will not engage in further transactions, or be more cautious in 
doing so. The separation also makes it more unlikely that an unfair attack on a company can 
influence the company's reputation too much. If a company makes an error or a mistake in a 
transaction involving an unforgiving customer, the customer might never use that service again. 
However, the negative rating the customer reports will not influence the overall integrity rating 
greatly and thus will not skew everyone's perception of the company. 
Decentralized trust 
Decentralized trust refers to a trust mechanism where each trustor makes his or her own decisions[2, 
10] independently of any control authority or community. It was introduced to reduce ambiguity 
and complexity of having to propagate a trustor's policies throughout a community. This en-
ables simplicity in the trust model, because it allows the trustor to make use of any information 
he/she can obtain, including ratings provided by trust authorities and community recommenda-
tions, and then formulate its own decision about the trustworthiness of a trustee to suit hislher 
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Weak-form trust 
Barney and Hansen [6] defined weak-form trust as trust that relates "relationships and interac-
tions where the parties involved are not vulnerable to the actions of the other parties, and thus 
no significant precautions are required." 
Weak form trust thus requires less assurances and a smaller level of trust in order for a trustor 
to engage in the relationship with the trustee as there is little risk in the scenario. 
Semi-strong trust 
Barney and Hansen [6] went on to define semi-strong trust as trust where one party or both 
parties are vulnerable to each other's actions. This introduces more risk into a situation and 
therefore requires more trust assurance between the parties. The authors then proceed to state 
that governing mechanisms are needed to facilitate the transaction. 
Strong trust 
Barney and Hansen [6] proceeded to define a third type of trust, namely strong trust. Strong 
trust refers to the trust required in a situation where one party is "significantly" vulnerable to 
the other party, because malicious behavior on the part of the trustee would be advantageous 
to himself, despite the negative repercussions of the trustee's actions. The authors state that 
governing mechanisms and social and economic controls do not influence the trustee because 
the incentive of cheating is greater than cooperating. 
Personal trust 
Williamson [52] defined personal trust as trust that "applies to emotional and personal interac-
tions such as love relationships where mutual performance is not always monitored and where 
failures are forgiven rather than sanctioned." 
Williamson believed that modelling trust was not suitable for economic interaction and that 
more well-defined concepts, such as reliability, utility and risk, can be used instead of trust 
in such interactions [4]. In this dissertation, personal trust in not suitable as a trust model due 
to the nature of the composition of transactions. Multiple service providers can be used for a 
single transaction, where many, if not all, service providers are unknown to the trustor, which 
eliminates the forgiving and loving relationship that defines "personal trust." 
2.6.4 Trust in this dissertation 
In the previous sections, models of trust in academia was discussed to to show the diversity of 
what trust can mean. It is important to note that these trust models aren't necessarily exclusive 
of one another. Many are complementary and can be combined to create new specialized mod-
els. To establish a suitable trust model for use in this dissertation, the authors propose using 
various models and allowing the consumer, or trustor, the freedom to use the model that best 
suits him for a particular scenario. By allowing for a trust suitable to the situation, and allowing 
the trustor to establish the correct type of trust to provide just enough assurance, so as to avoid 
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The higher the trustor's propensity to trust, the higher the trus t for a 
trustee prior to availability of information about the trustee. 
Trust for a trustee will be a function of the trustee's perceived ability, 
benevolence and integrity and of the trustor's propensity to trust. 
The effect of integrity will be most salient early in the relationshi ppnor 
to the development of meaningful benevolence data. 
The effect of perceived benevolence on trust will increase over t Ime as 
the relationship between the parties develops. 
Risk-taking Relationships (RTR) is a function of trust and the per ceived 
risk of the trusting behavior. 
Outcomes of trusting behaviors, e.g. RTR, will lead to updating of prior 
ee. perceptions of the ability, benevolence, and integrity of the trust 
Table 2.2: Six propositions for trust 
world, where it is common to interact with someone completely unknown in a once-off trans-
action, a complete analysis of the trustworthiness of the unknown entity might not be required 
if the transaction is not important or does not expose the trustor to any real risks. However, in 
situations where the trustor is subjected to real risks due to the transaction, being able to estab-
lish whether the services involved are trustworthy or not would be advantageous not just to the 
trustor, but also to the provider of the service. If a service is deemed to be trustworthy, a trustor 
would be more willing to interact with the service and pay a premium for the assurance that the 
service provides. This concept lies at the core of services such as eBay's reputation system[42]. 
In [40], Ratnasingham et al state that a lack of trust between business partners in Internet trans-
actions creates a barrier to the uptake of Internet technologies for business transactions. They 
claim that uncertainties that exist are caused by a lack of awareness on the part of smaller com-
panies primarily about "universally accepted business standards and policies" and thus their 
inability to confidently conduct online transactions. There is thus a need for a trust model that 
is capable of providing the desired assurances to provide the participating parties the safety of 
conducting online transactions, without introducing expensive and time consuming "one size 
fits all" trust models. 
In this paper, the definition of trust is based on the definition by Mayer et al[30]. The definition 
provided is similar to the definition of decision trust described above, but includes the fact that 
the trusted relationship exists in spite of an inability to monitor or control the trustee. The paper 
proposes six propositions that contribute to the measure of trust between two parties - a trustor, 
the party that trusts another party, and a trustee, the party being trusted. The six propositions 
are listed in Table 2.2. 
The parameters mentioned in proposition 2 in table 2.2 are described in the following sections. 
Ability refers to the Web service's expertise in which the service is offered. One is much more 










Chapter 2 - Background - 27 -
company offering the service, as the calculation of the interest rate lies much more in the exper-
tise domain of a bank. Ability alone does not convey trust, for a financial services group that 
has the expertise to calculate the correct interest rate might have no motive to do so, and may 
rather calculate one that provides them with more profit. 
Benevolence refers to the good will of the company towards the trustor. Benevolence is a mea-
sure of the altruistic intents of a Web service in that the service will strive to produce the most 
effective results for the customer, regardless of the negative costs it may incur, such as process-
ing expenses and post-sale customer support. 
Integrity relates to the external perception of a service held by the public in general. Consistency 
in past actions is indicative of integrity. Integrity of a service is also conveyed by correlating 
previous claims and actions of a service, and a strong sense of fairness displayed by the service 
in previous engagements. Unlike benevolence, the Integrity rating applies to the collective view 
that a community has of a service. The integrity rating also extends to the view that authorities 
have of the service, so that potential customers can establish the integrity rating of a service 
provider and then decide whether or not to proceed with a transaction. 
These three values, taken into account with a customer's propensity to trust, can be used to 
determine a level of trust the customer will have towards a Web service and the customer can 
then consider the necessary trust assurances required for a transaction. A customer's propensity 
to trust relates to a trust value that a client will assign to a service that the client knows nothing 
about. A trusting customer will place more trust in an unknown service to do the tasks it says 
it will than an untrusting customer who will need trust assurances before he will engage in 
the same transaction with the same amount of information. Some people are just more willing 
to trust than others, and should influence any trust model so that a level of assurance can be 
calculated that is suitable for the people involved and for the transaction at hand. 
Time also plays a part in the determination of a trust factor. Time is represented by previous 
encounters and the public perception of a service. When a customer knows nothing about a ser-
vice other than its own statements about its functionality, a customer has no way to determine 
a benevolence factor towards that service. Instead, the client will place more importance on the 
other two factors, namely ability and integrity. Over time, however, benevolence will increas-
ingly become more important because it encompasses the previous transactions the customer 
has had with the service and the customer should be able to provide a benevolence factor from 
his previous experiences. The benevolence factor becomes more important as more transactions 
are concluded and eclipses the integrity rating because the integrity rating is a rating provided 
by external parties. An individual who has a good relationship with a service provider will 
stick with the service provider even if other individuals have had a bad experience. This is not 
necessarily true in situations where a service has committed a serious offence which affects its 
integrity rating significantly. This is why integrity and benevolence both playa part in the trust 
determination rather than being phased out over time. 
An simplistic trust calculation formula is given below. 
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where a, band i represent the importance factor of ability (A), benevolence (B) and integrity (I) 
respectively, and where 
a+b+i=l 
PI. represents the customers propensity to trust and affects the entire trust calculation. Pt is a 
multiplier such that 
where x and yare lower and upper limits of the importance factor of a trustor's propensity to 
trust. The propensity to trust multiplies the trust calculation to alter the trust equation to impact 
on the amount of assurance needed to engage in a transaction to reflect the trustor's propensity 
to trust. 
For a successful trust assurance calculation, T should be greater than the perceived risk involved 
in the transaction. As risk is an antecedent to trust, both must be computed in order to be 
compared. The risk of any transaction is both subjective and objective. Transactions involving 
large sums of money might be perceived to contain more risk simply due to the amount of money 
involved, but the risk could also be established by the accuracy of the information required, the 
controls in place to monitor the service and other factors that influence the risks involved in 
. . 
usmg a serVIce. 
The last factor involved in the calculation is the relative weighting of the three parameters, 
namely ability, benevolence and integrity. The weighting of benevolence becomes more impor-
tant over time and its weighting therefore increases and reduces the importance of the integrity 
factor. 
The trust defined here is dyadic, and suits the purpose for trust assurance between a trustor and 
trustee. The trustor could indicate his willingness to trust a third party by using the trustee's 
trust rating of other services, chaining the trust values together between multiple services. This 
introduces trust transitivity into a transaction if it is desired without adding complexity to the 
general trust calculation. The trustor could then easily obtain trust values for an entire transac-
tion chain, and the transaction can then be evaluated based on the weakest link, or the average 
trust rating of the the entire transaction. By utilizing the concept of decentralized trust in the 
trust calculation, a customer has access to different trust models without changing the trust cal-
culation protocol. A customer may choose to accept the rating of a trusted 3rd party or may 
choose to use a social control community to determine the trust rating. A trustor could even 
use both ratings in an attempt to obtain a more accurate rating. The trust model used in this 
dissertation is elaborated on further in Chapter 3. 
2.6.5 Data collection 
Information acquired about a customer in an online transaction may be collected explicitly or 
implicitly. Explicit data is any data supplied directly by a customer to the Web service such 
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customer, but which has not been supplied directly by the customer. Examples of implicit 
data include transaction histories or search queries and can indicate preferences the customer 
may have but has not specified.[14] In a Web services environment, both types of data can be 
collected when the customer interacts with the Web service. All explicit data collection should 
be made clear to the user regarding the collection and use policies of the Web service. Implicit 
data collection may be beneficial to the Web service, and the customer might see the collection 
of such data as an intrusion of his privacy. Thus a customer learning of such practices might 
alter his benevolent perception of a Web service. Implicit data collection can provide a more 
personalized service to customers and can thus help in providing a better environment in which 
a transaction can take place. As long as the customer knows before the transaction whether 
or not his actions will be monitored and collected, his expectations will not change when he 
finds out that the service provider has collected data. Explicit data collection is discussed more 
thoroughly in Section 2.7. 
2.7 LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
In view of the trust and reputation systems that can be applied to online transactions and trust re-
lationships, and the different trust models, there is a need to create a realistic base for trust mod-
els and calculations. Assumptions demanding too much from service providers without offering 
any incentives will not succeed, because the the burden of restricting the service provider's ac-
tions lies with the service providers themselves. There is no incentive for creating a more 
restricted environment in which to operate. In the physical world, people have been using many 
different cues and instincts to determine whether they can trust a stranger or not. In the online 
world, these mechanisms do not exist; a good service will send out the exact same messages 
that a malicious service will. As described earlier, there have been many trust models and com-
putational trust models that use different techniques in order to entrench similar intrinsic trust 
evaluation techniques into computer applications. Whilst these models do provide novel ways 
of determining trust, the trust is still baseless in terms of the repercussions an offending party 
will face if he/she becomes opportunistic to the point where the end user is exploited for profit 
or some other gain, apart from a reduced reputation rating, if his/her transgression is reported. 
With the minimal cost of setting up the malicious service under a different name, if there are 
no "real world" repercussions for transgressions, malicious services will continue to operate if 
their transgressions are profitable. 
It is for this reason that legislation can provide a sound grounding for trust evaluation and trust 
models. By using existing and upcoming laws, the establishment of requirements for a trust 
model becomes easier because parties have to adhere to the laws that apply to them. In the 
physical world, it is common to base rational decisions in part on the law - not explicitly, but 
rather as an implicit consideration that the law enforces cooperation under the penalty of pun-
ishment and compensation to the victim of a transgression. This is true for business sectors such 
as financial services, where there are strict rules regarding business operations that intrinsically 
put customers at ease when dealing with these companies. The value placed in legislation in 
determining trust is only evident in the absence of laws such that a person's confidence in a 
sector or a company is undermined by the lack of control in the sector. 
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nesses have not proven to be suitable for similar transactions and entities in the online envi-
ronment. Legislation confined to a particular country or physical geographical location is no 
longer sufficient to an environment that has no physical space. The issues over control of elec-
tronic transactions, the validity of electronic messages and the authority of resolving conflicts 
that may arise in the online sphere have sparked the need for clearer legislation in the electronic 
transactions sector. 
In [26], Johnson and Post illustrate the deficiencies of traditional laws by means of an example. 
They show how traditional trademark laws are dependent of a country and that different coun-
tries have different trademark laws. When the borders created by physical landmarks and geo-
graphical authority are removed, the issues regarding trademark enforcement become blurred. 
Legislation has to take cognizance of the nature of the Internet, electronic communication and 
electronic transactions. 
Johnson and Post speculate that a local government's control is diminished in electronic trans-
actions because the physical borders no longer contain the transactions and the way in which 
they are conducted. Whilst both countries might have claimed jurisdiction over the transac-
tion or trademark, the courts many not have the personal jurisdiction over the foreign entity to 
order them to appear before the court. An entity can willingly subject itself to the authority 
of a foreign courts in contract law, but a company does not have to submit to a foreign juris-
diction. A recent example of incompatible jurisdiction involved a company based in Illinois 
that sued Spamhaus, a British-based non-profit organization.' The Illinois court claimed juris-
diction over Spamhaus. Full details of the legal battle can be read on the Spamhaus website, 
http://www.spamhaus.org/ 
The closest resemblance electronic transactions have to traditional transactions is that there is a 
offer and the option to accept or reject the offer. The contract entered into between the parties 
involved is still binding, and new legislation has created the foundations in which the contract 
can be proved or disproved. International trade law has created model laws which allows dif-
ferent countries to start from a common understanding of terminology, the requirements for 
data message storage and evidentiary value. The United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) [47] has created model laws regarding electronic commerce, elec-
tronic signatures, legal validity of computer records and the use of electronic communications 
in international contracts2 . 
2.7.1 Data privacy laws 
Data privacy has become a paramount concern in electronic transactions. Studies of websites 
have shown that the number of websites displaying privacy policy information has increased 
from 14% in 1998 to over 88% in 200 [20]. This has mostly been a self-regulatory step as 
commercial websites have addressed the concerns of customers who make use of commercial 
websites. In the United States of America, with the exception of the state of California, there are 
no laws enforcing the use of privacy policies[7]. However, the Federal Trade Commission may 
investigate companies who breach their own privacy policies. In contrast, the European Union 
I Spamhaus Legal Challenge : http://www.spamhaus.org/legallanswer.lasso?ref=3 
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Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications and the Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act of 2002 both require service providers to display privacy policies and conform 
to the data privacy regulations stated in the respective laws. The laws are described in greater 
detail below. 
The need for legal acknowledgement of electronic transactions has spurred a great deal of activ-
ity in legislative sectors to recognize electronic data as legal equivalents of paper-based trans-
actions. The UNCITRAL model law describes which aspects of electronic commerce should 
be enforced by legislative measures [47]. This model law has influenced the creation of leg-
islation in over 25 countries, including the United States of America, England, France, South 
Africa and China. While these laws give credence to the validity of electronic transactions, 
the laws do not necessarily include concepts of a consumer's or client's right to data privacy. 
The problem of ensuring data privacy protection can be achieved in two different ways. Firstly, 
there are legislative measures which enshrine a user's right into law, and secondly, there are 
self-regulatory standards that apply to specific sectors. In particular, America has decided to 
regulate certain sectors in terms of personal privacy protection. The most recognised American 
regulations concerning protection of personally identifiable information collected electronically 
are: 
• The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) 
• The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA) 
• Financial Modernization Act of 1999, also known as the "Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act." 
The laws above all define how companies should treat personal information. These laws have 
caused as much turmoil to the operations of websites as they have provided benefits to con-
sumers. As an example, the number of complaints to hotmail, a web-based email service, 
increased by 1,150% in April and May 2000 after it implemented safeguards listed in COPPA 
[20]. This example shows that legislation cannot provide a panacea for all privacy concerns, and 
in fact, under the COPPA Act, in some cases customers had to reveal more information about 
him/herself to prove his/her age. However, legislation is crucial to the wider adoption of elec-
tronic commerce. Until a customer can be given the guarantees that other forms of commerce 
can, it will never grow into the market it is envisaged to be. A customer must be confident that 
he/she can use hislher country's legal system to resolve disputes. 
The European council and member states recognize this fact and member states are proceed-
ing to roll out legislation derived from the UNCITRAL model law and the European Council's 
directives on Privacy and Electronic Communications [16]. The directive, known as Directive 
2002/581EC of the European Parliament and Council of 12 July 2002, extends the privacy af-
forded to persons and derives its meaning of "personal information" from the European Coun-
cil's directive on the Protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data of 1995, also known as Directive 95/461EC. Directive 
2002/581EC was created for the electronic communications sector and extends the more gen-
eral Directive 95/461EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 [15]. 
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natural person (data subject); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors spe-
cific to his physical, psychological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity ... " Directive 
2002/58IEC also defines who holds the rights to personal information and what rights are given 
to the person who the personal information identifies. 
Legislation, such as South Africa's Electronic Communications and Transaction Act 25 of 2002 
(ECTA) [37] defines several roles that service providers must fulfil, sets out the requirements 
of electronically binding contracts, rules for companies selling goods or providing services 
online and defines what information is considered personally identifiable information (PU) and 
specifies how companies should handle such information. Legislation like the ECTA gives 
consumers more right to contest business transactions and unlawful use of their PlI. The ECT 
act of 2002 is derived from the UNCITRAL Model law for electronic commerce. It therefore 
stands to reason that Web services based in South Africa should be able to negotiate appropriate 
terms under which to exchange personal information with other countries that provide similar 
laws. The ECT act defines personal information as: 
(a) information relating to the race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, national, ethnic 
or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, physical or mental health, well-being, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth of the individual; 
(b) information relating to the education or the medical, criminal or employment history of 
the individual or information relating to financial transactions in which the individual has 
been involved; 
(c) any identifying number, symbol, or other particular assigned to the individual; 
(d) the address, fingerprints or blood type of the individual; 
(e) the personal opinions, views or preferences of the individual, except where they are about 
another individual or about a proposal for a grant, an award or a prize to be made to 
another individual; 
(f) correspondence sent by the individual that is implicitly or explicitly of a private or con-
fidential nature or further correspondence that would reveal the contents of the original 
correspondence; 
(g) the views or opinions of another individual about the individual; 
(h) the views or opinions of another individual about a proposal for a grant, an award or a 
prize to be made to the individual, but excluding the name of the other individual where 
it appears with the views or opinions of the other individual; and 
(i) the name of the individual where it appears with other personal information relating to 
the individual or where the disclosure of the name itself would reveal information about 
the individual, but excludes information about an individual who has been dead for more 
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The description defines restriction for information that is personally identifiable information, 
such as a first name and last name, but also places restrictions on private information, such 
as race and religion. The similarity between the definitions provided in the ECTA and the 
European Council Directive 2002/58IEC allows for a compatible trust assurance protocol. In 
this dissertation, focus is given to the ECTA, but the protocol developed will be compatible 
with the European data privacy laws, and should be compatible on the rest of the electronic 
communication requirements as both are derived from the UNCITRAL model law on electronic 
commerce. 
2.7.2 ECTA 
The aim of ECTA is "to provide for the facilitation and regulation of electronic communications 
and transactions; to provide for the development of a national e-strategy for the Republic; to pro-
mote universal access to electronic communications and transactions and the use of electronic 
transactions by SMMEs; to provide for human resource development in electronic transactions; 
to prevent abuse of information systems; to encourage the use of e-government services; and to 
provide for matters connected therewith." In this research, only the sections of interest in the act 
are used. These sections deal primarily with the requirements for the providers of online ser-
vices, the privacy rights provided for consumers in the online environment, and the legal weight 
of electronic data messages. The ECTA provides numerous requirements that have to be met 
by companies or individuals conducting business transactions in an electronic environment. An 
Example of this includes Chapter VII, dealing with comsumer protection. The chapter is com-
prised of eight sections. Section 42, entitled "Scope of application," states that the chapter of 
consumer protection only concerns electronic transactions. This means that there are legislative 
differences between transactions conducted in offline environments, and transactions conducted 
using electronic messages. 
Section 43 is of great interest and potential application because it stipulates exactly what infor-
mation suppliers must make available to consumers. The section, entitled "Information to be 
provided", lists 18 information categories that a supplier must make available as a provider of 
goods or services in an electronic manner. 
Its full name and legal status 
2 its physical address and telephone number 
3 its website address and e-mail address 
4 membership of any self-regulatory or accreditation bodies to which that supplier belongs 
or subscribes and the contact details of that body 
5 any code of conduct to which that supplier subscribes and how that code of conduct may 
be accessed electronically by the consumer 
6 in the case of a legal person, its registration number, the names of its office bearers and 
its place of registration 
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8 a sufficient description of the main characteristics of the goods or services offered by that 
supplier to enable a consumer to make an informed decision on the proposed electronic 
transaction 
9 the full price of the goods or services, including transport costs, taxes and any other fees 
or costs 
10 the manner of payment 
II any terms of agreement, including guarantees, that will apply to the transaction and how 
those terms may be accessed, stored and reproduced electronically by consumers 
12 the time within which the goods will be dispatched or delivered or within which the 
services will be rendered 
13 the manner and period within which consumers can access and maintain a full record of 
the transaction 
14 the return, exchange and refund policy of that supplier 
15 any alternative dispute resolution code to which that supplier subscribes and how the 
wording of that code may be accessed electronically by the consumer 
16 the security procedures and privacy policy of that supplier in respect of payment, payment 
information and personal information 
17 where appropriate, the minimum duration of the agreement in the case of agreements for 
the supply of products or services to be performed on an ongoing basis or recurrently 
18 the rights of consumers in terms of Section 44, where applicable. 
In addition to the information to be made available, the supplier or service provider must allow 
a consumer to review the entire electronic transaction, correct any mistakes that the consumer 
may have made during the process of procuring the goods or services, and to withdraw from a 
electronic transaction before finally placing the order. Subsection three of Section 43 entitles the 
consumer to cancel the transaction within 14 days of receiving the goods if the supplier failed 
to provide the necessary information or didn't allow the consumer the required mechanisms to 
review the transaction, fix mistakes made or the ability to withdraw from the transaction before 
the order was placed. In addition to these requirements, the supplier is liable for damages suf-
fered by a consumer resulting from inappropriate payment mechanisms being used to facilitate 
the transaction. 
Section 43 of the ECTA provides an idyllic basis for a trust assurance protocol. Every service 
provider that falls under the jurisdiction of South Africa or a country that has implemented 
2002/58IEC has to provide all the information presented to customers. A trust assurance proto-
col based on the information that has to be supplied is applicable to the "real world," because 
the assumption that the service provider has to present all information for the trust assurance 
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Chapter VIII of the ECTA deals with the protection of personal information collected through 
electronic means. In ECTA, the section that stipulates the personal information protection pro-
cedures, Section 51, is voluntary and it is up to the supplier of the electronic service to subscribe 
to the entire section or not at all. If a supplier or service provider subscribes to the principles 
outlined in the section, he must make provision for all the following: 
A data controller must have the express written permission of the data subject for the 
collection, collation, processing or disclosure of any personal information on that data 
subject unless he or she is permitted or required to do so by law. 
2 A data controller may not electronically request, collect, collate, process or store personal 
information on a data subject which is not necessary for the lawful purpose for which the 
personal information is required. 
3 The data controller must disclose in writing to the data subject the specific purpose 
for which any personal information is being requested, collected, collated, processed or 
stored. 
4 The data controller may not use the personal information for any other purpose than the 
disclosed purpose without the express written permission of the data subject, unless he or 
she is permitted or required to do so by law. 
5 The data controller must, for as long as the personal information is used and for a period 
of at least one year thereafter, keep a record of the personal information and the specific 
purpose for which the personal information was collected. 
6 A data controller may not disclose any of the personal information held by it to a third 
party, unless required or permitted by law or specifically authorized to do so in writing by 
the data subject. 
7 The data controller must, for as long as the personal information is used and for a period 
of at least one year thereafter, keep a record of any third party to whom the personal 
information was disclosed and of the date on which and the purpose for which it was 
disclosed. 
8 The data controller must delete or destroy all personal information that has become obso-
lete. 
9 A party controlling personal information may use that personal information to compile 
profiles for statistical purposes and may freely trade with such profiles and statistical data, 
as long as the profiles or statistical data cannot be linked to any specific data subject by a 
third party. 
In ECTA, a data controller is defined as "any person who electronically requests, collects, col-
lates, processes or stores personal information from or in respect of a data subject." 
Web services must work within this legislative environment and provide users with the confi-
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determine who was involved in a business transaction and what role they played in that partic-
ular transaction. The following section introduces the need for a framework in which such an 
auditing trail can be created. 
2.S ONTOLOGIES 
An ontology, in a computer science context, is a markup language designed so that software ap-
plications can process the data included in the ontology, instead of just presenting it to humans. 
Ontologies represent data and the links between data so that a computer can infer and create new 
information from the information represented in the ontology. Ontologies store information in 
different elements, allowing a computer to infer information in which data is stored. 
Ontologies describe information as classes, individuals, attributes and relations. Classes contain 
individuals and other classes and can be seen as collection or a set. Individuals represent the 
basic object that are represented in the ontology. Attributes expand the knowledge represented 
in classes and individuals by elaborating on the properties of the classes or individuals. An 
important aspect of an ontology are the relations between classes so that new classes can be 
inferred from the existing classes according to their rules and properties. 
Ontologies can also describe vocabularies for different domains. Ontologies can act as tax-
onomies that classify different elements into an hierarchial structure. A vocabulary can be 
shared and extended between different parties by defining a vocabulary in such a manner. 
2.S.1 OWL 
According to the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), "The OWL Web Ontology Language 
is a language for defining and instantiating Web ontologies." Ontologies are core to the evolu-
tion of a new Internet. There is a great deal of data on the World Wide Web, and much of it 
is linked so that one can navigate one's way through the mass of information relatively easily 
and smartly. Computers are not capable of distinguishing between different types of data and 
cannot inherently produce useful results to a query. The aim of the semantic web is to tag infor-
mation with structured information that computers can follow and thus produce better results 
themselves. Ontologies create vocabularies that contain relational information between differ-
ent types of information, so that computers can follow the relationships and infer information 
from existing relationships and produce results that are not currently possible with text marked 
up primarily to be display to humans [32]. 
OWL, a vocabulary extension of RDF, the Resource Description Framework[31], is becoming 
known as a building block for the semantic web[31]. Instead of just presenting information 
in a manner that can easily be interpreted by people, OWL's goal is to represent data in a 
manner that is more accessible to computers. The OWL language provides for greater machine 
interpretability of a document and allows a computer to gather or infer information about data 
items contained in an OWL document. OWL supersedes the Resource Description Framework 
(RDF), which was created by the W3C as a formal data model, written in XML, to represent 
and describe online resources such as websites and the content of the web resources. The core 
of the framework revolves around machine readable metadata, enhancing a computer's ability 
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Ontologies also provide the functionality provided by taxonomies, and as such is capable of 
providing vocabularies so that different computer agents are able to operate on the same se-
mantically tagged information in a consistent and reliable manner. Vocabularies of common 
information and their meaning is crucial in the abstract interpretation mechanisms that com-
puter interpretation can provide. 
Ontologies are different from taxonomies, which is just a hierarchial structure. An ontology 
can represent a taxonomy quite easily, and the OWL-Lite sub-language of OWL is designed to 
conform to this need. The advantage of ontologies over taxonomies is that ontologies contain 
properties as well as classes and individuals. Properties allow the designer of the ontology to 
state general facts about a class (and therefore its members) and specific facts about individuals. 
In OWL, great care is taken to ensure the differences between classes and individuals. A class 
consists only of an identifier and the properties regarding that class with respect to other classes. 
Classes represents sets of individuals. Individuals are entities that belong to classes. Classes 
describe individuals, whilst individuals comprise the actual entities in classes. The granularity 
of the design of the ontology regarding the classes and individuals is quite important, as an 
entity could validly be either a class or an individual. The choice made in the design has a large 
effect on the sub-language of OWL that the ontology will fall under. Below is a brief description 
of the three sub-languages of the OWL language. 




OWL-Lite is a subset of OWL-DL which in turn is a subset of OWL-Full. OWL-Lite is suitable 
for classification hierarchies and simple constraints between different classes. It was created 
so that people currently using taxonomies could easily migrate their vocabulary to be OWL 
compliant. OWL-DL is a subset of OWL specifically designed to be as expressive as possible, 
but still retain computational completeness and decidability[31]. This means that any inference 
drawn from the ontology will finish in finite time. OWL-DL has more expressive capabilities 
then OWL-Lite, but forgos some complexity due to the goals for completeness and decidabil-
ity. The DL in OWL-DL stands for Description Logics, which is the logics on which the OWL 
language is based. OWL-Full is the most expressive of the three subsets, but complete com-
putational reasoning is unlikely as there are no guarantees that a computation will complete 
[31] . 
For the semantic web, only OWL-Lite and OWL-DL is suitable as an ontology that cannot be 
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2.9 SUMMARY 
The background chapter provides the base from which a trust assurance protocol can be devel-
oped. By looking at the underlying technologies, trust systems used in literature, and legislation 
concerning electronic transactions, a protocol can be developed that utilizes the best available 
technologies, trust models and conforms to legislation. All the different topics discussed above 
provide a foundation for a protocol and model that spans across different domains to ensure that 
the customer is provided with all the necessary assurances that the technology, legislation and 













Trust is an ambiguous term with different meanings when used in different circumstances. Aca-
demic research in psychology, sociology and computer science has defined trust over and over, 
and its definition has changed in every field. In the background chapter, various definitions of 
trust was described and a model for trust that will be used in this dissertation was introduced. 
While the model is conceptually intuitive and elegant, it is still too ambiguous. There still needs 
to be a common set of parameters so that the trust model can be used without requiring inten-
sive manual labour. The terms ability, integrity and benevolence are intuitive in their meaning 
to humans, but in order to be able to provide a consistent trust evaluation, these terms need to 
be defined with specific parameters, so that they can be evaluated consistently. 
This Chapter first extends the trust model described in Section 2.6.4 and then establishes para-
meters with which to populate the trust model. 
3.2 TRUST MODEL 
In order to use the definition provided by Mayer et al [30] to calculate a trust level, we need to 
establish parameters for each of the three characteristics of the trust relationship, namely ability, 
integrity and benevolence. 
There is a need to add semantic metadata to a company to know how we should evaluate a 
company that we intend to interact with. A trustor should know that a bank operating in South 
Africa should at the very least adhere to the Banks Act, along with the ECTA if the transaction 
is being conducted online. The trustor should also know that the South African Reserve Bank 
is responsible for bank regulation and supervision in South Africa. The Reserve Bank issues 
banking licences to banks and thus acts as an authority and is capable of verifying a service's 
claims about being a bank. Without knowledge of such an authority existing for a particular 
industry, a malicious service provider could conceal this information from the trustor. There is 
therefore a need to be able to stipulate the authorities, and legislation that a particular company 
has to adhere to, without requiring such information from a service itself. 
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erates. Without this information, finding the right accreditation and verification bodies would 
certainly be impossible. The information about the industry sector, combined with the coun-
try in which the company operates, will allow a trustor to find suitable information about the 
authorities in the sector. 
In order to establish the type of company that is being dealt with, we propose using the Interna-
tional Classification Benchmark to categorize companies into different sectors, where industry 
and sectoral legislation, codes of conduct and authorities can easily be determined, without 
blindly accepting the word of the company that is being evaluated. 
In order to facilitate the automatic dissemination of the classification information, the authors 
have created an ontology to classify companies according to their primary function. The ontol-
ogy is based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (lCB) I, developed by the Dow Jones 
Indexes and FTSE in 2004 to classify different types of industries that are represented in stock 
exchange markets worldwide. Whilst this classification designed for the stock markets, the 
sectors and industries cover all the sectors that can be used to describe a company. This classifi-
cation places a company into exactly one category, and can be extended to placing the company 
in different categories for each domain of expertise that the company is involved in. This ontol-
ogy can be combined with information regarding legislation that the company has to adhere to 
and information about self-regulatory bodies, accreditation bodies, and industry associations so 
that a trustor can establish exactly what requirements a service must meet to conform to the re-
quirements set out for it by all the appropriate authorities. Without this information, the trustor 
will have no starting point in determining whether the service is a lawful and verified service or 
a malicious person masquerading as a legitimate company. 
The ontology will be introduced and examined in detail in section 4.4. In Figure 3.1, the on-
tological representation of the ICB is shown to illustrate the granularity of the classification 
benchmark. By associating information about accreditation bodies, codes of conduct, legisla-
tion, and verification bodies for a particular industry sector for a particular country, a trustor 
can easily determine whether a company belongs to all the necessary accreditation bodies for 
its sector. In Figure 3.1, a sample class is shown from the entire ontology. The enlarged class 
shows the TraveLLeisure_SuperSector, and contains the various sub-sectors for airlines, travel 
and tourism, hotels, restaurants and bars, the gambling sector and the recreational service sector. 
The ontology allows information about legislation, accreditation bodies, self-regulatory bodies, 
industry watchdogs and other information to be added to each class of the ontology. Any au-
thority body listed for the TraveLLeisure_SuperSector will also apply to the sub-sectors, so that 
general laws that apply to the entire super sector also apply to the sub-sectors. 
Ability 
To determine the ability of a trustee, the trustor must evaluate the trustee against the particular 
context of the transaction they are entering in to. Ability is domain specific and a trustee must be 
evaluated for each expertise domain that the trustee offers. For example, the perceived ability of 
the South African Weather Service (SAWS) to forecast the weather would lead to a higher trust 
rating of their ability than the trust perceived from them manufacturing equipment un-related 
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Figure 3.1: Graphical representation of the Industry Classification Benchmark ontology 
to weather. Whilst this seems logical to humans, computers can not automatically determine 
that the South African Weather Service should be more capable at predicting the weather than 
producing manufacturing equipment. 
To determine the ability of a company in a particular domain, several parameters can be evalu-
ated to produce a rating of the overall ability of a company: 
• Accreditation bodies 
• self-regulatory bodies 
• public knowledge of company's expertise in domain 
• an ability rating from a trusted third party 
• the company type, according to the international classification benchmark 
• the company's public certificate 
• an evaluation of search engine rating 
• past history of expertise in domain provided by an authority in the sector. 
A trustor's knowledge about relevant accreditation bodies and self-regulatory bodies prevents 
trustees from claiming that they meet all the criteria specified for them when they do not. A 
company can try to fool a trustor by omitting the presence of a verification body in a particular 
sector, but with the information available to the trustor from the ICB ontology, any such mis-
direction will be found out. Without such an information repository, the trustor would have no 
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values for accreditation bodies and self-regulatory bodies come from querying those bodies to 
verify the existence of a company in their records. Public knowledge of a company's expertise 
is another source of information about a company. Here, the value of shares listed in stock 
markets can give an indication about a public company's performance in a given sector. Pri-
vate companies might find it beneficial to advertise their expertise so that public knowledge of 
their expertise increases and combined with previous history, enhance any trust derived in this 
manner. The value generated for the public knowledge of expertise is received by querying a 
community endpoint which contains sufficient information gained from the online community. 
The trustor can also query the community itself, and search public forums for information about 
a particular company. 
Independent trusted third parties also have an effect on the perception of a company's ability. 
In particular, if products or services are endorsed by the South African Bureau of Standards 
(SABS), then that should create a positive effect for a company's products or services. Similarly, 
a company that adheres to the IS09001 quality standard should have that achievement impact 
its perceived ability rating. A third party entity with knowledge of an industry and an incentive 
to produce reliable and accurate information could be used to receive a rating for a company's 
ability rating. 
A company that provides a service outside its primary business market should be treated more 
cautiously than a company entrenched in a particular market. Following an example used 
earlier, a consumer should trust weather information more if it came from the South African 
Weather Service that from a reputable cosmetics company. If a service offered by a company 
exists in the same classification as the company, then a high rating will be recorded for the 
company on this requirement. If the domains differ slightly, then a lower rating will be afforded 
and if the expertise domain of a service is completely different to the expertise domain of the 
company, a low rating will be awarded. A company's public certificate can also serve as a guide 
that the company is legitimate and if the trustor only needs minimal assurance to a company's 
authenticity, then the trustor may decide to only validate a trustee's public certificate to prove 
authentication. A company without a public certificate could indicate that the company is not 
able to deal with secure transactions and will receive a rating of -1. If a company's certificate 
appears on a certificate revocation list, it is up to the trustor to decide whether or not to continue 
with the transaction. 
Search engine results can point to a company's popularity and status in a particular field and 
give the trustor an indication about whether a company is a well-known establishment. Re-
ferring back to the example of the South African Weather Service, a internet search for "South 
African Weather Service" produces 71,500 results, a search for "South African Weather Service 
+forecast" produces 15,700 results and a search for "South African Weather Service +manufac-
turing" produces 604 results. Whilst these results do not prove anything conclusively, they do 
suggest that the public record shows that SAWS is more recognized with forecasting than man-
ufacturing. Previous history of successful transaction and referees can also vouch for the ability 
of a company in a certain field, A third party, community or both can provide a rating for the 
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Integrity 
Integrity consists of the external rating of a trustee by a community for all factors other than 
those that contribute to its ability rating. The integrity of a trustee is a statement about their 
conduct in general, over and above their abilities in the specific context in which the transaction 
is taking place. The following parameters describe the integrity of a service: 
• Third party evaluation 
- public reputation 
- historical legal challenges 
- current legal challenges 
- consistency in actions 
- operational openness 
• Directly observed 
- acceptance of relevant codes of practice 
- adherence to voluntary legislation (such as Section 51 of the ECTA) 
- adherence to mandatory legislation 
- perceived sense of justice 
- observed consistency in actions 
- perceived operational openness 
- the jurisdiction in which the company operates. 
Third parties refer to established companies and entities who solely evaluate and authenticate 
other companies. The need for assurance about the authentication of a website or company on-
line created a new business model and started the boom in the certificate authority market. Third 
party evaluations also refer to a new breed of authorities, such as trust authorities and other au-
thorities that attempt to provide more assurances than basic authentication and communication 
of a company's public key. These third parties provide ratings to consumers about companies so 
that the consumer has some indication about a company before engaging in a transaction with 
the company. An example of a third party would be the recommendations of an industry watch-
dog, which the industry has come to respect and is seen as a fair and unbiased in order to give an 
accurate reflection of the companies in the particular sector. A public reputation is the integrity 
level that a community holds of a company or service. This could be a reputation system, such 
as the reputation system used in EBay[41], or it could be a more general rating built into a social 
community that has dealt with a certain company. Historical legal challenges refer to previous 
lawsuits filed against a company. Of particular interest are lawsuits of negligence and malice 
regarding the services being evaluated. Not all lawsuits directed against a company will affect a 
company or service, but particular lawsuits directed against the company should be noted when 
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will influence its integrity rating and should thus be taken into account. Ratings about the legal 
challenges can sourced from appropriate authorities or from a community. The rating rates the 
company relative to the rest of the sector to determine the weight of the legal issues faced by a 
company. Consistency in actions influences the integrity rating either positively or negatively 
because of the confidence a trustor will have in a trustee if he is deemed consistently good. 
A consistently bad trustee should be avoided if possible and an inconsistent trustee should be 
approached with caution. The consistency of a company can be measured by a community of 
agents, a third party, or even investigating previous financial records to ensure that the company 
is consistent in its business practices. Operational openness refers to the amount of information 
disclosed to a trustor about the transaction and the progress thereof. Openness in the transaction 
instils a greater sense of assurance and therefore open business practices, where a trustor can 
check on the progress of his transaction, will increase his confidence in the transaction and the 
company he is dealing with. The openness rating can be sourced from a community of agents 
and provides a rating relative to the rest of the industry. 
Directly observed ratings about integrity are the ratings about the integrity that a consumer can 
gather about a company without the need for third party assistance. Third parties could also 
provide ratings for the conditions that can be directly observed, and the trustor could prefer to 
delegate the entire integrity check to third parties, either centralized authorities or decentralized 
comm uni ties. 
If a company publicly states that it accepts codes of practice which an industry has set, any 
violation of the codes of practice will leave the company or service liable and affords the trustor 
with the ability to challenge the company in a legal institution for compensation. A company 
who refuses to agree to a code of practice or declines to advertise it should be treated with more 
caution, because any violation of the code of practice does not afford the client the chance to 
seek for recompensation based on those particular grounds. ECTA contains a voluntary section, 
Section 51, which sets out rules regarding the electronic collection of personal information. A 
company that subscribes to a voluntary section of legislation should be deemed to have a strong 
sense of justice, which would influence its integrity. Similarly, a company that adheres to the 
mandatory sections of legislation should be seen to have more integrity than companies who 
have been found contravening the law. A trustor's perception of a trustee's sense of justice 
will provide assurance to the trustor if the trustee is perceived to have a strong sense of justice. 
This means that the trustee will abide by the contract between the two parties and will provide 
assurances to the trustor. Consistency in actions are exactly the same as described previously, 
but takes into account that directly observed behavior has a greater influence than a third party's 
recommendations. Lastly, the jurisdiction in which a company operates is an important factor 
in choosing a trading partner. If there are two services offering the same service, the service 
operating in the same jurisdiction as the trustor will be more appropriate because any dispute 
can be resolved without the need to cross jurisdictions. 
Benevolence 
Benevolence is the most personal criterion used to evaluate a trustee. A service might have a 
good ability and integrity rating according to past history and third party recommendations, but 
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world, once a person has had an experience with a company or service, it becomes a large part 
of his decision to use the service again, despite the fact that the ability and integrity rating of the 
company stays the same. If a person experiences bad service at a restaurant or receives faulty 
goods from a company, he will take that into account before returning to the same restaurant 
or company, despite the external view of both business being good. The following parameters 
describe benevolence: 
• Previous interaction experience 
- normal business operations 
* timely delivery of goods or services 
* full compliance to business contract agreement 
- extraordinary service 
* customer service 
* refunds of exchanges 
• perceived altruism. 
Benevolence relies on direct previous interaction with a company or services. A rating of previ-
ous business experiences with a particular company will influence the overall trust value that a 
trustor holds over a trustee. If a transaction runs smoothly and completes as per the agreement 
of the business contract, then the personal trust rating of the trustor towards the trustee will 
increase. Similarly, if something went wrong in a business transaction, a trustor might decrease 
his trust rating towards a trustee. Extraordinary service, whether it is good customer support 
services or efforts to rectify mistakes made by the trustee, will increase the level of benevolence 
that the trustor holds of the trustee. Refunds and exchanges that occur without hassle will also 
increase a customer's benevolence towards a company and make them more willing to trans-
act with the trustee again. The ratings for the benevolence factors involved are supplied by the 
trustor himself, as he is the only one with information that can populate the benevolence ratings. 
The range of the ratings are -I to I and specify the worst possible rating to the best possible 
rating respectively. 
3.2.1 Parameters for trust calculations 
The parameters of the trust equation listed above provides a trustor to use different trust deriva-
tion techniques and form them into a trust value that suits his needs for a particular transaction. 
The trustor has to look at which parameters are feasible to obtain, the risk involved in the 
transaction, the assurances he would like to have before entering the transaction, which of the 
parameters are the most important and then evaluate the trustee with all the information that the 
trustee possesses. It would make sense that a trustee would ensure that an online car dealership 
has a good reputation, and a good rating from third parties and other previous customers. It 
would however, not be suitable to go through the effort of establishing the same information 
and calculate the trust level the trustor has in a company or service that provides a directory 
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general preferences and be able to rate the previous parameters in a manner that is suitable for 
the transaction at hand and then calculate a trust rating that is relevant to the transaction. 
We propose a subjective rating scale to indicate the relative importance of each of the parameters 
described above: 
I Not applicable 
2 Not important at all (0.25) 
3 Not very important (0.75) 
4 Neutral (l) 
5 Important (1.25) 
6 Very important (1.75) 
7 Deal breaker. 
The numbers shown in the brackets represent the multiplication factor with which the value 
will be multiplied. The last item has no multiplication factor, as any transaction that fails a 
condition labelled as "deal breaker" will cease immediately. Thus if the transaction matches the 
conditions labelled as deal breaker, it is effectively ignored for the rest of the calculation. 
An example of the importance factor ratings is shown in Table 3.1. The importance rating above 
simply describe the multiplication factor with which each rating will be multiplied, except that 
any rating of I, i.e a factor of no importance will be removed from the trust calculation equation. 
A rating of 5 means that the condition must be true or else the transaction will fail. That is the 
reason why there is a threshold column in table 3.1 to describe the minimum rating required 
before the transaction can proceed. It is important to note that some of the values that will be 
obtained from evaluating the parameters will be discrete values, such as "Public Certificate" 
and that other parameters will produce a value within a range. For discrete values, a value 
of -I signifies failure or the parameter test and 1 signifies a pass. The other factors can also 
represent subjective trust ratings, as a parameter of "Jurisdiction" can only be evaluated once a 
list of suitable or unsuitable jurisdictions is created. The trustor can either assign a value to a 
jurisdiction or group jurisdictions into groups so that a jurisdiction can be evaluated against the 
trustor's preferences. 
3.2.2 Trust calculation 
The trust calculation is dependent on several factors. Firstly, any calculation needs to account 
for the relative weights for the three parameters, namely, Ability, Integrity and Benevolence. 
In figure 3.2, the graph for ability is defined by 
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Name Rating Threshold 
I 
Accreditation bodies 4 
I Self-regulatory bodies 4 
Public rating of expertise in domain 5 
Ability 
Third party ability rating 5 
Company type 4 
Public certificate 7 
Search engine company rating 4 
Historical ability in sector 4 
Third party integrity rating 4 
Public reputation 4 
Historical legal challenges 4 
Current legal challenges 4 
Consistency 4 
Operational openness 4 
Integrity Acceptance of codes of practice 4 
Voluntary legislation 4 
Adherence to legislation 4 
Sense of justice 4 
Observed consistency 4 
Perceived operational openness 4 
Jurisdiction 5 
Timely delivery of goods or services 2 
Benevolence 
Adherence to business contract 2 
Customer service 2 
Refunds or exchanges 2 
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This indicates that the relative importance of ability does not change as the number of interac-
tions between two parties increase. 
In Figure 3.2, the graph for Integrity is defined by 
Initially, integrity accounts for much of the decision about whether to use a new and unknown 
service. Because a benevolence rating doesn't exist yet, it is very difficult to know how a 
service will act towards a trustor, and thus the integrity rating becomes a good indicator of the 
level of service to expect. Over time, as more interactions occur between the two parties, the 
integrity rating will become less important because the trustor will have personal knowledge of 
the service which will influence his decision whether or not to use the service again. 
In Figure 3.2, the graph for benevolence is defined by 
where (J" = 2M to shift the curve to the right so that the curve is in the range 0 ::; t ~ 21).. 
Initially, a trustor will have no knowledge of a service and thus will not know personally how 
that service will act towards him. For this reason, the weighting of the benevolence factor 
will not matter because the trustor has no information on which to base hislher decision. As 
more transactions take place between the two parties, the trustor will be able to work out how 
benevolent the trustee is towards him and it will influence hislher decision whether or not to 
use the service more than the integrity rating received from other sources. The integrity rating 
will become less important as personal experience is more important than knowledge about the 
service from other people. 
An example parameter evaluation Table is shown in Table 3.2. 
This example is between a trustor and a trustee where no previous transactions have occurred 
between the two. The trust evaluation rating can then be worked out as: 
(3.1) 
The sum does not include any items without values, or items with a value rating of "Not impor-
tant at all" or "Deal breaker." Each parameter category, namely ability, integrity and benevo-
lence, is summed up individually so that the relative weight factor can be applied. 
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Name Rating Threshold Value 
Accreditation bodies 4 0.75 
Self-regulatory bodies 4 I 
Public rating of expertise in domain 5 
Ability 
Third party ability rating 5 0.5 
Company type 7 I I 
Public certificate 7 I 1 
Search engine company rating 1 0.14 
Historical ability in sector 4 0.4 
Third party integrity rating 4 
Public reputation 4 0.6 
Historical legal challenges 3 -0.2 
Current Legal challenges 3 0 
Consistency 4 0.7 
Operational openness 4 0.4 
Integrity Acceptance of codes of practice 4 I 
Voluntary legislation 4 0 
Adherence to legislation 4 1 
Sense of justice 4 0.34 
Observed consistency 4 0.3 
Perceived operational openness 4 0.24 
Jurisdiction 4 0.5 
Timely delivery of goods or services 1 0 
Benevolence 
Adherence to business contract I 0 
Customer service 1 0 
Refunds or exchanges I 0 
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Integrity has a weighting of 
1 2/ 2 P(:r) = __ e-(O-I') 2<7 = 0.9974 
crV'ii 
which means that I = 0.9974(0.394) = 0.393 
The trust value is calculated by combining ability, which accounts for one third of the value, 
with integrity and benevolence, which accounts for two thirds of the trust value. 
Benevolence is not calculated for this transaction, as it has no applicable values. If the trustor 
interacts with the same trustee that is in this transaction, the integrity weighting would drop, 
the benevolence weighting would rise and the trustor would have values for the benevolence 
factors. 
Therefore, the entire trust calculation deems the trustee to be trustworthy with a rating of 0.206+ 
~0.393 = 0.468 If the customer is happy with a trust evaluation of 46.8%, then the trustor can 
proceed with the transaction. 
3.2.3 Trust assurance protocol 
In order for customers to engage in online transactions, it is necessary to determine the risks in-
volved in the transactions. There are several factors that have to be considered before a customer 
will be able to determine whether or not to initiate the transaction. 
• Importance of the transaction 
- If the customer needs the transaction to progress, and has no other method of achiev-
ing the required result, he might have to initiate the transaction regardless of the risks 
involved. 
• Protection of personal information 
- If the customer is concerned about the potential abuse of his personal information, he 
might delay starting the transaction until he has the necessary information to assure 
himself that his information will not be abused by the service providers involved in 
the transaction. 
• Large risk 
- If the transaction involves a large amount of money or risk, the customer may be un-
willing to initiate the transaction until he has enough confidence that the transaction 
is legal and that the transaction is completed under an acceptable legal jurisdiction 
and there are procedures in place to contest the transaction if the transaction does 
not proceed successfully. 
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- The customer may wish to know exactly who is involved in the transaction to make 
sure that there aren't any unscrupulous companies involved in the transaction. 
The factors mentioned above have to be addressed by an assurance protocol to address cus-
tomers' concerns that assurances be provided that the transaction will not have a negative impact 
on their expectation of the transaction. However, the level of protection sought by a customer 
does not alter the trust assurance protocol, but rather adjusts the requests for information that 
the customer creates. The client is responsible for determining a level of assurance that he feels 
is suitable and can then request the appropriate information from potential service providers, 
and any authorities or communities that can influence his decision. 
3.2.4 Level of assurance 
The level of assurance that the customer would require for a particular transaction is dependent 
on the risk involved in the transaction, the value or worth of the transaction, whether the cus-
tomer trusts the primary service provider and the information the client has to disclose in the 
course of the transaction. In a transaction involving many service providers, third party service 
providers might require personal information about the client that the primary service provider 
does not need. For example, a car hire service might require the unique licence number of a 
customer or his exact age to complete a car insurance quote through a general insurance portal. 
If the primary service provider does not need the information that the customer provides, the 
customer should know who has access to the information and what they intend to do with it. The 
importance of full disclosure of information usage become more evident with the consumption 
of more sensitive data, such as a person's identity number or his credit card details. In a world 
where companies share information between each other to complete a transaction on behalf of a 
customer, the privacy policies of the primary service provider does not necessarily apply to any 
third party. It is up to the customer to investigate the privacy policies of all the services involved 
in the transaction. 
Once the client has determined who is involved in the transaction, the client must be able to 
define a level of assurance at which he wants the transaction to proceed. The level of assur-
ance refers to the assurances the client wants or needs before he will engage in a transaction. 
This level of assurance is subjective to the customer's concern for the privacy of his personal 
information and the risk involved in the transaction. The protocol presented in this dissertation 
allows a customer to receive a list of possible transaction parties, eliminate the services with 
privacy policies orthogonal to his preferences, and then evaluate the remaining companies to 
determine the best possible transaction path for the transaction. For example, a customer based 
in England might prefer to use a merchant bank for payment that is also based in England, 
because the client knows that merchant banks in England have strict rules regarding personal 
information. If the merchant bank does violate these conditions, the customer can use the local 
legal system as the merchant bank falls under the jurisdiction of the local courts. When a choice 
of a Nigerian or UK merchant exists for the customer to choose from, it is desirable to evaluate 
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3.3 TRUST ASSURANCE PROTOCOL 
A trust assurance level can only be determined once sufficient information has been collected 
from various parties about the subject of the evaluation. Information from the subject itself 
along with information that other people have of the subject and personal knowledge about the 
subject is required to properly evaluate the subject. Therefore, information collection is key to 
a protocol regarding the establishment of trust assurances. In a world where the subjects are 
companies offering goods or services for sale, the companies are bound by laws and industrial 
regulations to supply information about themselves and their activities. As seen in Section 2.7, 
ECTA stipulates clearly what information a company or individual providing goods or services 
in an electronic environment must provide. This legislative requirement provides a convenient 
base for the information required by a trust calculation service. In order to facilitate the transfer 
of information between parties, we have created a policy document containing the necessary 
information about a entity offering goods or services online. The next section describes the 
policy document created from the legal obligations that exist in legislature. The next section 
then introduces the protocol that allows a customer to request policies, disseminate them and 
find a suitable transaction path. 
3.3.1 Policy document 
The policy created essentially allows a company to concisely present information regarding its 
operation, and its use of a client's personal information in a standard way, so that the policy 
document can be distributed to other companies and potential customers. Creating a policy, 
rather than just querying a service provider on individual items, allows a client to both get 
all information and also query individual aspects of the company's operation as specified in 
the policy. The policy document also acts as a guard to ensure that a company presents all 
the information that it is legally obligated to provide and thus places no extra burden of the 
company. The policy allows a company to present and provide the information required from it 
in a way that is now globally accessible. 
~ con:ContactDetails + 
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In Figure 3.3, the top-level structures for the policy document is shown. Below is a description 
of all the element presented in this figure. 
Policy 
The eveloping XML tag containing a single policy document. 
EntityName 
A text element representing the entity's name in plain English. 
Legal Status 
A text element describing the legal status of the company or indivdual, described by a vocabu-
lary. The legal status of an entity can be one of the following: 
• Individual 
• Sole proprietor 
• Partnership 
• Close corporation 
• Private limited company 
• Public limited company 
• Guarantee company. 
The list of company types above represent the legal company types that are legally recognized 
(apart from "individual," which signifies no company type), and provides necessary information 
so that a customer can then check the requirements on that type of company to see if it com-
plies with the regulations. The customer can also use this information to validate the company 
by querying various registries to see if the entity really exists as the type of company stated. 
The list of the different company types is fairly straightfoward, and does not require explana-
tion of the different company types, except that a "Guarantee company" is the equivalent to a 
Section 21 company in South Africa. Companies registered under Section 21 are defined as 
"associations not for gain" and are non-profit organisations dealing with "promoting religion, 
arts, science, educaion, charity, recreation, or any other cultural or social activity or commu-
nal group interests." [1] This is the reason why a vocabulary is neccessary so that equivalent 
company structures can be identified. "Guarantee company" is the legal classification in differ-
ent countries around the world and Section 21 company would have little m~aning beyond the 
borders of South Africa. 
Company Type 
CompanyType allows the entity to describe itself in terms of the International Classification 
Benchmark discussed in Section 3. The benchmark, combined with the company type and ju-
risdiction information under which the company operates, allows the customer to establish the 
exact requirements that the company operates under so he/she can then evaluate the company 
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establish what self-regulatory bodies exist for the specific industry and can then evaluate the 
company further by querying the appropriate bodies involved in the specific sector. The ICB 
benchmark was dissussed previously along with the ontology created to represent the bench-
mark. 
RegistrationNumbers 
RegistrationNumbers is a complex XML element allowing a company to state its registration 
numbers, such as its VAT number and numbers assigned to it by other regulatory and authorita-
tive bodies. It is shown in greater detail in Figure 3.4. 
ContactDetails 
ContactDetails is a complex XML element containing other XML elements to describe all the 
contact details for a particular company. Contact details is shown in depth in Figure 3.5 and 
discussed in detail later. 
lurisdictionlnformation 
Jurisdictionlnformation is a complex XML element containing information about the jurisdic-
tions under which a company operates. It is shown in greater detail in Figure 3.6. 
Affiliations 
Affiliations is an optional complex XML element allowing the company to state any affiliations 
that it has with other companies or with accreditation, regulatory or self-regulatory bodies. It is 
shown in greater detail in Figure 3.7. 
Productl nformation 
Productlnformation is a complex XML element for describing the goods or services that the 
company is offering for a particular transaction. The element is shown in greater detail in 
Figure 3.8. 
Conditions 
Lastly, Conditions is a complex element allowing the company or entity to state the conditions 
of using the service, their privacy policy and other information about the condition and terms of 
use. It is shown in greater detail in Figure 3.9. 
By using the legal requirements for the information supplied in the policy, the policy is not 
adding any additional burden on the company involved. Rather, it is just formatting the in-
formation the company has to suppply to conform to legislation in a specific manner. In the 
following sections, the policy is described in greater detail to describe the complete usage of 
the policy document. 
3.3.2 RegistrationNumbers 
The RegistrationNumbers element shown in Figure 3.4 allows a company to list its registration 
numbers. An anbounded number of RegistrationDetails elements can be created so that an 
unlimited number of registration numbers can be listed. A description of a registration number 
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Figure 3.4: The RegistrationNumbers element of a policy 
particular registration number can be listed. 
3.3.3 ContactDetaiis 
Figure 3.5: The ContactDetails element of a policy 
The ContactDetails element of the policy element is a general XML structure developed to 
contain all the information needed to present the contact information of a service. The Contact-
Details element is defined in a separate XML schema document and is included in the policy 
element schema. 
The ContactDetails element contains elements for physical addresses, internet addresses or 
URIs and phone numbers. All the elements are optional because the ContactDetails element 
is reused in other sections of the policy schema definition and in other XML schemas. It is 
thus necessary to generalise the element to allow it to be reused without having to redefine the 
element for every situation. 
The Address element contains two elements, namely physical and legal. The Physical address 
element is unbounded and multiple addresses can be defined. A physical address element con-
tains an optional description of the address and an Address Details Element. Like the Contact-
Details element, the AddressDetails element is also defined in a separate XML schema and is 
included into the policy schema for reuse purposes. The AddressDetails element contains all 
the elements necessary to fully describe a physical mail or PO BOX address. The legal address 
element also contains an AddressDetails element and is no different from the physical address 
element except that the address listed in the Legal element is the legal mailing address for the 
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goods or services in an electronic environment must explicitly state the address where the entity 
can receive legal documents. It is explicitly stated in the policy document. 
The URI element lists the various electronic resources that are made available by the entity pro-
viding the service. The service can optionally list the website URI, a list of Policy endpoints that 
are applicable to the service and the transaction, endpoints to any protocols being used and the 
address for the service itself. Once again, the URI are all optional due to ContactDetails being 
defined externally, but a service must provide the URIs applicable to the service as stipulated in 
Section 43 of the BCTA. 
The PhoneNumbers element allows a company to list several numbers so that the service may 
be contacted. Multiple numberDetails elements can be created in the PhoneNumbers element. 
The NumberDetails element can store numbers of any type, and thus the description field is nec-
essary to notify the consumer what the number is for. The number could be an office telephone 
number, customer support number, fax number, pager number or any other telecommunications 
number. 
3.3.4 JurisdictionInformation 
Jurlsdktionlnformlltlon - - - '===.i!I 
Authontyll/lnle 
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Figure 3.6: The JurisdictionInformation element of a policy 
Jurisdiction information asserts in which jurisdiction the company is resident. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, territorial jurisdiction could prove to be important in the choice of trading partner. If 
two parties reside in the same jurisdiction or in countries or states that have common jurisdiction 
rules, it might prove more convenient to choose such a service over a service where jurisdiction 
is a non-trivial issue, and where the client's jurisdiction has no personal jurisdiction over the 
company or individual to force them to appear before the local court. By choosing a compatible 
and suitable jurisdiction more assurance can be offered by the local governance structure. 
The policy documents therefore expects a company to at least state what territorial jurisdiction 
it resides in, but also allows the entity to stipulate any other jurisdiction information that may 
be appropriate to disclose for the transaction. 
The JurisdictionInformaiton element contains one or more Jurisdictionltem elements. The Ju-
risdictionItem contains three elements, namely JurisdictionDescription, Jurisdiction Value and 
an optional element named AuthorityDetails. JurisdictionDescription is an element whose value 
has to be part of the jurisdiction vocabulary list defined in Chapter 3. This allows a common un-
derstanding of the type of jurisdiction being described. As mentioned before, the entity must at 
least provide one Jurisdiction item and it must contain a JurisdictionDescription for "territorial 
jurisdiction". Territorial description refers to the country under whose authority the company 
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If the company willingly submits to the jurisdiction of an arbitration authority or self-regulatory 
body, details about the authority can be listed. There are two elements in AuthorityDetails, 
namely AuthorityName and ContactDetails. AuthorityName simply lists the name of the au-
thority and ContactDetails contains the necessary contact information of the authority as de-
scribed in Section 3.3.3. 
3.3.5 Affiliations 
Figure 3.7: The Affiliations element of a policy 
Affiliations is an optional element where an entity can list any regulatory bodies or accredita-
tion bodies to which it subscribes. This is a requirement unber ECTA and if the company or 
individual subscribes to any such bodies, they must be listed here. The RegulatoryBodies and 
the AccreditationBodies elements share the same structre. They both contain a Name element, 
a Descritpion element, and a ContactDetails element. The name element simply provides the 
relevant body's name and the description provides a short textual description of the body. The 




Figure 3.8: The ProductInformation element of a policy 
The ProductInformation element contains details regarding the goods on sale or the service 
being offered. There are four elements within the ProductInformation element, namely, Pro-
ductName, ProductDescription, ProductCost, and PaymentOptions. Product name is a simple 
text element containing the name of the product or service. Similary, ProductDescription is a 
text element containing a description of the goods or services. Product cost outlines the prod-
uct's total cost and also breaks the costs down into the applicable taxes, transport costs and any 
other costs as stipulated in ECTA. The TotalCost element simply contains the total cost of the 
goods or service. The Taxes element can be used multiple times to describe different taxes and 
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of the tax. Similary, transport coses can be used multiple times to describe different transport 
costs and contains elements to describe the transport and the cost of the transport. Other costs 
is an element that allows the company or individual to describe any miscellaneous costs, by 
allowing the company to describe the cost and to attach the cost of the extra fee, by using the 
element FeesDescription and FeesCost respectively. The OtherCosts element is optional and 
may be used any number of times. 
3.3.7 Conditions 
Figure 3.9: The Conditions element of a policy 
The Conditions element outlines the service's policies, guarantees, warrantees and many other 
information items. The Conditions element also outlines what a service does with personal 
information that it collects and states it in a clear manner so that the customer in the transaction 
knows what the service claims it will do with his personal information. The Condition contains 
four Elements: TermsofAgreement, PrivacyPolicy, PaymentPolicy and PersonalInformation. 
The TermsOfAgreement element is shown in Figures 3.10 and 3.11. The Privacy Policy and 
PaymentPolicy Elements are shown in Figure 3.12 and lastly, the PersonalInformation element 
is shown in Figures 3.13 and 3.14. 
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Figure 3.10: The top half of the TermsOfAgreement element of the conditions element 
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These include guarantees, warranties, exchange policies, refund policies, the time in which 
the goods will be dispatched after the sale or the commencement date of the services, action the 
customer can take if a dispute arises, the security procedures in place to protect the transaction 
and the parties involved in the transaction. 
The Guarantees element can contain an unlimited number of GauranteeElements which consist 
of the name of the guarantee element, a general description of the guarantee offered, and op-
tionally a ValidUntil element to indicate a time frame in respect of the guarantee element. The 
Warranties element is structured in the same manner as the Guarantees element, and does not 
require additional explanation. 
The ServiceRenderTimeFrame is an optional element describing the time when the goods will 
be dispatched or the services will begin. It provides two optional sub-elements, namely, Com-
mencementDate and ValidUntil. CommenementDate refers to a date when the service will start 
or when the goods will be dispatched. The ValidUntil element is a date element that states when 
a service will terminate. The company can use either or both elements to specify the duration 
of the service or only one to specify when a service will dispatch the goods. 
The UserAccountlnformation element specifies how a customer can access and maintain the 
details of his account details. The Accesslnformation element contains elements that allows 
the entity to describe the access information element, along with the Acceslnformation Value 
element, which contains a URI to the appropriate service endpoint so that the customer may 
access his information. This could be a second Web service, or it could be a website where a 
customer can easily access his user account information. 
Similary, the Maintenancelnformation element describes the manner in which a customer may 
modify his user account details and functions exactly like the Accesslnformation element, ex-
cept that the elements contained in the MaintenanceInformaiton element are called Maintenan-
celnformationDescription and Maintenancelnformation Value. 
The Transaction element specifies how a customer can access and maintain the details of the 
transactions. The Accesslnformation element contains elements that allow the entity to describe 
the access information element, along with the Acceslnformation Value element, which contains 
a URI to the appropriate service endpoint so that the customer may access his information. This 
could either be a Web service, or it could be a website where a customer can easily access the 
transaction information. 
Similary, the Maintenancelnformation element describes the manner in which a customer may 
modify the appropriate transaction details and functions exactly like the Accesslnformation 
element, excepts that the elements contained in the Maintenancelnformaiton element are called 
MaintenanceInformationDescription and MaintenanceINformation Value. 
Access to and modification of information sent in an electronic transaction are required by 
ECTA and thus the service provider must provide the necessary controls for such activities. 
The ExchangePolicy Element allows the company or service provider to list the different poli-
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Figure 3.11: The bottom half of the TermsOfAgreement element of the conditions element 
created to specify the exchange policy. The ExchangePolicyElement element contains the el-
ements for naming the policy, describing the policy and assigning a value to the policy. The 
RefundPolicy element similarly allows the service provider to state the policies regarding re-
funds and is structured in exactly the same manner as the ExchangePolicy element. 
The DisputeResolutionCodes element allows the service provider to stipulate any additional 
dispute resolution codes that are avalable to the consumer if the need arises from the transaction. 
Details of additional resolution codes are provided in a DisputeResolutionDetails element which 
contains elements for the name of the dispute resolution codes, an element describing the details 
of the code, and contact details for the code, as explained in Section 3.3.3. 
Termi.QfAQreement + 
Person/ll!nform8110n 
Figure 3.12: The PrivacyPolicy and the PaymentPolicy elements of the Conditions element 
The PrivacyPolicy element allows a service provider to assert the company's privacy policy. 
Privacy policy conditions are stored in Privacy Policy Items and contain the name of the privacy 
policy item, a description and a value. These are kept in the PolicyItemName, PolicyItemDe-
scription and Policy Item Value respectively. 
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it to specify the policies regarding policies. Like the PrivacyPolicy element, the Paymentlnfor-
mati on item is contained in three elements, namely PaymentInformationName, Paymentlnfor-
mationDescription and PaymentInformation Value. 
~".~1/,,,, 
Figure 3.13: The PersonalInformation element of the conditions element 
The personalInformation element is a crucial part of the policy for the purposes of determining 
whether or not a service is suitable for a customer. This element describes the information 
that the service requires and allows the service provider to state explicitly what the information 
will be used for. This is a requirement of ECTA. The PersonalInformation element contains 
two elements, namely BrokerInformation and EndClientInformation. BrokerInformation is an 
optional element that is used if a service is invoked to perform a service on behalf of a customer 
via another service provider. Thus the information required by the service provider consists of 
the information applicable to the broker service. The service might also need information from 
the end user, such as their credit card details to perform a credit check if it is what a service is 
required to do. 
The BrokerInformation element consists of one or more InformationItem elements. The Infor-
mationltem element contains elements to describe name, type, description and optionally, the 
content of the information item and and usage information. 
The ItemContent element consists of either a value or one or more InformationItem elements. 
Thus complex information items can be built up if necessary. 
The ItemUsageInformation element describes a services intention regarding a particular infor-
mation item. It contains the ItemUsagePolicy element, ItemStoragePolicy element and either a 
choice of explicitly stating that no sharing of the information item will take place or explicitly 
stating the sharing policy. 
The ItemUsagePolicy can contain one or more PolicyItems, which contains three elements, 
namely, PolicyItemName, PolicyItemDescription and PolicyItemValue. The PolicyItem struc-
ture is identical to the Privacy Policy Item structure described above. 
The ItemStoragePolicy element is identical to the ItemUsagePolicy in structure, the only differ-
ence being the element name. 
The mutually exclusive choice of no sharing or the ItemSharingPolicy allows the service provider 
to state his actions. If the N oSharing element is used, then the ItemSharingPolicy cannot be used 










- 62 - Chapter 3 - Trust Assurance 
OtherCompany and PolicyItem. The OtherCompany element describes the entity with whom 
the information will be shared. It contains the CompanyName element for the company's name, 
the CompanyType element to describe the type of the company, the ContactDetails element to 
describe the contact details of the company or entity as described in Section 3.3.3 and the Com-
pany Affiliation element to describe the affiliation or relationship between the service provider 
and the company with whom the information would be shared. 
All the information described in the BrokerInformation element is only information concerning 
a service that invokes a service on behalf of a end user. If the service requires end user informa-
tion, then the EndClientInformation element would have to be populated with the appropriate 
information. 
The EndClientInformation element describes the policies concerning the collection, storage, 
dissemination, and sharing of a end user's personally identifiable information. The element 
contains two children elements, InformationItems and PII. The Informationltems element sim-
ply contains a list of ltemName elements and merely lists the personal information that the 
service provider requires. The values for the ItemName element are contained in a vocabulary 
of personal information so that the names can be standardized and the information items can be 
listed easily. The vocabulary is listed in Section ************. 
Figure 3.14: The top half of EndClientInformation element of the PersonalInformation element 
The second element in EndClientInformation is the personally identifying information or PII 
element. The PII element contains two optional elements, GeneralPolicy and SpecificInforma-
tion. The GeneralPolicy element describes the usage, storage and sharing policy of items not 
specified in the SpecificInformation element. 
The UsagePolicy allows the service provider to list an unbounded number of UsagePolicyItem 
elements to describe various policies regarding the use of personally identifying information. 
The UsagePolicyItem contains three elements, PolicyItemName, PolicyltemDescription and 
PolicyItemValue. These policy elements have been discussed previously. 
The StoragePolicy element contains StoragePolicyltem elements and describes the policies re-
garding storage of personal information. It has the same structure as the UsagePolicyItem 
element, with the addition of two optional elements, Duration and Until. These element are 
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compliance with ECTA's provision for the protection of PII. 
The SharingPolicy outlines the sharing policies of the service provider as it applies to personal 
information collected via electronic means. The element has the same structure as the sharing 
element structure described in the ItemUsageInformation element. 
Figure 3.15: The bottom half of EndClientInformation element of the PersonalInformation ele-
ment 
The SpecificInformation element contains information about individual pieces of PII collected 
that are handled in a different manner to the general policies of PII. If an information item 
is defined in the specific information, the general policies regarding PII are discarded and re-
placed by the information supplied by the PersonalInformationItem element. The structure of 
the PersonalInformationItem element is identical to the structure of the GeneralPolicy element. 
A PersonalInformationItem element can be created for each information item that deviates from 
the general policy for PII. 
3.3.8 PolicyDocument 
In the previous section, we describe the schema for creating a policy. Here is a valid policy 
document based on the schema defined above. 















































</ServiceRestrictions> </Restrictions> </ServicePartners> 
</PartnerRequest> 
3.4 TRUST CALCULATION 
3.4.1 Composite web services transaction chains 
Web services transaction chains are links between different service providers to create an envi-
ronment in which a customer's request to conduct a transaction can be dealt with. The transac-
tion is conducted between the customer and the primary service provider, but also other services 
that participate in the transaction to add value-added services or provide some of the services 
that the primary service provider offers but cannot perform itself. The primary service provider 
is still the primary contact for the customer and responsible for the success of the transaction, 
but if the customer's personal information is passed to the participating service providers, it 
poses a threat to the customer by exposing potentially sensitive information to companies and 
services that the customer may not even be aware of. These third party services do not have to 
comply with the privacy policies that are used by the primary service provider and the customer 
is left vulnerable because he cannot control what happens with his information. 
Value-added services or services that the primary service provider outsources, may require some 
of the customer's personal information in order to conduct the operation. For example, a travel 
agency portal, acting as the primary service, may enlist the use of a car-hire company to pro-
vide a seamless car-hire facility in their portal. The car-hire company may require personal 
information from the customer in order to provide pricing information. The car-hire company 
might have a policy of sharing or selling the information it collects to information harvesters. 
A customer should be able to determine what will happen with his PH before the transaction is 
started or at least know the intentions of all the parties involved. 
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Figure 3.16: Composite Web service chain 
panies that the primary service provider deals with. Both companies provide the same service, 
but service 2 uses service 3 to complete his service offering. The customer should be able to 
decide whether to use service 2 and service 3, or use service 4 to conduct the transaction. The 
customer might be willing to pay a premium to protect his PlI and if service 3 does not have 
an adequate privacy policy, the customer might prefer to use service 4 as opposed to the trans-
action path that includes service 2 and 3, even though service 4 might be more expensive. This 
concept of chaining services together to provide the end user will all the information concerning 
a transaction is the cornerstone of the trust assurance protocol. By allowing the client access 
to the transaction path and to information relating to the services involved in a transaction, the 
client has the ability to become involved in the transaction. Scenarios created in Chapter 5 will 
use this model as a base from which to evaluate whether or not assurances can be presented to 
the client by using the trust assurance protocol. 
The scenario depicted in Figure 3.16 presents a challenging stumbling block to the adoption of 
Web services for transactions that involve any amount of risk. If customers could choose a par-
ticular transaction path over a more risky path, it would reduce the entire risk in the transaction. 
The full disclosure of the services involved in the transaction might provide enough assurances 
to the customer, but in transactions that present a lot of risk to the customer, the customer may 
require greater assurances. A privacy conscious customer may also not engage in a transaction 
until he can be guaranteed what actions will be taken with his PlI. 
Transaction Path Elicitation 
To establish what services or entities could be involved in a transaction, a protocol is needed 
to establish whether or not there is a suitable transaction path, and if there are mUltiple suitable 
paths, to find the best path to suit the customer. 
In the scenario depicted in Figure 3.16, the primary service provider aggregates policy and 
operational information from the participating service providers and sends all the collected in-
formation in one message to the customer. Each service provider is responsible for collecting 
the appropriate information from the services that it directly contacts to complete the transac-
tion. This forms a recursive protocol allowing all the possible transaction paths to be sent to 















Figure 3.17: Tree representation derived from policy collection 
ing other Web services protocols. The trust assurance protocol only operates to find a suitable 
transaction path, and has nothing to do with the actual transaction. 
Apart from offering the customer primitive assurances, such as authentication, the protocol pro-
vides mechanisms in which the customer can state restrictions on what services may and may 
not do with his personal information, and he may also specify restrictions about the services 
themselves, such as jurisdiction information. For example, the customer can choose the most 
suitable transaction path by only choosing transaction paths that involve service providers from 
his country (if possible) or only use services that are certified as ISO 9001 compliant. As an 
illustration, a customer might be willing to pay more for a service that resides in the same legal 
jurisdiction as he/she does than a service offering a similar service that operates in a jurisdiction 
where the customer has no recourse should the transaction fail. In particular, services and cus-
tomers residing in the European Union may not transfer information to services in other coun-
tries where there are not adequate privacy protection laws. This legislative restriction would 
force the customer to only choose services in countries that have adequate privacy protection 
legislation or countries with explicit agreements with the European Union, such as the United 
States, and then only with the companies that comply with the legal amendments in the Safe 
Harbor Act[48]. 
The information that the customer can use on which to base his decision must be contained in the 
policy document of a service provider. This provides a suitable base of mandatory information 
that service providers have to provide to the customer if requested. Whilst this may seem to be 
a significant assumption or requirement for the policy, the information contained in the policy 
is information that is required by South African and comparable electronic commerce laws, 
such as the European council directive 2002/S81EC to all member nations. These laws require 
service providers to make available all the information required to the customer of electronic 
transactions. There should thus be no reason why the service provider wouldn't be willing or 
able to provide the information requested. ECTA clearly stipulates what information a company 
has to provide if the service is conducted electronically. 
In Figure 3.17 a tree diagram of the possible transaction paths is shown from the scenario 
depicted in Figure 3.16. The tree representation is useful as each path to an end-node represents 
a complete transaction chain that will function together to complete the transaction. Thus the 
client has to choose one of the paths in the tree in order to start the transaction. The client 
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Figure 3.18: The PartnerRequest XML element schema decription 




, .. :' R~-q~'~~~:\:~I~:e·: 
,. ~~' S~~:I~~·\;~I~~·: 
Figure 3.19: The Restrictions XML element schema decription 
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transaction path that is most suitable to his requirements. These requirements could the cost, 
privacy, quality of service or transaction jurisdiction. 
Transaction path elicitation protocol 
The root element of the transaction path elicitation protocol is the PartnerRequest element as 
shown in Figure 3.18. The PartnerRequest element can contain one of three XML elements, 
DirectServices, AllServices or ServicePartnersMetadata. DirectServices and AllServices are 
control elements that either request just the services that the service provider is directly in 
contact with or request all posible transaction paths, down to the last end node service. The 
DirectServices element contains a ServicesRequestType element which is a control element to 
instruct the service provider to present the path that best fits the customer's restrictions or to 
send back all valid options for the client to evaluate. 
The Restrictions element allows the customer to specify exactly what he will and will not allow 
to happen to any information that he sends in the transaction. These restrictions will eliminate 
services based on their policies and the primary service provider will send back a list of suitable 
transaction paths. The restrictions element is shown in Figure 3.19. The optional Returnln-
formation element allows the customer to specify what information he would like to receive 
from each service involved in the transaction. The client could request that each service's entire 
policy be sent to him. This is the default action if the client does not specify what information 
he would like. The customer could request that only the services' URLs are returned to him or 
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Figure 3_20: The ExactiyOne XML element schema decription 
The AllServices element has the exact same structure of the DirectServices element and does 
not require extra explanation. The Informationltem element was described in Section 3.3.7 of 
this Chapter. 
The ServicePartnersMetaData element allows the user to request information about the entire 
transaction path. The customer does not have to specify any restrictions or any other informa-
tion, but can do so it he/she wishes to. The return element only lists the available transaction 
paths along with the contact URI of all the services, so that the customer can contact the services 
to inspect their policies if he desires to do so_ 
The Restrictions element shown in Figure 3.19 allows a customer to state the restrictions that 
service providers have to adhere to in order to qualify to the transaction. The Restrictions ele-
ment specifies two different restriction conditions; restrictions that apply to the customers' per-
sonal information and restrictions that apply to the service itself. The Rescritions element uses 
the InformationltemRestrictions and the ServiceRestrcitions elements respectively to specifiy 
the restrictions. The structure of the elements are the same, and so only the InformationItem-
RestrictionsElement will be discussed. 
The InformationltemRestrictions element contains an element to state the specific information 
item element that this restriction appies to. The element's name is InformationltemName. The 
InformationltemRestrictions element then allows a choice of elements, namely ExactlyOne, 
All, Allow AllExcept, Deny AllExcept and Restriction Condition. The details of the ExactlyOne 
element is shown is Figure 3.21. The ExactlyOne element has the exact same structure of the 
elemens All, Allow AllExcept and Deny AllExcept. 
By defining the elements recursively, complex restrictions and equivalence conditions can be 
created from these elements. The recursive nature is akin to the structure of the policy assertion 
mechanism found in WS-Policy [44]. RestrictionConditions can be stated in the restrictions 
conditions to state the customer's preferences_ The element contains the name of the restriction, 
and optionally the information item name, requiredValue of the restriction and a service Value 
element. The serviceValue element is a element that is used to report discrepancies between the 
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An example PartnerRequest element is shown below: 



































The PartnerRequest element shown above states that a service provider has to securely store any 
information items containing FinancialData and that the service may not share any Financial-
Data or the users full name. The customer also places a restriction on the service by stating that 
the service can be in any territorial jurisdiction other than in Nigeria. This simplified condition 
shows the descriptive power of the Restrictions element. 
Transaction path elicitation protocol results 
Once a PartnerRequest element has been sent to a primary service provider, the result needs to 
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Figure 3.22: The ServiceQuery XML element schema decription 
ServiceQueryResponse - ---
Figure 3.23: The ServiceQueryRespone XML element schema decription 
transaction paths. 
To issue a request to an authority of community end point, a ServiceQuery element is used. The 
ServiceQuery element is shown is Figure 3.22. 
The ServiceQuery element allows the customer to make a boundless number of VerificationRe-
quest and RatingRequest elements. The VerificationRequest element contains a ServiceName 
element to describe the service in question, a ContactDetails element to specify the ContactDe-
tails information of the service in question and an optional VerificationElement which allows 
the customer to specify specific verification queries. The RatingRequest element is structured 
in the same manner as the Verification Request element, except that the VerificationElement 
element is replaced by the RatingElement element. 
The figure shown in Figure 3.23 is the schema definition of the response to a ServiceQuery 
element. The ServiceQueryResponse element allows an authority or a community endpoint to 
assert its verification details or its rating of a service. The element consists of a ServiceName 
element, an optional ContactDetails element and a QueryResponseDetails element. The Ser-
viceName element identifies the service about which the verification or rating is about. It can 
contain an unbounded numer of QueryResponseItem elements so that the authority can make 
assertions about numerous verification or rating queries, or the QueryResponsedatails element 
can contain an FaultMessage element, describing any errors that may have occured in the veri-
fication or rating process. The Faultltem element contains one or more FaultItem elements and 
describes the query name in the QueryItemName element, the details of the fault in the Fault-
Details element, and optionally, the fault value in the FaultValue element as well as an optional 
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Figure 3.24: The PRRLSelection XML element schema decription 
The QueryResonseltem element consists of the QueryItemName element, to name the particular 
query item, a ServiceQueryDetailselement to specify any details about the verification or rating, 
a ServiceQueryValue element to state the result of the verification or the rating value and lastly, 
an optional AuthoritySignature element to sign the value to ensure that the result of the query 
is not tampered with. 
3.5 CONTRACT 
Once the customer has requested the available services using the trust assurance protocol, and 
has calculated the most suitable transaction path for him/her, the client must notify the PSP as to 
which transaction chain the PSP must use in order to process the transaction. This file can then 
be propagated through to the other services involved so that they too can know which services 
they should use to complete their part of the transaction. The schema for the PRRLSelection 
element is shown in Figure 3.24. 
In Figure 3.24, the PRRLSelection element contains the information about the service which 
the client wishes to use. This includes the service's URL and its name. The PRRLSe1ection 
element contains a description element so that a simple textual description of the agreement 
between the client and the services can be stated so that the signed PRRLSelection element 
can be binded to its intented use. The PRRL element also contains an optional XML element 
for the external services the service will use in the transaction. The client received the options 
for each service in the trust assurance protocol's PRRL element. The ExternalServices element 
contains an unbounded number of PRRLSelection elements, allowing client to create a PRRLS-
election element for each service and embed it in another PRRLSelection element so that the 
transaction chain is stored. Additionally, the PRRLSelection element contains the ValidPeriod, 
TransactionInformaton and Signature elements. 
The ValidPeriod contains to date elements allowing the client to specify the time during which 
the PRRLSelection message is valid and the TransactionInformation element allows the client 
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which services to use when they receive a transaction with the particular identification. 
The signature element encapsulates a WS-Security signature hash and uses the WS-Security 
specification to include the signature hash in the PRRLSelection message itself. This forces 
each service to acknowledge the external services involved because they then sign signed PRRLS-
election elements received from the services that they will use in the transaction. When the 
client receives this PRRLSelection element back from the PSP, the transaction path will be 
signed by all parties involved and will provide the client with the assurance that all parties in 
the transaction are in agreement about how the transaction will proceed. The client can verify 
the services by computing a hash of the PRRLSelection element and computing the signature 
using each service's public key. Because the PRRLSelection elements contains the PRRLSe-
lection elements from other services, each service signs his own as well as any services that it 













In this chapter, the following implementation artifacts, developed to provide a transaction as-
surance framework for Web services, are discussed: 
• transaction execution framework 
• implementation of the trust assurance protocol 
• implementation of Web services 
• client prototype 
• legal ontology 









Figure 4.1: Implementation architecture 
Figure 4.1 shows how the components connect to provide an environment in which Web ser-
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prototype consists of a client side implementation of the trust assurance protocol and makes 
use of the ontologies to create standardized policies so that the trust assurance protocol works 
efficiently. The client creates policy documents to state hislher preferences. The client proto-
type then initiates the trust assurance protocol by engaging Web services. The Web service is 
deployed in the transaction execution framework and uses its policy and connected services to 
provide suitable information to the client of the transaction. Each of these items is discussed in 
this chapter. 
The implementation of the artifacts described above serve two purposes. Firstly, evaluating the 
protocol in the context of different scenarios produce results that can be evaluated to determine 
whether the protocol is producing results consistent with expected results. The need to evaluate 
the protocol based on a qualitative scale stems from the fact that the trust assurance protocol is 
elegant in its simplicity. There is no scope for a dead lock further than a service not respond-
ing, whether due to network conditions or malicious activity. The protocol is designed not to 
require complex interaction between the services interacting in the transaction assurance step. 
The protocol however, does produce quite complex results and can be measured in two ways. 
The initial trust assurance protocol step to find suitable transaction paths can be evaluated by 
comparing the restrictions set by the user against the policies that are provided by the services. 
This step can be evaluated objectively because the customer's restrictions and the service's pol-
icy are both based on the same vocabulary, which in turn, is based on applicable legislation. 
The second aspect of evaluation falls on how the customer chooses the most suitable transac-
tion path if there is more than one available option. This step is inherently subjective because 
the decision of choosing an appropriate transaction path from the available suitable transaction 
paths, depends solely on the desires of the client. Most customer's might be perfectly happy 
with using any of the suitable transaction paths, and may use other quality of services factors to 
choose which transaction path to choose. A more discerning customer may choose to determine 
the best transaction path on trust values determined by the customer. The trust evaluation part 
of the protocol, described in the previous chapter, was specifically designed to be flexible, and 
effectively independent of the protocol. Because there is no concise definition of trust, no one 
measure of trust can be considered better than any other. Thus only experience using online 
services and recommendations from others can guide a customer to choose a suitable trust eval-
uation method for himlher. The trust evaluation method described in this dissertation has an 
over-arching architecture that allows the customer to determine a level of trust using any trust 
system. 
The Trust Assurance Protocol described in Chapter 3.3 needs to be implemented to verify that it 
produces results consistent with the requirements it set out to achieve. The artifacts produced for 
this dissertation is also applicable to similar research areas beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
For example, the transaction execution framework and the ontologies presented below can be 
used independently of the trust assurance protocol and are thus artifacts in their own right. All 
the artifacts created for this dissertation are discussed in subsequent Sections of this Chapter. 
4.2 TRANSACTION EXECUTION FRAMEWORK 
For the purposes of this investigation, the transaction execution framework (TEF) was created to 
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and evaluated. TEF allows the user to create and deploy services easily so that the messages 
being passed between all the parties involved in transaction can be monitored. The framework's 
main objectives are to run Web services, monitor those Web services, report on the activities 
and results of the Web services and to provide a visual interface to configure the environment. 
The execution framework is a modular java application that can be used to simulate any Web 
service. By only concerning itself with the messages sent to and received from services, TEF 
treats Web services as black boxes. TEF allows Web services to remain autonomous software 
artifacts that can be implemented in any way. The only requirement that TEF places on Web 
services is a message passing API so that the user of TEF can initialise, start, stop, configure 
and run the Web services. Another design goal of TEF was to allow both actual Web services 
deployed in a Web services container and instances of the business logic classes to be deployed 
in the framework. The reason to local java objects to act like a Web service was to speed up 
the creation of Web services to be used in the framework. By using local java objects, other 
benefits are also provided for the user of TEF. A few examples are that the Web services and 
their interactions can be monitored by a debugger, so that the development of Web services can 
be sped up. Another benefit is that scenarios can be saved and loaded without concern that a 
remote server may be down or not configured to handle the services that the user might want to 
use. The different execution methods that are used in TEF are described below. 
4.2.1 Execution paradigms 
In TEF, multiple execution methods can be used. TEF can monitor axis2 Web services, Web ser-
vices as local objects in either a multi-threaded environment or a single-thread environment. A 
few motivations of why this is desired was highlighted above. The different execution methods 
are discussed here. 
Deployed Web Services 
TEF can monitor and report on deployed Web services deployed in an Web services container 
or server. These are fully deployed Web services that can be contained on any Web server. TEF 
can interact with these services if they extend a simple TEF messaging API, which allows TEF 
to communicate basic administration commands and control commands to the Web service. The 
business logic of the Web service and how it is implemented is left to the Web service itself. 
The Web service does not have to conform to any specific platform, provided the Web service 
implements the TEF messaging API. Currently TEF provides support for interacting with axis2 
Web service containers and axis2 Web services. TEF uses the axis2 SOAP implementation and 
so has no interoperability issues with axis2 Web services, but any Web service can be monitored 
by TEF as long as it implements the TEF API. 
The Web services have to extend messaging interface provided by TEF so that every Web ser-
vice can be configured, initialized, started and stopped by the TEF controller. Currently TEF 
supports axis2 Web services and allows for easy creation of Web services for an axis2 container. 
The TEF messaging API is a list of service endpoints that TEF can connect to to pass informa-
tion, ranging from information requests to control commands to a Web service. These endpoints 
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The endpoints adminJeceiveInformation and admin_sendInformation provide endpoints that 
can be used for communication between the Web service and TEF. The contents of the mes-
sages are dependent on the services themselves. There are no specific messages that have to 
passed, but allows the TEF controller to send information to the Web service so that a spe-
cific scenario can be run without the Web service have to be recompiled and deployed with 
the new information. In the transaction service protocol, all the Web services are based on 
a base Web service type, because they all implement the same protocol endpoints. The ad-
minJeceive endpoint is used to pass Web service specific information to the Web service at 
runtime. The service name, the specific policy that the Web service uses and information about 
other Web services that the Web service connects to is all passed to the Web service using the 
adminJeceiveInformation endpoint. The admin_sendInformation endpoint allows the Web ser-
vice to connect to TEF to send information to TEF. Both these endpoints are available to be used, 
but are not necessarily required by different Web services. Both the admin_sendInformation and 
adminJeceiveInformation endpoints use SOAP body elements to contain the information that 
gets passed between TEF and the Web services. 
The adminjnitialize, admin_startService, admin_stopService endpoints allow the TEF con-
troller to control the Web service. The Web service is responsible for implementing the methods, 
so it is up to the Web service to adhere to the requests received from TEF. SOAP are used to 
convey simple instructions written in XML. 
The admin_getLog endpoint requests an XML log of the messages that has been received and 
sent from the Web service. When using services deployed in remote Web services containers, 
TEF cannot automatically records the message interaction that each Web service engages in 
unless all the Web services interact through the TEF proxy. As an alternative to using a proxy 
service to intercept all messages passed between Web services, the Web service can keep a 
simple log and sends that to TEF before the service shuts down or when TEF requests the log 
of a given Web service. 
TEF provides a Web service interface that java Web services can implement to ensure that the 
Web service contains the necessary endpoints. The Web service is still responsible for ensuring 
that the methods have been implemented. This is because these commands and requests are 
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• Apache Axis2 
• Apache Axiom 
• Tungsten 
• JUnit 
• Java Logging 
• Vector Visuals 
lava 
Java was chosen as the development environment for numerous reasons. Ease of development 
and the variety of tools designed specifically for Web services written in Java provided an ideal 
environment to build TEF. There are numerous open-source Web services containers available 
for Java and thus TEF can use any of them so that lock in does not occur. TEF currently uses 
axis2 as its Web services implementation, although any other (java-based) implementation can 
be added to TEF with relative ease. Non-java implementations can be used with TEF when 
using fully deployed Web services, but TEF cannot execute such web services in its own local 
execution environment. 
The java programming language also provides a suitable logging framework that TEF and the 
Web services use to log and monitor interactions and results during the execution of a transac-
tion. 
Logging occurs at various stages in TEF. There are mainly two different logging purposes in 
TEF. Firstly, TEF produces a log to record its own actions and is useful to record the actions 
of TEF incase an error occurs within TEF. This log file is not normally used by users of TEF, 
but TEF produces the log files so that any abnormal behavior can be spotted. Secondly, and 
more importantly, TEF uses logs to record the actions of the Web services that interact in TEF. 
These logs can be used to replay a transaction, view the transaction at a specific state and 
allows the user to see exactly what happened in the transaction. The Web services maintain a 
log of messages sent and received, and TEF stores these logs, along with logs created by the 
transaction controller to store a complete record of the transaction. 
Apache Axis2 
Apache Axis2 was chosen as the Web services implementation for several reasons. Axis2 is 
an implementation of the SOAP protocol described in Section. Axis2 was chosen because 
of its adherence to mUltiple Web services specifications and standards, and its open architec-
ture. Primarily, TEF uses the SOAP processing engine provided by axis2 as well as the XML 
processing facilities provided by Axiom. Axiom, a name derived from "AXIs Object Model" is 
a XML pull-parser that allows XML structures to be created, read and traversed. XML parsing 
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Tungsten 
Tungsten, mentioned earlier in the Chapter, is a Web services container built around Axis2 and 
other Apache organization tools. Tungsten is designed to be a stand-alone, or embedded, Web 
services container that eases the installation of the tools required to deploy Web services. Tung-
sten is effectively a wrapper around axis2 and other required tools, and provides a simplified 
install and configuration environment so that Web services can be deployed quickly. In tung-
sten, Web services are packaged in the Axis2 Archive format, ".aar" and these services can be 
deployed in any axis2 compliant Web service container. 
JUnit testing 
JUnit is a testing environment which allows for the automatic execution of tests so that specific 
application properties can be tested. Test driven development produces code of greater quality 
and JUnit allows all the different modules of TEF to be tested to ensure that they work together 
and that there are no logical errors in the code that will cause TEF to function improperly. 
Vector Visuals 
Vector Visuals is a java library that simplifies interactions with Java2d images. Vector Visuals 
is used to manage the visual representation of the transactions and the interactions between the 
services. 
4.2.3 TEF modules 
TEF is made up of modules that can be extended to add functionality to TEF. The following list 
shoes the modules that make up TEF. 
• TEF 
• admin module 
• archive module 
• clients module 
• config module 
• GUI module 
• logging module 
• monitor module 
• protocol module 
• services module 
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• transport module 
• utils module 
TEF s the main application and effectively coordinates all other modules. Modules all imple-
ment the TEFModule interface to ensure that all modules have methods required by TEF to load 
and interact with them. 
The admin module provides the controller for the transactions being simulated in TEF. The 
admin module is responsible for deploying Web services, configuring them and using a transport 
module to allow Web services to engage one another. The admin module is responsible for 
loading applicable service types so that instanced of the Web service can be deployed in a 
transaction. The admin module utilizes the Java reflection API to deploy services at runtime, 
and also to configure endpoints described in a services WSDL document. 
The archive module is responsible for dealing with packaged Web services. Currently TEF uses 
the AAR module to process Axis archives. The AAR module is an extension of the Archive 
module that understands the AAR package, and can then use the resources packaged with the 
AAR file, even when the AAR file is not deployed in a Web services Container. 
The clients module is a module that can be used by TEF if there if the client is the focal point of 
the transaction. In the trust assurance protocol, the client is an independent application that uses 
the information received from the protocol execution to determine the most appropriate path. 
TEF provides the client module the freedom to display a graphical user interface to allow inter-
active behaviour if required within the TEF graphical user interface and also allows the client 
module access to TEf's service visualizations and logging services. The Client module has a 
simple interface to allow the client access to the rest of the services deployed within TEF. Sim-
ilar to the TEF message API, the client modules, and any extensions of the client modules, has 
methods for sending and receiving SOAP messages in synchronous and asynchronous methods. 
This allows TEF to be independent of how the client is implemented, whilst allowing the client 
to interact in the service. 
The config module is a module that keeps information about the different modules together so 
that TEF can find the active modules, deploy different modules and maintain modules. The 
config module is also responsible for saving configurations, so that transaction paths,logs and 
monitor results can be saved and loaded. The config module makes use of Java's serialization 
API to store the state of different active modules so that they can be restored. 
The GUI module provides the main application window for TEF. The GUI module contains an 
API that allows other modules to register their GUrs and allows them to be displayed within the 
main window. As an example, the admin module provides a few GUI components to administer 
the available service types and also the deployed services. These GUI components are then 
registered with the GUI module so that the user can use them to administer to services that are 
deployed in TEF. The GUI module allows any module to register a GUI component, allowing 
new modules to be created to provide new functionality. The modular architecture of TEF was 
designed to be extensible, so that modules could be created for specific transactions and that 
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The logging module provides the logging mechanisms for TEF and for the services modelled 
in TEF. THE logging module can be configured to produce log files or to send the logs to the 
console or a remote service. The logging module allows TEF to record logging at different 
levels so that the amount of details being logged can be determined by the logging module. 
The monitoring module is similar to the logging module, except that is designed to deliver 
reports to the user. The monitoring module is designed to be extended for specific protocol 
evaluation so that the user is presented with applicable reports and results. The monitoring 
module has access to the logging modules information, can request information from services 
and can register its OUI component with the OUI module to display its results to the user. 
The protocol module allows the user to describe a protocol and the conditions necessary for 
success. The protocol module can specify the requirements for a protocol to ensure that every-
thing is set up in TEF to facilitate the protocol and can then report on the success of the protocol 
run based on information received from the logging, monitoring and client modules. The pro-
tocol module can be extended for each type of protocol being tested and can provide a OUI 
component so that the user can see when a protocol failed or succeeded. 
The services module is a key module in TEF. The services module provides the necessary com-
ponents to deploy services within TEF. It includes a OUI representation of a service, so that 
it can be displayed in TEF's graphical representations, the necessary configuration information 
for remotely deployed Web services or local objects. The services module is extended to create 
service types. the services module implements the TEF message API so that any service con-
tains the required endpoints. The service module contains the service specific business logic 
and data to process specific requests and protocols. The service module can also be used with 
the AAR module to create Axis2 compliant Web services from the service modules. 
The test module is a module that contains all the JUnit tests for TEF. From this module, all other 
modules can be tested to ensure that they conform to the interaction requirements, so that new 
modules can be tested to see if they will work with TEF and the other modules. Tests can also 
be created to test Web services to ensure that the process messages correctly and that they are 
functioning correctly. 
The transport module provides the functionality of getting messages to the intended services. 
If a Web service is deployed remotely, the transport module will send the message to the Web 
service in the appropriate manner, either asynchronously or synchronously. If the Web service 
is a local java object, the transport module will find the correct object, and then use java's 
reflection API to invoke the correct endpoint with the SOAP message that needs to be sent. 
Thus services all send and receive messages in the same manner and leaves it up to the transport 
module to ensure that all messages are received correctly. The transport module can also be 
extended to simulate flawed transport medium, delays and disruptions. 
The utils module provides small utilities that are available to all the other modules. The utilities 
include creating XML elements from files, parsing XML files, creating certain OUI components 
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TEF u>CS thcs.c modules to crc~(~. configure and nm protocols, savice" diems and all the Olllel 
('omponent, necessary to simulate SCn lees. interaction, between services and the results of (he 
interactions. The modu lar;ty of n+ and 11,. n lensibilily of thl' module, and the ability to crea(~ 
arK! regi,ler new Ilk>dules make'l TEF a vcry flcxibk syMcm in which ,en'i~e" transactions aOO 
protocols can be ewluated. 
4,:;,4 t:scr i"terface 
Tile user inlerfal'e of TEF allows the user 10 configure ~nd deploy Weh ,en'i~e\, to ,jew a vi,ual 
reprc:;enwtion of '1Veh 'en'ices and connections octween Jitkrcm scrvi<'cs, to view execut ion 
of interaction, belween ,crviccs and to display any result, or error, resulling from tho.; !ran,ac-
tion TEl' provides gUt m(xiules for creati~g, deploying ~nd configuring servi c'es, and p[(lVlde, 
moJulcs fur monitCIring tile Transaction al.d the ",ult' 
.~ .- '---------___ 0---
.0 , •••• v ,-,,-- -
• 
• 
" ' • 
• • 
-<= -
FigUl't 4,4: Scrtcnsllot uf tile TEf application interface 
4.3 C I.IF: l\"T PROTOTYPE 
The TIllst iblurancl' Protocol described in Chapter 3,3 allows a customer to detcrminc tile 
p<,,,ihle transaction paTh' that ~re availahle to him/her and to decide Whl~h p~til to cilOose. 
Any complcte pmh represented to thc cU\tom~r rcpresents ~ \uccc\sful transaction chain that 
~onfonIls to toc r~,'trictiuns that the cu,tomer stipulat~d in the < PartnerRe'l~e't> ~kno~nt tllat 
he se nt to The primary s. rvice provider. TI,. client musT c' h(x"e a transaction path so lllClt the 
lran,action c'~n he inil ialed. Any c'om]ltete trans~ction ]lotil avai lable TO tile diem repc"ents 
a transaction patil where a client's restrictions on tile s.crvicc aml usagc of his/Ilcr persunal 
;nf"nnation ha\e been nod by all the participating snvi~e\ in each cOlupkte tran,anion chain, 
A"uming that ~Il Ille 'ervic", imol.-ed in The Ira",~cTion chains 'rec'ifi ed are honest to tlleir 
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any of the compl cte trall"action chain" and have w nl icknec thai he/shc know, \,,;hat will happen 
with hislher pe"onal informalion, 
However, the goal of thc lI'U"1 assurallce protocol I,' 110t just to flnd parmers who claim they 
arc "uit"ble> hut to really dLlcrminc If a scrvice IS honcll in its claims aboul ih opcrmions, 
In the onlinc world, maliciou" selvicc prov ider, can [10l be iuentilied ea,i ly, as they have no 
illitial idenllf",b le warning signs thaL will steer the dicm away. In conlrilSl, nmliciou" sCl'vice,' 
will look and act nactly like honest services anu can be inui,linguishabk from their toonesl 
cOlJ[IICrparls. 
TIle trusl assul';lI1ce pmlocol delivers all the infonnalio" lhat can be readily oblaineu fmm scr-
vices and pre>ents Il10 the client. TI1C information i., I'cadily avai lable becilu>e the in formatioll 
rClUrncd is comi,'lellt wit h the re'l uircmen ts placcu upon the serviec provider by legislation. 
Any sCTl-ICe "1110 docs not comply with the "''1uest for the illformalion LOulu be deemed SUSP'-
ciou" because lhey \";Oldu he in hrcach ofthc laws rc~uiring lhcm 10 provide thc illfonll"tion 
Thc cli cnt pl\lwtype is an ex ten"""1 of ttlC clierll nJO<Juk provided lt1 the TEF. The chem tn(xlul e 
allows the clienl to sendthc ill iti al me,"age to a service that is dep loyed HI 'I'EF, rhe dient is 
"im i lar to services in lhal il creaLes. sends and I'C,C i\T" mes.'agcs as thc only cxtcmal imcl'action 
Wilh scrviccs. It diffcr>, in that LI can ha,e an imeraclive graphical H1lcrfacc so llml the user 
can change the messages bcin~ scm 01' can act on mcssage" coming ill, Thc cliel11 module also 
hns m'ccs" to sy"tcm rcsources, allu can conneLl lo uatahases. load Jiles or makc uSc of any 
other resourCeS to iL IL is up to thc dcvelopc r 10 eithcr make Uk' of" SimpleCl iem module 
whcrc the diellt simply acts on a conligu!Ution sClling and iniliaLes the imeraction Wilh olher 
serviccs. 01' the u"cr can create illl illterilcti\e gui elient based on the Gl:IClient module. This 
m(~jule disp lays a m,er application which can be wntigu,'Cd "nd handlc " II mcssagcs it scnds 
W)(I re.ccivcI. Thc ContCllt, of the CJl:IClient i" up to lhe lIse r e"l irely. aparl from cr~ating a 
vi,ual representation of the scrviccs. and is indcpcndcnt of TEl'. It is displaycd in TFr for 
cotwcnicnce. and allow" the cliellt to make use of TEF'.' olher GUI compo[\C"ls . The only 
methous in the c henl modules arc th c ,'cndMcssagc and rcccivc\1e>'sagc melh<.xl, that allow the 
clicnt to comm Lllli cate with the olher sen'iccs, This allows thc client to do all the pror:csling 
nel'cssary wi thout adding thc complexity to a lrallsanion whiell i" nol concerned wilh ,ueh 
complexity, 
Thcre arc scve ral aspects to the dien l prololype. Thc chent intcracts v.'ith a service and then 
choosc,; a rcsulting trans"ction path bascd on ,evera l fador". The eliem's preferences and re-
II riction., 011 u".,,' of his/her pc", lIlal I nfonnaLion eSlablish cs thc initial l'cs11'ict ions that arc scnt 
to particip"ting ,erviccs anu eliminate, ,e"'iccs if lhey fail to comply Wilh (he rCltrictil'tls of 
the client, Thc I'c>ll' ic(ioll" are colltaineri in a client personal in[OrIllalion prcfcrc[\Ce, (PIP) 
doc um e nl. 
Whcn the clielll receives lhe lisl or poss ihle transadiotl paths. it uscs TEF s sc('v icc visual izatiotl 
GUI componcnts to di'plilY po",ihle palhs and [aiku palh,. From this point. il is up to lhc client 
to choose a transaction path. The cl iellt u".,,' the trust eVil l uat;on prolocol to ITcciw informalion 
[mIll vario u.' ,0UlCCS to infiuctKC hi" dcci" ion about the differellt ,erviee" ill\'ol\'ed. 
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ILS~' a tms! prl'ferl'nce poli~y (TPP) docuillem. The", docullll'nls a, "dl a, PIP docuillems 
are all stored and ,eu,~d (() provid,' the c",toml'r with information for futur~ tral1,acli()jl'. TIle 
TPP document is used in conjuoclion with a dataha~ of known services so that the cli~m can 
determine the benel'o/ena factor for a panicular ,ervice. 
The followi ng section, desc,ihe the [>lp documl'III, the Tpp document. the trust calculation, the 
kno ..... n ~"'ice' databasl' and the graphical US~I' imerface that the cli~nt pmtOlypc ",es, 
..\.3, I I'rtfrrrncc~ and p"lic~' d"cum~n!' 
for the tWIt a"urance prOioco l, the client is quite involvc'd w,th the trallsa~tion and requires 
quite compkx intl'roction. Because the client is actively invo l,ed in thl' tramaction and has to 
Iptcify hi,lh~, preferenc," on pc'f'onal information alld his restrictions. Th i, docum~nt rdat~' 
to the witial stat1lng pe>im of th~ trult assurance protocol The client 1I""t ,tale what mayor 





, '.-." .. -~ ..... ,' 
b'igure 4.5: Sch~ma of the Cl i ~llI p,ddl'IICe X"IL documen t 
In figure 4,5, the "heilla fe>r the client preferellce document i, ,howl1, Effcc1i;-cly, the schl'ma 
allows dient, to create XML docmTll'nt' that stores Lnformation about their restrictions ha,>~d on 
, en 'ice, al1d transactions rhe ClienIP,ef~rel1cl'l'olicy "krnent contaim the Po1i~yName. Pol-
i~yIdenlityNumocl'. Poli~J-Dl'sniption. Appli~ationOjPolicy and Polic}Value, ekml'nts The 
PolicyNaml'. PolicyldentityNumocr and thl' PolicyDcscriptil>!l elemems are text el em~nt, al-
lo ..... ing the di~nt to ,tate th" name, i<kntil)' nlLmocr and dl',niption of the preferen~e policy 
,e'>!"'ctiveiy. The Applicat ionOl1"~icy dem~nd allows th~ client to captme the conditions un-
der which the preferellce document i, valid . The c li ent can ,!",cif)' that the document i, ,'alid 
for certai n or all i Ildustries above or below a certai n value and level of risk, requi r~d accurac)' 
, 'alue and whl'tocr it app lies to known b"siness partIICrs or 1101. The cl ient call also lrecif} for 
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The PolicyValu~s elemenl conlams information aboul how lhe ch~nl weighls lh~ uifkrenl pa-
ranwtefl frM' The trUlt caleul alioll_ The cl iem can Slale I-.ow il wallts 10 ",eighl allY of Ihe ahi lily. 
][Ilegril} mid henevoknce valu~s thaI wcw def.Cfib~d in Tahk ],1, Th~ cli~nl can alw 'lxocify a 
k,-e l of his/her propell,i I y lo lmsl for lfle tru,l calcu latIOn for which lh~ policy i, applicahle. 
The sec'~lc! pref~renc~ policy UOCUlllCnt lhe dient n~~ds rdal~S to th~ acfllal tru,t ewlualion 
\Cl:tioll_ The cliell!' o\'er lime, h"ilus up polici~, c<Mlceming his wei ~hlin~ of the abililY, in-
legril}' and henevolcnce factors for industry Iype';. lransaclion va lue or risk, monetal), \'al"e or 
r~<juired accuracy. These policy documenls c~n lh; conlbinoo to create a policy document for 
each ,erv ice involved in lh~ lransaLliorl anuls [hen uscd wh~nlh<; aulhorily ServICeS ar~ uSLd (0 
ockrminL lhe mist rat ing of each service po%ibly ill\'()I..-ec! in Ihe trall,action_ 
..\,3,2 Trust nallll.liu" prut"e,,[ 
OrlC~ a client has slarl~d Ih~ trust aSluranc" protocol, I,,-';she wi ll recei\'e a Parmers Reql>,;"t Re-
s!"""eljsl (PRRL), As memiollCu bdor~, any path with all kaf n(x\c, passing the reslriction:; 
leSllS eligible 10 lh; use d as spec ified by lh~ eliem, parlnersRe<jlJesl X:>.lL elemenl reslriclions 
on lhe service and his/her personal mformal ion. 
In order 10 sourc~ lh" best l>o ~siblc path out oft!", a\'a ilab le patbs, The cl ient needs to e\'a luaTe 
Ilk services involwd in lh~ palh u.sing the lrUl l evalumion prolocol. Th~ lrU,1 eval Ual ion occurs 
H1dep.;nd"llt of the trU,T as",ranee pn>!",,,,!. which m"Uns Ihe cuslomer can decide how much 
caIL"lalion he needs 10 do fO,-lhe lmnsaction to procc"d, lf tllC transaction is not ((lO risky for a 
trusting cl iem, he m ighl ch,~"e lhe !irsl availahle path wilho\Jl doing any ex pensive caiLulalioll' 
However, ,houlu a clielll wish to ver ify any octails ahOUT Tbe services ill\T, lwd.I",/she hUI th" 
ability to do so_ The tfllsl evalualion prolocol us~s Inc clienl prderence policy documenl lO 
nalual~ tllC s~rvic~s alld checks to ,ee it hel'he ha, h:Jd ~ny previous C(X,lact with Ihe se r\'ic,,_ 
A tmsl value i, e,wbli:;hed for cach service and if all '~rvic~ 1 pa,1 the cliem', tbre~hold, then 
lhe palh can he chosell to proceed This procLss can oc illleraClivc or aulomawd depclxling on 
the di~n( s d~sire_ 
433 Cser interface 
The elienl prO/ol ype user interface COIl, istl of differellt ,~clioll' tfle prOTolype inci "des a graph-
ical repre",nlalion of th~ ParllwrRL'l".,;,tRe,ponscList (PRRL) X.\1L ~krne nl lhat is Ihe n"ult 
of the trust assurallce prow(:o l' s ParlnerRe<j""'1 XML demenl, Th~ cli~nl can interacl wilh Ihi s 
graphical elcmelll to s~~ Informati 011 about lerv ices, includi ng Ihei r po I id es and Olher illf,.'ma-
Ii on Tlk mer, nlerf ace al so includes crealing,loading ancl diling of PIP uocun)(;nis >0 lhat the 
cl iem can 'pecify hi0her re,lric li on, On ,crvicLs and the USc of Im/her personal informali'~l so 
lhal lhe cl i",u can start a nUSl a"" ranee rrOl,,,,ol Tn., illierface also inelm]." the facili l y lo cre-
alL, 1000 and ~C!il TPP docurnenis, M' that th" cli ent call ,lale his prd'erences f<.M'lh" M' ightillgs 
of trust rating S(,MJrces_ 
Once lhe client has eval ual"d the service, and compared them to the dalaha", of known dienls, 
IhL graphical u.ser mterfac~ will indicate the r"lings for lhe ditferel1l serv ices ~"d transaction 
P"ti"_ Th~ cli~1lI can liren sdecllhe transacti(~l path tbat has the higllCst nUlt rating and create 
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Figure ..\ .6: Cli~nt Prototype ,howl og Ilnw tlk: u'~r "n:me, requests 1m th~ tru<t i, ,,ur~llcc 
I'!\"',,,~,I, 







Fi:;"l fC 4.7, ClIenl prolOlyi"" t11,pl.l~ ill); "s" al ""'ptr'ICnlallon "f 3 Im.,1 3."ura"tt pmul(:ul re· 
'Pl'llSC 
Figures 4,6 arid 4.7 ,how Il~ client prOlO\)'pe creatmg ~ re<llL~' t ~nd <Ii,playlng Ill e r~' I'(lfl'e of 
lh~ n:' llL~' 1 rtspcc li"dy. The cl ient 1'''*1-1>'[1<: int~gralcs with TEF to pro<hLce a .'~~m lc.,s u>ef 
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,ervic~s 'md their conlledions, 
,,\.4 ONTOLOGIES 
n..: ontologies cr~~l~d for this di"ertalion was creatcd so lhallhcr~ i, a COmmOIl vocabulary 
for client ,1l1d serv ic~ prov i d~rs_ A comrnon vO("lhul 'H-y i s nec~s,ary w hell de"ri hing a business 
emity hcC'lU'C compulers Can only matcil id~lllicalname, whcn:as husi[\Csse, Can t,., dcscrit,.,d 
innume rous ways in eve ryd"y l,ll1gua~e, Thi, 'lmbiguity complicate'" protocol where difkr-
elll aclions arc l~kcll for Jifkrcm induslry types and company siLes, A common vocahulary 
elimill"tes ,llnbiguity 'mJ allows for e,,,i~r int~gralion t,.,tw~en di,,~rent 'y'tem_,_ Th~ ontojo-
gies abo scrve as a guidebook 1'01' cliems to know what to expect from comp<lnies 1n difrcrent 
mdustnes, A eli,'"t ha, 10 lmow whetocr locrc is an onicial indu,lI-y r~gi.'try of cOlllpalli~, as-
sociat~d with lhat illduslry, If therc" IlO COmmOn poinl of refcr~[\Cc for the cli~lll to rd~r to 
and a m'lliciolll service omit, intimnatioll 'lbout tt,., existellce of _'lIch 'm indust ry ,,"ociation, 
the CIiClll will oc nonc the wi""r and lilus not hal'e all the pcrtin~1ll inrormation at hi, tii,po,~L 
By lIli l1g onlologi e,_ It,., cl i ~m Lan ~a,ijy look up di "~r~nl mdu,lry typ"s in diff~rellt Loulltries, 
anti can look al toc kgaJ requlremems. ,1l1l1,,)ritJfive bodies and busliless proc~durc s that april' 
to a r,mi cular ('ompany_ r f a maliciou, company th~n Omll, allY m,ormation thal "oul d ~x po,e 
(ile service "s I'raudulellt. thell di~nT will be abk to pick up the omis_'iOll e'ls ily ,1l1d will not 
tru,l the s~r"ice pro"iticr, 
4.4, I leM ontology 
The ICH onlology r~rr~'Cllb the tiilTcr~nt ,ccton. or th~ ,lode markel seLlor, anti tt,.,refor~ 
place, differem companies into din~rent categorie', Simil,u'to the legal ontology. (he reB on-
lology can t,., ~x lendeti lO mdude Hlformalion ~bout ][\Uu,lry a%ociatioll', walch dogs, lhird 
pal1y ~ll1horities "nd c;m provide 'l%i'lanc~ with verific'llion of '1 particul'lr COmr'Hly in a par-
licular indu,try. i\, all illu,tralion, the A.,sociatioll of South African Travel Agclll, IASA['\) 
could verify a mlVe] agem\ c1'lim of t,.,illg a 1"'Vd a~~nT in SOUlh Africa, Any 'ervice who 
fall, the verification with tile industry association should be r~garded as suspicious unles, valid 
,)[\U corJcluSl\'e rmo, (for thoc cLL'tom~r) is provided lhat tile servicc lS kgilimat~, H y comhilling 
knowled~e of Jif,erem s~ctors 'md authority btxl I~' that comrol di "~rent ,eclO,-S, tll~ ol1tolo~ies 
become powerful in providillg the cliellt with lle,lI' pedect information about the informat iOll it 
,hould rcccivc from a s~J'\'icc provider. 
4,"\,2 Ltgalontology 
The legal ontology contain, a ontological rcpresentatlOn of th~ informalion !h~l an onlille ser-
vice provider IllU,t provide, Thi, allow, the client 10 blOW wh<:thcr lhe .sen' ic~ provider has 
omin",! 'my impornmt inl'ol1n"tioll_ The legal ontoklgy can he ~xt~IlJeJ to incorpor,lIe indu,-
trial and sector;"l reg lliations iL' well a, leg,,1 re'luiremems for differem comp,ll1Y type" This 
allo\\I' the chcllt to ~asily s~~ which laws" company has to wmply with and can thcn evaluatc 










Chapter .j - Implement"t;"" - 9 1 -
--------
4A.3 Tools us£d 
In orJcr 10 Icverag~ Ihe power of Ih~ oil1ologies. tool, to c rC~le anJ inl~rad wilh the OWL 
ontologics w~rc u:;~d, To cre ~t~ ~nJ edit thc struclurc of the ontologies. Prot~g~ 3_2 w~, useJ_ 
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l'igur~ 4X Graphical rcprc,cntatlOn of the cla,scs in the JCD oil1010gy 
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In Figure 4_g. the ICH structure can be ,een_ The oIllology " dfecli.ely a hi~rarl'hial repre-
scntation of Thc bcnchm~rk an,) pro\'ides the STructu re '0 th"t companie, call be da"ifi~J. Any 
rule, lha l go,em a ,ul"'r-,cl' lor will abo govcrn any indivi,)ua)s in the sub-sectors of the sUjlCr-
sel'lor. ~nJ \hul \he u,e r of th~ onto logy <"1LIl ,~e cxanly whatlegi,lalion ancl rc,lrinion, apply 
to ~ ce n~in ,ector_ Combin~d with an onTology Je"rib illg thc n>untrie, of lhe wor ld, shown 
in figurc 4,11. th~sc g(l\'~rni n g bodies c~n apply int~rnationally or 10 componies ill specific 
countries, Each dallln The ICD ontology can contain incli\'iduah, In thi, ca,e. ind ivicluals are 
companies, As can be Seen In Figurc 4, 10. the companies arc place,) Ln the l!'a'el an,) touri sm 
' Ub-sC<:lOr of the travel ~nJ I~isure ,uper-,el'lOL A u,cr <"1LIl now inw,tigate which la,,, arC 
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F,gure4. I I: (j"Jr]n~:,] rcpn:~nt:nlOn of an <mh.]" g-y containing i nfnrn1 ~lI"lI "II an Ilk' coumncs 
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informed choices about which services to interact with. To interact with an ontology, a library 
that provides an OWL API has to be used. The Jena framework written in java allows access to 
OWL ontologies. The Jena framework is described as "A semantic Web Framework for Java" 
and allows the client prototype to query and traverse the ontologies to find the applicable classes 
or individuals. The client prototype primarily only uses the ontologies as a vocabulary. This 
ensures that the service providers describe themselves in a manner that will allow the client to 
be sure that he/she is dealing with the right type of company. 
4.5 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the various artifacts developed in this dissertation was discussed. These arti-
facts show the results produced from the requirements of creating a trust assurance protocol. 
The TEF framework allows any Web services transaction to be simulated and can be used for 
purposes beyond the requirements of this dissertation. Similarly, the ontologies created to stan-
dardize the descriptions of companies in terms of their primary business purposes, can be used 
in other Web service applications so that clients can know which laws are applicable to different 
companies. These ontologies are designed to be extensible, so that industry bodies can govern 
the information for a particular industry in a specific country. The client prototype created for 
this dissertation is a protocol specific application showing the involvement of the client in trans-
actions where the client previously had no knowledge of the transaction. The prototype allows 












EVALUATION AND RESULTS 
).1 I r\TRODUCTJOr\ 
III this Chapter, (he artir~l'ts created in this dissenarion are discussed aIlu evaluated. In pm'Tic-
ul~r, evn lualion ot th e tmsl assuraIlce prolocol is disCI"""d nnd the artifan, that call be u>ed 
lIldCjxIl<,knlly 01 thi s dj"el1,llioll is eval u,1teu, 'fhe rcsulls oj this di,scnmioll i nclud~, n pro-
tocol to lind suitable lran,ac tion pd(hs. a prolOcol and prOTotYl"'" to Jelemlill~ it Irml rating [or 
Web services. a ;imuiatioll ~nvironmel1t in whi('h iIlleral'lions oc(I'ccn Web serv ices C~ll be 
monitored and V("'nbll l ~ri~s th at call be u,,,u and CA1GIllicd to apply to ditkrenl induslri" s and 
sectors"O lhat >crvices m~y wndllC! trnn ,uctiolb LOllfldenllhallhcy have all rCkvilll1 illform~­
linll nt th(,ir di'po,al 
5,2 PROTOCOl. EVALUATIOI\ AND A"lALYSIS 
The tru't as"uralK'~ protol"l allow, the client to ('re~t~ req llest me"ag~" I" the primary scrvi('e 
providcr (PSP) to speci fy ti,e dknC>; preferenc'e, and r~stri~tiom, that n ppl y to se rv ices invol "eu 
in th e transadion anu al", to the usc o[ thc cliem':" peNll1al information 
The prolo~ol itself i> >impk in that e~ch ,erv;ce on l)' rec~ives a ,;nglG mcssage nnd send, Ollt 
a single re 'ponse. Thi, simpli~ity n~gates compilcated protocol failures SIlch as ckadlock re-
su lting from'l ~ompli~ar~u prot"col scenario, The only ucadlock thm c~n o~cnr in the pro«x;ol. 
~an reslLlt [rom a >crvice wnit ing lor ~ reSjX,r"e tmm a ,~rvic~ that is lLnable or not willi ng to 
r~'ponu . A fai lure to re'pond ~an m, mitigateu by thc und~rlyin~ transjXlIT proLDl'Ol inuicaling 
that ~n error Il~' (kX'urrw or that the mnnedion has timeu out and the '~n'ice is then aUlomati-
~ally excluueu [I'om the rest of tll~ protocol. The ,implicil)' ,,[tm. pr01ocol allows lor intuitive 
r~asoning to m, us~d to ~,'alu ale th~ protocol. 
TIle following five scennrio' were cr~ated to ~xercise the tru,t a"uran~e protocol and comp~re 
resulis to the eXp"cted o utcomcs. 
A ,ccnario involving only ti, e client nnd n 'n i lUb l ~ l'SI' 











- '}6- Chapl"" ,S'::c """·,",.,",,rilm and re.HlI/,I' 
3 A <eenario illl'o lving: lilc PSP providing" ~hoi~~ ~ lwe~nlwo sCl'vicc> 
4 A scenario involving lh~ prin,>rl' sal'ice I'cquiring the u'e of ~ m,m(hlorl' ,~rvic'~ wh() 
req uire;; two ~x t~mal s~n ic~,. e~ch of whic'h h~, ~n ~<juiYl1knl sel'vice ()ption 
~ A s~~nari () in\'olving multiple pani~ipaling ,e ryic~s which PI'Od llC~' multiple [n,ml1Clion 
p~th,. 
5,2.1 ~"cna ri" "ne 
SL~llar i o on~ cOIllain, a \Veb 'e '-viL~ trmbaction ,dl~re the on ly pmtie, illvolved in the transac'-
lion are rhe diell! and the PSP. The PSP doe' llot re<j ui r~ any additi ()nal ,ervice' to complete 
lll~ transacti()n. 
I'arricipa"/,I' 
Client Thc clicll! ill rhe lransa~ l ion 
PSI' SureTravei Web ,~rvice. 
Fi gur~ 5, I: TEP grap hic' ,howillg [he par[ic'ipl1nl, 
In Hgure 5.1. lhc connection bc(w~en rhe c lient se,,'i~~ and (h~ PSI'. Surc TravcL Can be ck~rly 
'een. 
Il efor~ tile lru St as;; uranc~ protocol i, ru n. the di~nt Cl1nnol be ;; ur~ lha! S ul'~ Tr~vcl "'i ll be 
[he only s~rl'ic'e inyoll'Cd in Ih~ tra","nion rhe d iem n~e<ls [() ,~nd a ParlnerRcoquc"1 XML 
elemelllio lh~ ,~ry i ce. Tllis" cre~led u,ing the Client pro[oll'pe withi n rEF. 
Pigurc 5.2 , how how lh~ c' lien( c['~alCS a PannerReque;;1 clemen! [0 send to (h~ PSI', rh~ cheIll 
~an 'jX:c ifl' restricti oll , on the s~rvi~~ or on 1m, u,~ 01 p.::rsonal inform~11 on . hom 1m, P~n­
ll~rRe<j"".'l ocplC!ed In Pigure 5.2. il can be se~llth a! tile di~Ill 1l11' crcaled a request that con-
wins no req ri~tiOll S on any .,erviccs, 
Sure Tmvcl rc,polld, hl' sending" I',mn~rRcque'IRl·,pon,eList (PRRI.) element whi~h indi-
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... -_ .•. .. _--
• 
'"" .-.. -• , .. , ..... 
) ' 
MriO Ihe diem didn't 'I ipulale any ~~l1'k!U",. Th. PRRL o r ~urc Travcl dldn'l Inelulle ~ 
S"rvit-eGroup dement. indicating tlta! It do.:sn·! \1"1: ;"'~" ~ef\'iCtO' to l",rrmTn ally Ir.1l"a('110n~ " 
111C fCSu l~ Qf ~hc P," tfICfRequc.,t feque<;~ i~ ,h<,wn hel,,,.. '11", 1'01;('), document ~ h ~t I) ...em " lilt 
Ihe I'IJW L ha.~ """n 001111",", rOT brc' i~y. 
". ~., L f."~ r ~"Pqu~ c,tR<,c,!""nse Li s" 
~ .. , v ,N'VKI ~ " "I ,+' '--' J 'i~ , I 62 • ~ , ~~ , q 'It 1I a"h:U~ur ~~ r~·~ .. l " 
.""I1C~t<~~~-""'vr .. H."'~l ~o).~pon\'·;, 
< S~ tV, ~~ 1:\ f ~n",'. ; :)n > 
'.r~ ~ J.~l:' x,,,l,,, - ' c. ~ ~ fJ : .' I ,jn" , C r. , ,,:r. ;\" ,a lTru, U."·;" ~ :\ ~ ~. 
Xn~" : x, i -' Ie" p : I .' n '" , .-1 , "J" l ~ eel lXl1LC, OhC:nd - ~~Hon:Q • 
X"l.: ",oh~'''~L'-,c~' ~o " . ·I:: l p: I /,1,,', C", ,"c'. , ,1C, "a/;<uot,II""uun:~ 
C : '-. rna". ~r' ",,~": c ,. ~ \ ~ ,;1 ~,.,:,. ,,~ I ; ~y " xc. ,j.', 
<~ " t. i t. yK ~:nc>:· ';r~ r!. '-"Q ~ C'c"P~ fly < i "J". ; '. y'n~"" 
'l",]ai "t. ~t. '.J' ,'r Ht nc~.t, ~!!' 'L"I~ 1 S'",""~" > 
<I:""-;><l"\'Tn'~ • r,. ~. ,, __ ~,d_L .. I .un" /"."",p .. fi l'rYF'" > 
</PO_~'Oy~ 
(/3~ r .. ,,' ~ hf "rm,n i<>n> 
<3c"", cc, 'd ~ t I:> 
<I p"n "c< .• ~q:J"'st ""S9"",,,I,, ~ ~ > 
If th. <:I i.nt r~c"~"e, a PHRL [rom SlI!'I: Tr~"c l (hal lndlcates that Sure Tr~vel cOlllp ile' wun lhe 
C Il~ ll ,men, r.,trinion, ami c"ol1tall1 ' nIl "Ilier information ~b()ut additlOll al serv ice, lCI be u'eJ in 
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Figure 5.3: TEI' Visualis,l!icHl of tl..., PRRL received by lbe client 
whether or not hel,he can l,-ml the ,er\'ic~. TIli, step is di,ctllsed in Section 5.4. Based on 
the relulb; obtained from the [rust ca lculation, the customer eilher proceeds with the ;e,,-ice 
or terminates any further aClion. The clien( proceeds by creating a COlUraCI that elTcclively 
stale, the I'RRL back to [he service '0 thlllthe service can acknowledge which le,,-ices will be 
im'olI'Cd in the tmnsaction and what re,triClion, are placed on per,onal inrOl1TIalion ite"". Tlw 
COnlrad i, dlSclL,"ed in Section 5.4 
5.2.2 Scenario two 
Scenario Iwo is idenlicallo ;,cen~r io I except lh~l lhe client ,ends restriclions to Sure Travel 
and lhat Sure travel does not c",,,ply with the rc,lricliolllthm the cliem has ;lipuiated. 
I'articil'anr., 
elienl TIle client in the transaction 
I'SI' SlireTrave l Weh .serV1Ce. 
®0 
I'iglL,-e 5.'1: TEF graphic ,howing the participants 
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~<'Iurc the lru,t 3"'lImn~~ pmu...,,,1 I' nm, Ih,: CIi~TIl cannot be Mi re that Sure TrJ'- cl WIll be 
(~ onl,- 'lrrVlce involved III the IrJI1<:lCliun The di~nl Ill'l'(h to M.W a PannnRC'q uc. t X ~lI 
eJcl""nt 1<1 the "''' ic~. This is rr~~I~d uSing the Chen! prototype "it ~ i n TEF 
-.-
v ." ..... " 
---
• 
" i8u~ ~_ ~ ,"',,~ IMrw the d ROll! In; at ,·s F'JnncrRcque;;t dcmenl ~ '<I .",00 lU the PSI' Tho.' client 
c~n ~f1'-"C1f} H"'lriClion. nn thoc «""<vice nl on the II"" "r p'.-r;on~1 intomlallnn 
S\ln: Tm> cl rc~rnOO~ hy , emllng a f'R kl ekm"Jl! whtch indIcates "h~lher ur " vt 11 h", p"",,--d 
the rl' , triction, Ihat the drrnt ~ as l'rr~emcd In thi s , • .-~n:"io the rlicnt , tll>lII Jtcd rc.<lri~ti,m. 
IhJ! Sure Trawl d,dn', Illeet. ,,,\d the psp rndic~tc, II!" error in thl" PRRL. 
TIll' td ull Ilj" the P~rln erHcqllr ' l reljue, l i, 'hown bl" low. l\() policy IXXllmClll wa.' ,upplicd 
he~u """ the ServICe did nOI pn >.S the fc'tricl i' ''' le.1. 
~." tn" r~f ~~~e~ o ,," >'_.on'~ ~l.t 
"" 'Ji""tl"L - ~. < « ." , 'I n . 1 ,8 "8 . 2(0 , 9'G ~ I"x , "~ '"",-..0 ' < ,: """ 1 • 
• "".".""'tl,''-~-"''''L <'' T~,, ·;..,I C"omp.~,y· 
'"~'" rv ~"~[""' ~ ~ , 
<.'«>~: , ,c~ ,cnCO"'~l t :on cr it. :41 r 4~ I t . - } "',' > 
< It=~i.''''> Fu II ,,~,.,.. < I It ~1t\I:u- . 
" ~.,~~ n o! ,oc,J." .. m~ '. Sh_= j I 0,\' "._ ~r ... ", ,cn'kmo 
< "~ rn o,,'';a 1 U" '. r", ~ 1 ~t _" 1, ,,"~ ,I icv i ''''' 'OY i re".' ~'-' .. > 
<~~q-"n r~,:j'j~l,,~ ;. ~oSh_· '''~'·I ~a,!" , 'c'''-'-. 1 "<: ' 
< i f ~,- 0 r l ~t ,"cnCoc,"" it, 0'" 
<i~~"V~~~f a~~t > 
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._ 2 14 11 bytes 4~ bytes I~ I~ byte, 
Table :;.~: Summary of the messages 'ent in the tn"t as<urance prot,,"o l 
@1ilil3 
- __ 0_- ~_o_ 
• 
Figure 5,(,: TEF Vis ual isation or iI PRRI, received by the d,enl 
lr Sure Trilvel fail ed Ihe PartnerR"'-lu~st r~striction', TEl' wonld indicate lhe fai lure and indi-
cate what lhe f~ilnre wa,. Figure 5.0 , how, that lh~ Sur~ Tm\'cI serv ice h:l' been ""1rked:l' 
fai ling the reltrictions sct by the customer :lnd shows lhe 1'l{l{I ~ failure di'play mdicating what 
coodition , tile ,ervi ce fai IN, The client can I>OW eil her inve'tig:lte t h~ fa i lure rea,OI" pre,enled 
I'll' Slire Trawl or , imply terminate Ihe lransaction. 
Scenario lhrw ext~nds the "cn:lr io pre,enled in the r. rM ,cenario hy creating a PSP that make, 
1"~ of:ln :lddil iollal ,en·ice to compkte Its transact i0l1, 
In Ih i, ,cenario. the PSP ciln usc c ither ofth~ two :lddil ion ill ,erv ice, 10 complele th e lran,acl ioll 
In til i' in stallce_ Sure Tra\'el Can use cithcr XYZ cr~dit rr..,rchml1 Oft h~ l\igerian credit rr..,rch,mt, 
In the modlll ar ilrchitcdurc of \\/e1> ,en' ice" many ,ervice, call provide lhe ,ame fUnctionali ty 
alld a ,ervice can thlls mak~ usc or any sef\'ic~ prov idi ng the ,ame fl Lndi0l1alny. Only the PSP 
can 'kcide wilich service il u,e, in il, tramaLlions. The PSP Can either mak~ use of s ~rvices 
wilh which il alr~ady has ~.\ i st i ng bu,ine" rei m iOl"hips or it can dynamically locale appropriale 
ser\'ic~" This proce" i, transparen l 10 the client and to the t]'Ust assurance protocol ilnd docs 
not affecl the protocol operation at (Ill. 
Participallts 
Client TIlC cl icnt in the Irall ,action 
PSP Snr~Tr~vel Web ,ervice 
Secondary Service XYZ credil merc'halll 
Se{"(,"dur~' Sen-ice Nig~rian crcdit m~rchallt 
ln Figure 5,7, the diellt is in direct comaLl with Sure Travel. Slire Travel COl1l1e~iS to thc (\.<,' 0 
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Figure 5,7: TEf gruphic showing the parlicipant, 
requi re, bolh "en icc, or nolo the vi,ual ization only ,hm"-' the conneclion, lilat lhe sefV ic~s huve 
with each mller 
Herore the lru,l a,surance protocol i; fun, the client can nol be , "re lhat SlIrc Travel wil l be 
the only sen' ice involved in a tramaclion. TIle clicnt n~~ds 10 send a p~rtnerReque.\ l X.\lL dc-
meIlllO lile servicc, This i, cr~ated using the Client pmwlypc wilhin TEE Th~ PaJ1nerRequest 
message is the 'ame as the requesl creale<l fGrlile fir,t scenario and i, shown in Figure _~ . 2_ 
Sure Travel re"p'Hlds 10 liIC req uest by sending a PRRI. element which conlain, all tile In-
formation ubolltthe tfunsJct ion_ The PRRL of Sure Tra\'el includes u S~rviceGroup elemclll. 
in<licaling thaI il usc, a<l<lilionai services to perfonn its ,e rvice 
The [esull of lhc l'aJ1llerRequest re<jllest is ,hown below Thc policle, sent with the PPRI, h~, 
occn omitted for brev; ty_ 
., "n '"'" "." '0, ' "",,,, ,-,,", "'.'" "0.'" '0',","'-' ,,",., .• "."" .,,' "' ''' _"'_'''' •••.• , 0",,,·,",," __ , •••. " ", '","" 
", ",.~~' ~." ' , _"" " " .~,_ ~,~. ".-0." ,",,""'" '"~ .... _"e ,. ,,,.,._ •... ,,' __ , , __ ,,', 
.""",_"", -".-J .,.,.""-,,,,., ",--", 
"m-"."",,,,_,,,,, •• 
".,'. ,., ,,~,_~ '"'_.' ~,.".- '"'''~"'' '"e" I" " __ ,,., " "",'0>;,' '",( __ 'J,," ,_"., ,""~_,,,., ",,..,,,,.-< •• ,, ", 
'''.''0', ~", ",_U",- ~~."',·K',~ '" C""",'""''',." ,., __ " ' """ _ ,~."' o"""",",w_ m"~.' 
,'; ... ~,.~",~" ,,~ "'''" ',,,.'-0;. " _". u.''',·""" "~'.' ',"" .. ,>, •• "",,, --__ "_.,, "., ... ,, " , 
.'"",""~"'. '~"""" ,;, .. ,-"" ,,''"-' 
','oUq" 
,""" -"",,,,-
,~,' -.<;'''.' ,.,,,,, ... ,,,,,--,,.,", 
." .... M .. '.""O' uJ.,·,," ",~,,', _"._, 
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TII~ PRRL den'en! f,n", ~"r~ T <;,,'0:1 "nlbcds the IWO eMernal PRRI :~ in'" a ~c"·keb.tui,·"I~"l> 
d~IIl<.·ul to Ltldicate (0 the d lenr ,t ... t tilt> t"" "" ... t~-.:." al"l.' uSC<i for Ihe 5J.n~ pU'1lO'e 1\11<1 thai the 
<Ct,'Ice. ~an "" "'h:rch"ng~d. TIIC I'RRI (ur XY/. n"d" merchanl Indicates th~, n <~m.pJic., 
wnh IIIC "'''riClIons supph<"tl hy the- diem. and lias re.urned it" "" .... ,~e in(um.atwil. NIsenan 
~Iwit lno.:rcllal:t has cned it- tcrril<,"ul IUII.-d1<1U>n ,L' the cnl;e,,' n-aso" wh)" II l'Ould not comply 
" "h lhe ,he"l, 1",I . i.·, ,,,ns. 11'11s (~< JlOI mcan [II", Ihe chem camull dU~>M' I\) L1 . .c N,g.:riiln 
cr.:.J,1 in the lmn'action. it ,in.ply l\1dil'atC~ Ih"t Nigerian en'dit "o!lld nOl cOl1lpl~' ,.·jlh the 
rc,t,ictj"", pm' ,d....J b}· tht client. ' rlle ,j' llal repre".."tati"n of the I' RRL fCl"Ci>cd by lho: dlml 
e,<II be ~en in Figure.5's' 
., 
- -.. ,'" 
Figul"l.' 5.8: H:r gml'lIk 'I"''''in~ the I 'RRI. de"",,,! ,e.:."""t:<! hy (he di.llt 
5. !4 ~"n;,riQf,,"r 
So:c O:arlO four _how. m"ltip~ ...;r, i~'Co "",\I'cd on tho: Iran:;3ClIOIl. Slife TI'J.' d 1"C" a P<'nnel 
,nco Surc Holds. who in TUm ll"<l' <eO' ,en tu ~~'1Jlp''''e the Imn",~loon. 
In th" <"""~Ij". till> prim,H) ~,.. kc 1\tO' Idcr ha< 10 \ o<c the ~ecor>d ary <e,,.;ce tl) cm"plrle the 
lronsac1ion. rhi, sh",n to the dien[ th~l (hc,r '.' ,"-' d",,~c Ill" hkh ~"!l\I'~' II CS CiOn \lc i,,,',,lved 
in (lie (n.msactioll at tll~t point. Sure TrU"e l hu,!o u,"" Sure HOld , (0 l'o1Jl~ICll' troc lr"".octlOll. 
Sure Ho(d, c"IlIlCd, to either AIlC I [OIel, or 1 2~ 110l~ [ . and to ei[r."r XY Z ere.li( n,,'rchan( or 
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I'flr licipfllol.' 
C liem Th· chem 'Ill he II1m<~c"' .n 
SI.'Wfl ~ ~T) & n ·icI: AHC Ii , ~d, 




----. -- ----> 
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~~ ---,.. -- > • 
[n h !-,urd 5.9. lh~ cla" It; ' 'tl dire" ,·ulllaCI wilh SUI"" Tr'lvel. Sure Tr~vd econn.ct, I" Sure 
Hold,. whn ;Illllnl ~(>nn~cb hl lhe "", ,·red,1 locrdwnt b~nh. nn!llwo ditl~renl i1(lld,. In lMo 
PRRI. vi . " ,hr>wl1 in Fi~ur~ 5 10. II ~~n Ix '"~n that Ihe 1"0 hotel> ar~ ~quivnl.l1r ;llld [h~llho 











Table 5.4: Summary "f !1 1t! mC~'~8e.' ,em ill Ih,' Inl SI as>unlllce pl"OIocol 
B,-f"rc lile (roSI a"ll1"nc~ jJ"~"c,,1 ; , Hill. til e elie n! can no! bo: '"I'e thaT Sur~ ') r"vel will Ix 
tho o nl )' le rV;('e jn"oh"c-d I II a lransaCTl on, '11'0 dient """d, to ,emj « rarl!1erRL-quc~1 X ",lL de· 
(11<.' 11\ (0 {he ~,"\ ire. Thi, i, credle<.! ''''1111 (he Chen! protOlype Wllh,n I"EI ' The l'a'lne r R~ue>1 
11l<!'''''gr '~ th~ .artlC:lS (h f." r~ur't cfCa'~'<I (ur (h~ lirs( scellario :llld i, ~ha...· n (II Figure 5.5. 
Sun: Tra\cI II.,;;pond, 10 (he n:l.JUo:>-l I>y >O<:lIdlOg a PRRL ('kmen! .. 1"ch C(lnlai n~ alil he m· 
fOfmdl;,'n n"',.,( lile lm~~101\. 'llle I'R R I. " f Sure T rmel illl' lude!. a Sc., ic~-(jroup o:kllK'111. 
lIldicatlll~ ll>al il US~~ adJ i.,,,,,.,) W' \'IC~S 10 p .... rfOf1n U& ser .. ice. 
11", rc,nil "f ll>e ParlllcrRl" l uCbl req '~!1 IS <I>o ... n t>clo .... n.., p"lick, .«:111 "HI> Ih. PP~L h:.~ 
h .. :,'11 0111111,"\l for h rev;!~' . 
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5.2.5 Scenario fiw 
Sc~nari o the ,how, mlLhipk s~rvices boeing used to process the transaction. Sure Travel u,es ~ 
pannef site, Sure t !otds. who in tum uses ",rv ices to cornp l el~ lhe Iran,acliolL 
In [hi, >cenario. [he primary service prm'ider lLses multiple secondary scrvice to complete the 
transaction, The primafY <.e rvic~ provider uses a speci flc servi ce a, "ell '" "'''' of I" 0 ,enic~, 
thaI lh~ cli~m ~an choo,e, The ,~ llLP of the sen ices can boe Seen lIll'igure 5,9, 
l'arliripalllS 
Clien! The client in lhe Ir:lIl,adion 
PS I' SureTravel Web service, 
Secondary Service Sure HOlds 
Secondary Servkt XYZ cfeditmerchant 
Sl'Condary Sen ice "igeri~n cred'l merchanl 
Sfcondary Senicc ABC HOlds 




Figure 5.11 TEF graphic Ihowing lhe panicipams 
From Figure 5.11. the clienl is in di",clconlad "ilh Sur~ Tra\·el, Sur~ Trawl conn~c(s 10 
Sure Hotds and credit Ilwrchants. SUfe t!otel connects 10 IWO credil merch~n( banh, ~nd lwo 
different hotels. TI""e hotel> then in lurn conneCI (0 1"0 mercham banks, This scenario ,hows 
how a PRRL clement can indicate (hm (he Same service c~n be used in the same (ransadion, If 
lhe dient wi,h~ s. he can ~hoole a ,ervic~ (ha( appears mlLl(iple (imes In the serl'ice ((l reduce 
Ihe number of un ique serv ice, in\'olwd in the (r~nsadion In Ihe f'RRL image ,hown ill Figure 
5,12, Th<' clicm can see (he pmhs (hat arc a\·ailable (0 him and can >.CC lhat Sure llo(ds h~s 
failed (he r~'lfic(ions lha( "ere ,;uppl ird . Figure 5, 12 parallels Figure 3.16 in how it coli eCiS 
and presents the (ransaction chain (0 the diel11. Ill' r~ceiving one hi~ r~rchiat ' I ru~ l ur~ ~()n("ining 
all (he possible paths, the c1km can reconstructs any path and ime'tigate the serviccs invoh-cd 
in lhl' tr~n,a('(ion wi (I.out ha"i ng 10 mak~ r~p"(iti ve reqll~'('; (0 s~n'ic~s. 
Before the (J1],t assurance protocol i, run, the clien( can not be ,ure lh~( Sure Tr~wl wi ll be 
(he only service Jnvolved 111 a transaction. The clicnt need, (0 send a p~rtnerH~quc,[ XVI I. de-
",em w (il~ service, Tili, is created using the Client protO(ype within TEl'. The Pa ltn~rHeql""t 
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hgun:: 5, 12: TEF graphl' showmg tile PRRL cleillent recci \'cd by tbe client 
The reS l!lt of the Pal'lll erl~C'l UC' l rC' I LL ~stl s shown helow. The:: polLcies sent with the PPRl. b;LS 
l~~n olmttcoJ 1'01' b re" it y. 
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T~~I SIZe vI MCMlIges 
158.00 Kbylc~ 
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Tahle ~ II .,h"", lh~ lis! or IlleiS<lj;C> (hat Wl1S >cnt ,hrougllOUI th" !I11S, aS$Ur;l"("<: Pf~QCQI. The 
lable ~how, Ihe 'l\cssagc~ Ihat were ,,,"I and ' .... ~i"'!d and shO\\'s Ihe tn~a~c $'1e. In r F.t-.lh" 
molt"ur m,.lul~ ~II."" .n., u,""r .o vic\/. nit} oll~ IllC'SS3gc->.. The m"n""f m",h,l" tS shown In 
Figure 5.1 J. 1111~ allows Ihe uSCl U. IIn'e'I1S',I" "hal IIlCS>-ltgcs were >oell! l>el\/.·et'll (he ,." vicl'S 
dUrIllg the »Toto"" l. 
~ 2 () Scena rio discus.,ion 
'1 he M'eJlarJu" . 1>1, .. ' h,,,,... II"" \ruM (.nnsaction prolocol w(Kh and Wh~l n-.c:"aj;c< afe L"fe"tw 
and ~el1l on the pmt".:ol. T~hl~ ~,7 ,h .. " ~ '1Ltntllary of the §cenarim PfCsented "'rom II!.. t~lll~ 
II canoc seen that (here is 00 di"mc, correl~l i"'l r.,lw""n Ihe number of !c!'\',cc~ (ltl'O)"c-d in a 
Ir~II".'~I"'" and th~ ,ia of me, ! ag~s lece l' cd, S,enaflo three ~nd four 1l"lh u 'e <i:o. ,~r\'ic.s. bLLt 
s~e " ~ ri\J four ne~led 20 mes"L ~~' ",hm;,ls !ccnario three prod uced only I 2. This j, r.,,'"u,e Ihc 











Mes,age )l" I l'rom To ' Sll~ of 111~"agc 
I Chell! SlIle'! ,a,-e1 1-4 11 b}t6 
1 Sure TrJI-d Su ..... I iold, [-III b)telo . , Sur'" I 100d , A BC 1 [o[d 1-1 II b~ II<'< , AHe I IOId Sure 1101"'- .. 1)1 blt"" . 
~ 
, Sure Hllld \ 123 HOld 1..\ 11 byt", 
6 , 123 H(lId XYZ c,eJit l-1 TT b)'le' 
7 XYZ ~rwit 123 H(J.(d l:P:P \ bj l ~' 
6 123 I-Iote l l\ ifcri an c-roli t 141\ bl IC: _ , 1'\ igr.-ian credit I ~3 H" tci 21l b~' I<'., 
to 1~3Hotd <;u", Hotels , 171190 h~ l<!.' - II Sure H,~cls XYI..,ml,1 1 411 "~ lo - " XllZ "\'(1,, Sure H"ld~ !:!!:!Jl b> h" lJ Sure HOI eI ~ ";sendn crcdH l J ll l:1} , ,,,, .. 
" Nlg~ri all c'r.:di l Sure Hotd~ 213 byl~ 
" Sure II()t d~ SlIn: TraH I 40"1 12 byws " Su,e Tmvol XYZCrdit ,14 11 b}' I ~' . , 17 XYZn("<jil S llre Tr~vel 884 1 b}' I ~~ - . " Sure T ..... ·d Nig..-ian Crn],1 IJll b)'le' 









Ch"pler S "mhml;"n "",/ res,,/Is 
C 
Scenario 1'';0 Total:-1o Servi<;e:; TotJI No \1~"Jge, , 
2 , 
3 3 6 , 6 " 5 6 





99.1g Khyt~" 2 
158.00 Kb yt.,s 8 
Tall ie 5.7: Summary of,c~nario result, 
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un i'-jue, eac'h ,ervic'e woult! only rec~ive One reqllest and se nd one fe' lX'n'e . rh ul II", num ber 
of messages wo ult! be 211 "here /I i:; the number of nod." in the graph The In"t a%llnUlce 
protocol thus ,;cale, nke! y for ~very additional node entered LntO the Il<'twork. 
The amOlllll of data sclll with trol1gh tt", 1]11't aSluralKe prolocol j, very much tkpendelll on 
what information the c'lielll requests from each ,ervice. In the calc of tl", scenJri0'5, the client 
requ<'sted the full pol i~y docu ment of all I he service,. and therefore burdened the syst~m with 
tran, ferring the ]J'oljci~s Lo lhl' c1i~nl. If the client reql1ested a URL to a po licy doc ument from 
each sen Lce instead of the fu ll policy, the lcOa l ,in of the mes-lage,l senl ant! received in th.' 
,cNlario ""ult! be 3,23 Kbytes instead of 158 Kbytes, The prOl ocol i, thus quite practical in that 
the I'<'su lt s it produces arc not impraclicaL and that L I~ size of til" messages can be drastica lly 
redllced if the d ie m chooses nO! to recei, e tt", fu II pol icy document,. 
Once the tru,t aSSuranCe protocol completes and return, all th.' aqiiab le transaction path, b,,,,k 
to Ihe ~hem, h~,he Can evaluate Lil e ,erVIC~, involved in the transaction and present the PSP 
with the lI'an:;action path th~t the clL ent has chosen The tnlSl eva luation proce"s i, -IhO\,n in 
SecLion 5.4. A contracl for scenario 4 is sllown bclo'l, where the cl ient has chOlen XY/ Credit, 
123 I lotel. and Slll'<' l lotel as the tr~nSJ<:t ion partner, for Sur~ TraveL Tile signatures llaH bc~ n 
omined for hrevity. The signatures enSUreS thm tt", services ~cknow l edge th e impendi ng tran,-
action feql1esL Th il allows tb" cl ient 10 verify that all tile ,ervic ~, illvol v~d in the transaction 
koow that the transaction will proceed and that tl", serv ice' wiil know which serv ices Lbey may 
u,e to p">c~" the transaction. 
"'"_ H,m,'">"" ,~o,,", .. ,,,,·,··, ,'''',., .... ,''~ 
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5_3 WEB ~H: RV I CES EXECUT IO~ FRAMEWORK A!';ALYSlS A~D EVALUA-
TIO:,\ 
The u,~ of TEF c~n tx: '~en ill the ,cenario, de"' ribed alxlVe_ TEl' allow, th~ u",r to "'t up 
scenario" dep loy ,"" ,,' i~e, and prolocols and iIlcorporatc a clienllnlo the lr~nsaction. TEF then 
m(~litoTh the int~mct ion' b..;1\!!een thc '-C rvice' to a, the tr~n,action progre"e'_ TEl' monitor, 
th~ interact ion< betw~en the servICeS and the S ~n'lCts them,clves to provide the u,er with rcle-
"ant in formmion aboul the 't~n" of the tr~nsaction and allow, ~ cl ient m(xlule 10 tx: import~d 
mto TEF so that the cl ient'> (kci,ion c~n ~trcctt he tra nSllCl ion flcing , imul at~d 
lJy deploying services in TEF ei thet' ~,\ fully deployed r~nlO1e W~b s~rvic~, or a~ local objects 
w]thin the' rEF env ironment. th~ usn can use ~xiqing ,e[vices. providi ng that (hey hav~ SUPP'Jll 
for the TEl' me,.,age API. ~nd create neV. sen'ices (hat Can quickly be created to (eSl a new 
prol""o l ot' ,e r\' ic~ endpoints_ 
'rhe module., crea(cd 10 provide TEF wi th it, functionali(y provide ~ flexible ~rc hi(eClure in 
whidl modules l' an interact wilh e~ch olher and dbplay i nfornlation (0 the Uler of TEl'. wi thout 
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5.4 TRUST ;\IODEL EVALUATlO:" 
In ord~r to ~home the hest av~ibble p"th for a transaction, thec1ienl mUlt he able to detennine 
whether or not a service i, trustworthy. If a serl'ice i, n~tlicious or (]i:;h()jIC,t, there is no inherem 
informalion thai the client can use to determirte that a sen' ice could po~ e a threat to (he c l i~nt Of 
hi.1 pC'r.lonal information. This b (he reason thal vocabularies and metadat~ ~boUl indll.ltrie.1 and 
legisla(ion i.l required Thi, allows (he ciiem (0 .'Jl<,l and r~pmt on omission of infomlation that 
a service supplies. i-Iowe\'er. the client still c"tln01teli if" cl ient is " reputable service from (h is 
information The lru,t e~lculat",n lI.le, infonllation al'~il~ble from different source, to deter-
mine whether a 'ervice c"n he tru.'ted for a p""icular tran.,"c(ion. The amount of a,.,ur"nce thai 
a client reqlllfe.1 is completely depew.lent on (he client ~nd how highly he v~llles the information 
he supplies in (he transaction and how imJl<lrtam th~ tran.,action i, In the di~nL 
The (rust calculation col lc-<;(s inlormation lrom third p~rties online ~ecording to the lis( of para-
me(~" prm ided in Tallie 3. I. An oniolngy of industry "P<'cif,~ au(horities. ",atch-dog.,. indus(ry 
bodies. experts and communities allows the client to find (he necessary services to qlK:ry (0 e, -
(abli,h ~ tru.\t r~ ti ng for a cOIlIpHny 
, J.2 btU (11111:\0. 
~ . ""'''Y 
<0 . .. ~·""; ,_""" .""o"";~",,, , 
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Figure 5.14: Ontology .\howiIlg aulhorities that apply to a particular indu,try for a sP<'~iflc 
cOllntry 
In Figure 5. 14. an ontology conlain, in formalion anout authori lies ~oncemi ng the nanking sec-
tor in South Africa. In lhis ~xampk the three regi~t ~red authorities include RankingSA. the 
SOlllh African Ik'erve Rank (SAR B) and (he South Alrican Business Bur~Hu (SABR). In this 
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Figurc 5, J 5: TCr graphic ~lIthority i>~rviC~i> thm apply to ~ trans~ction 
comp"nics, SARB i, th~, official ~uthmity in th~ 'ector and can w.rify wh~t llCr or not a servic~, 
j, r~gi,ter~d as" financial service provider, SABB " "3rd party i,ltlustry walch-dog tlWl mtes 
all tinaocial s~.rvices providers_ From thi, o[\lology, th~ dient can find th~ ,ervic~s that ar~ r~,­
qlLlred In orekr to ~.vaillme th~, scrv ic~,s ~'igllr(', 5. 15 ,how, TI':Fs repr~senl:ltion of the a\lthority 
services ",ltllhe reply reccivcd from qlterying tllC SARB ,crvice, 
Using the client trlLst prder~nc~ docllm~nt with the r~sults from qll~rying the "uthorillcs rdat-
ing to the sel'.'i('es, a trusl va lue c"n be ~stabl i,hed for ~"ch ".,ryic~ i n th~ tran,ad ion, 11", cI i ~nI 
collects the lnrormation r~g" rding ~hi lity and int~grity from tiw, ~utllO rity services arKl otl,er e~ · 
lemal rn~an< ami has no initial values for knnolence. From th~ C I Lent', prd er~nc~ dO<:lLll",nt, 
the tnl st c~lcll i ntion pammet~rs to he u,~d in th~, ~vahlmion for XYZ Cr(',dit i:; sllown in Table 
j,l\, TIte table ,hows the pammetcrs that the client has chosen for ti,e cvallMion. the we i gl~ing 
of ~och parametcr and the value; receivcu rrom lhe ditrercnl authori lics. B",cu on lhi, infor-
m~tion_ tllC ahi lity rating of XYL Credit can be worked out to be /1 = O_:J:J{OJiS7) = o~n_ 
Inlegrity is worked out ~s 0_9974(0,5JJ} 05J2. The wcighting of ().~~74 comc; from the 
integrity value as il is th~ flr.lt transaction Ihat the client has conduct~u wllh lhe s~rvic~, tfom 
these \'"lu~,s . tll~ t rw; t rating of XYZ Cred it ('~n lX', wo rked out to h~, 56,73%. XYZ Cr~,dit CQn 
be conSlllcrcd someIV 11 at trllstIVorthy by the cli~m based on ti, e trust weighting vallLcs the client 
Uecided to use and the re"dts received from eXlern"! sen iccs, 
I f the ('I i~nt J~al, wi Ih X YL Cred i I agai n in lite I' Ulure. thc cilenl protOl ypc wi II recogniL~ XYL 
creJil as a known s~rvic~ and u>;e the avai lahle kne\'olen~e ratings from th~ previous tran,-
~ctjon, and al t~.r Ih~ weighting of benevolen('~ "nJ integrity 10 I~k e into account tllC pr~,\' iOl" 
interoction, In the second transaction, I nt~grity 11 M a \\'eighting or 0,605 and benevolence (),3~5, 
Tallie 5.9 sm,w, tm, same t ahl~ 'IS Table _~ .R. bul has ratings ror benevolence includ~J . lh~ cal-
culation for th~ tru'>1 vaJu~ wi II thus he IJ_:J:J{ O_liM) + ~ (II_Gl),'i{ 0_,) 1 :J j + 1J_:1\J,'i{ O_e(4)) = IH\(;. 
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Name Rating Threshold Value 
, A~creditationlx><ii es , 0.7 I 
Self-regulmory fx:xiie, , 0.6cl 
Pubhc rating of cxpenise in domain , 0.72 
Thiru party ahility rating ! , 0.6.l 
Ability 
, 
Company type 7 I I 
Puhlic cenificate 7 , I 
Puhlic repu!.1tion , O~ 10 
Current Lcgal challenge, 3 0 
Con si,tency , 0.7 
Operationalopenncs, , OA 
A~ceptan~e of coue, of practice , , 
Scnse of jus(ice , 0.34 
Integrity Ob>ervcd consislcncy 7 OA 
Jurisdiction 7 , , 
--
J 
Timely delivery of g(x><is or services 0 
Hene\'o lence 
Adherence lO bu;i,ICss contract I 
, Customer serviLe 0 
! Refund, or exch,mge<; 0 
me high. It the eu.,tomer had a b"d experiencc with a service in the first Ir~ ns"c(ion they had 
Logelher, a ben evolen~e Lable like the one shown in '!lLhle 5.1 0 ~ould be expecled. When trust 
is nalua(cd, a trust raling of 53,74% is obtaincd, This is cxpected becau.'c a bad benelo!encc 
valuc initially docsn't carry as much " cight as integrity imtiall y, j[ the samc parameters arC uscd 
for the thiru anu fourth tr~mactions, Ihe trmt values ~ome 5 .l, 14% anu 49. t (,&,1; respectfully. 
The lrusl model iliu,l:rale, the ability 10 galher information about a serviLe Ii-om uilTerem 
;,ource.' ,lIld to compu(~ ,I ,alue which e~n be us-;:d to mc,L,ure homogenou, sen'ices. If IWO 
,e[l·ice; provide the 'aIne fun~tionalily and Ix>lh ~onl{mn lO the diem's re,triLlion,. lhen lhe 
(rust evalu,l(ion will ,llIow the diell1to choo",;: the service th,lt i:; percei,'ed 10 k more tru,l· 
worthy by o(hcr people. watch-dogs and indUstry blxlies or to ba;e thc ,election of ,cnice, on 
mher fOCLo", .,uch as tran,action ~o\l. A client may he w; IIi ng to pay a prem; um to use" trans-
action palh thut proviue:; more ,NUrunces. tn order to fully evuluute whether Ihe (rust model 
pl'Ol ide> the elicnt with an appropriate mcasurc' of a service's tru,twonhiness, a more robu,L 
study i, re'luired to investigate it, fea,ibility. In thi .' ui ."enat!On, the trust mood addres:;e, Ihe 
re<JlIi ,-emenl of distingui ,lung betwccn two di Irecent sCTvicc, "hen currc'ntly. therc are no "xed 
mech,lIli,ms in pl,lcc to cvaluate >en'icc;, 
figUfC 5.16 shows TEF di,playing differem ,uiwhle transaLl;on paths, along with the trust val-
ue, that "'IS cakulateu fot' e,lCh service, 1n (he clienl punel . (he cumul,llil'e trust I 'alu~ for u 
tran"LLti'~l ch,l in i, ,howilto gilc an overall ;mprc,sion of a transaction palh, The two path, 
.,hown in figure 5,16 i:; 'i 5, no/c. 55%and 56, 17 '7< from lhe top path in the piduce to the bllllOll1 
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'bme Rating Thl'e,ho ld V:llue 
Accr~tlilali o n lxxlics 5 11 .7 
S~ l f-reg lL lalnry hooies 4 0.68 
PLlb] ic rat; n g of expert;'~ in domain 4 0.72 I , 
TIlird pal'll' abi lity rating ; OJ;1 
Ability 
Compa"y type , I 
Pllbli~ certi licme , 
Publi" r~plLtati()n 4 0.5 0.6 
Current Leg" i chal lenge' S U 
Con,islenc'), 4 0.' 
Operational ol:>e"'''''' , 0.' 
AnTpla!l<;C of codes of pmclicc 4 I 
S en,~ {)fjll sli~c 4 0.34 
In tegl'ily Oh,erveJ cons;'ten"y ; 04 
f- Juri,Jic l ion 
, 
Timely deli\'ery of good' 01' 'cr.-ice' ; U.H 
Adherence to N.lS i[Je" nln lrac\ 4 
Ilcncvolel1ce 
Cu,(orT\cr , en kc 4 0.56 
Refund, or exchange, 0 U 
Table 5,9: Ta hl e ,how; ng the In"[ na ilLalioll paramet~" for X YZ Credi t. 
Kame Rnling lllrcsiloJd Value 
THUdy tlel ; \'~ry of goods or ser\'ices 3 U.3 
Ikncvoienc'e 
AJherenc~ to bus; ne,,, contract 4 O.s 
Cuqomer 'ervice 4 O.lfi 
RefLlod~ or cxchange, 0 0 ' 
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contract!O !ll~ PSp, 
Figurc 5.16: TEF graphic 'howing. some possiblc tran:;action paths. 
5.5 CO\I PARISON WITH OTiIER ASSl:RA'lCE \IO IWLS 
As introtlucetl in chapt~r 2. lh~l-e ar~ l~dmol"l!i~s thai exi,t lO provide u,cr·.' wilh a"UraIlCC, 
wflen d~alin g in onlin~ transactiot". nHmpl~s includ~ digita l c~nilicat~'. federated identity 
manag.ement ,y,tems being t.lcwlopctl!O allow U,er~ to authenticate themsch'c~ to domains of 
s~rvic~' and privacy a'suranc~ compani~s such as TRUSTc or JlJlJlOnLine that c~nify weI> 
,itc, and provid~ a sea l of approval for a fee and pro"ide assuran('es to the ('u,torner that Lhey 
lmve evaluatcd tIle b\lsine's policies, 
Whi],t these all provide specific as:;urance:;!O thc clts!Omer. cach systcm is limitcd and in most 
ca'-Cs. wcrc crcatcd 10 bencfit (hc companics that use thcm, Thc LruSt aSSuraIlCC prO!ocol was 
tlewloped beCaLbe of a pe[('ei ved lad of a "uran('e prov"ion for the ('u,tomcr in online tram· 
anion ,. \lli~1> ,erv i('~' complicate provi(!i n g a"urances becau,~ WeI> ,en i c~, at-e design~d to rn, 
modular '-Oftwar~ ani facts that can b~ 'trung lOgctllcr 10 perform complex business process~s. 
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LOIlIpal1ie, inlerl<l lo do with information they receive . The trust asslIrance protocol provide, 
tile lx)w"r of il1f(llm~ti(lIl ami choice \{) lhe ell'lorner. by compelling W~b ,ervil'"' to provide 
inf()rmaricln rh~t, by law. trn,y ;,boule! provid~_ OrK'~ tn., custoIller has Illore information about 
the (r:lm;acti on and the 'erv ice' involved, the service c~n m~ke an informed choice about" hich 
lransa<:lion palh lo "hoo," in order to cOlidllCt his online transuoion. 
111C assutatK"C methods :loove all fall ,h(>rt of provid ing tile customer "jth the ent ire picture of a 
lr(lm,.;;tion. It is 'lulle p",,;ible for a reputable ,,,,yice (0 u," a third parly ,en'lce lhal hu, differ-
ellt \X'licics to the primary ,ervice. The CllWlmer has no way 10 e,wblish (his information from 
a certi~cale. a federated identity 'y,tem, or eWIlthe privacy ,eat cornpanie" Tm, m"t a,S ur-
ance pr()(ocoi Ii II, a gap in 1m, current assurance environment and show, wh~r a"Ufalxes could 
be harnessed from an aSSurimcc protocol. It should be noted thnt the trust assurance prOlocol 
provide, mec'narli,rn, for arl)' of the technologic, abo\'e to be induded In the protocol. thereby 
providing all the benefits of the I"'pect ive techn.)iogie" as weil 'IS pwviding the c",tomer with 











DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The need for assurances in online transactions are required because benevolent services are 
indistinguishable from malicious services when just their external appearance is evaluated. Both 
types of Web services provide the same endpoints and both create and consume well constructed 
SOAP messages. Assurances therefore need to be explicit and more detailed, so that all parties 
concerned can be made aware of possible risks involved in a transaction. 
This dissertation focused on providing assurances to a customer of a Web services transaction. 
The customer is provided with assurances about the trustworthiness of a Web service, and as-
surances about how the (trustworthy) services will use his/her personal information during and 
after a transaction. Legislation governing electronic transactions provides a sufficient base on 
which a trust assurance protocol can be based. It minimizes the assumptions about what in-
formation the customer should have access to and allows a complete protocol to be structured 
around set regulations. The trust assurance protocol allows the customer to be sure of the ser-
vices involved in his/her transaction and allows the customer the freedom to choose the path 
that is most suitable to the customer. 
A trust framework, represented by several artifacts, was created to enable the formation of 
a trust assurance protocol. The Transaction execution framework (TEF) provides a simulation 
environment in which Web services can be deployed and monitored so that their interactions can 
be evaluated. The ontologies provide the necessary vocabularies so that all the parties involved 
in the transaction start form a common base and reduces the negative impact of ambiguity. The 
trust model developed for this dissertation extends an existing concept of trust to incorporate 
trust parameters that can be quantified and used to rate services against each other. As with any 
trust model, the results are subjective because there trust cannot be concisely defined for every 
type of interaction where trust is required. 
6.2 ARTIFACTS 
The artifacts developed in this dissertation were created to provide a solution to this disserta-
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which services are involved, and what will happen with his/her personal information during and 
after the transaction. The vocabularies, protocols and software were all developed to provide 
functionality that an assurance protocol required. The vocabularies were required to ensure that 
the client had the right information at hislher disposal, and that the client and services could 
communicate without fear that ambiguity would jeopardise their interaction. The software was 
developed to implement the protocol and shows what is required from both the services and the 
client to fully utilize the trust assurance protocol. 
6.2.1 Protocols 
The trust assurance protocol consists of two sections; Requesting the transaction chains that 
can be used to complete a transaction, and determining the trust rating of a service by querying 
various external sources. 
In Chapter 3.3, the trust assurance protocol was described and in Chapter 5 the results from 
using the protocol was shown and discussed. The trust assurance protocol is the main artifact 
resulting from this dissertation, as all the other artifact,S were created to facilitate the creation 
and the execution of the protocol. 
The protocols were designed to address this dissertation's main goal, namely, to provide the 
customer with control over his/her transaction. From the evaluation and results chapter, it can 
be seen that the protocol does provide the client with control over the choice of Web services 
to use in a transaction, and also provides the client with trust assurances about the (composite) 
services that he/she chooses. The protocol fulfills the aims of this dissertation to allow the 
customer to enter into online transactions with confidence. 
6.2.2 Software 
The transaction execution framework and the client prototype was created to show how the trust 
assurance protocol works. TEF was created to be a general Web services simulation environ-
ment that can be extended so that different Web service deployment architectures, Web services 
and protocols can be simulated. The modularity of TEF also allows additional modules to be 
created that can add new features to TEF to enhance is applicability to simulate and monitor 
Web services. 
The client protocol provided the client interaction that the trust assurance protocol was designed 
to provide. The goal of this dissertation was to allow the customer to have power over a Web 
service transaction. However, it is not possible for a customer to harness the power of the 
trust assurance protocol without exposing the customer to the complexities of the Web services 
transaction chain. The prototype was designed to show what was expected from the user and 
how a customer could interact with the trust assurance protocol. 
6.3 FUTURE WORK 
There are many aspects of trust assurance that need to be addressed in order to provide a safe 
environment online in which to conduct transaction. The trust assurance protocol described 
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protocol to provide the functionality that client's would need to utilize the trust assurance pro-
tocol. The standardization process involved in creating a standard from a specification will also 
increase the robustness of the specification, and will tie it more tightly to the rest of the Web 
services stack. 
The vocabularies created in this dissertation should be adopted as an open standard and con-
trolled by various bodies, including an unbiased third party to govern the addition of industries, 
authorities and legislation as the online environment evolves to cater for ever more complex 
transactions. Such a vocabulary will increase the ability to detect phishing attacks and mali-
cious services whilst maintaining independence from anyone country or company controlling 
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7.1 EXAMPLE POLICY DOCUMENT 
The XML document shown is a complete sample policy document. 
,')XIT<~ ':e:s~cr.="~. 
·~.--::Gdlng="r,·~f'-?"7 1.:-=-y 
~r.s="l-'.t'::p: \..let d Il '.jst AssU!<lflC(·" 
' ... "-; .... '.','). h,=rnd-~r.std:lCe" 
:- =":."_ '::F--: . La -r Uc>t A.ssLlrctTl ...... 
. \masters,mas:ers .scheIT.a p.--,-=-lCj.xsd"> 
<E!l':: 1 t yNarne>Sure Trave: Company< / Ent 1 t yName> 
< Le:jd 1St a t us>Fa. rt "le r5h lp< I Lega 1St at us > 




<AddressDet a 11 5;> 
<5t reetAddres 5> 
<number> 12 3 < / number> 
<street>Sure Street<lstreet> 
<: 'St reetAddress> 
<Town>Rondebosch< / Towf'. > 
<Clty>Cape T:=)',·<n</Clty> 
<Countq·>50Lltr. Afrl.ca<, Country> 
<P8stC,de P'>st ":ode' 
<. .;::::Id: essCe':: a 1 J.. 5;> 
Fr.ys.:..::a~ " 
(,,:", j(J! es O;:::P'.:. d':" ~ '0-' 
<?JEox;>L:J~~'< 
<To',.,':J--,Kondebosch< Town> 
(,~~ ::.y>::,app ; 0''''' n " Jelty> 
<Country>Scut~ P."frlc:a< C:J1.lntry> 





< St reet Addres 5> 
<number>~23< I number> 
<street>Sure Street</street> 
< StreetAddress> 
< ;,y .... n>Ror,debcsc:h< J ;y ... ·n ,> 
M.:i::lress> 
< L:? ~ > 
</,'>2851 t e>~::. tp: ,"' ............ s:Jret r a \/e 1. . Zd< /\'<.·ebs.:.. t e> 
<..,?~ ~ 1 :::y~'R:"> r,: :p: '''''''''''''.5 ,lret rave 1 . za 1 po lley. xml <' / POI1CyIJRL,> 
<..,Servlee--'I,'L tp: ;. 0:.1 co. S. 20: 97621 aXls2 /suret rdvel< / Servlee;> 
"i r:RI > 
< ?h0r.eNu[T,e,e t- s ,> 
<l'<c.mberCeta 1'::' s > 
<Cesc r ipt lon>Of flee Phone< /Oescr lpt lon> 
<Number>5SS ~234</Number> 
<.." l\'clmberDetal:'s--' 
< NUT'1be rDet all s > 














< jPhoneNumhers > 
< /Contact Oeta 11 s> 
<Jur i Sdlct ionIn format 10n> 
< ,Ju r i sd 1 ct 10n I tern> 
<Jur 1 Sdlct lonDescr ipt ion>Te r r 1 tor 1a 1 < / ,Ju1' i 3dl ct lonDescr lpt 1 on> 
<Jur i Sdlct lonVal ue>South Af r lca<! Jur 1 Sdlct lonVa lue" 
< / Jur lsdlCt 10n Item> 
< / Jur i Sdlct ionIn format 10n > 
<Product I nformat ion> 
<ProductName>Travel Packages</P roductName> 
<P roductDescr ipt lon>We prov ide complete travel packages< /ProductDescr lpt ion> 




< Excl~a:JgePollcyElement '> 
<Po llCl' 1 t emName>NoExchanges < fPollCY ItemNdmp> 
<POllcyltemDescr lpt lon>TravelRouk 1 ngs can not b,:, exchanged< IPa 1 J cyI temDescrlpc lon> 
<Po] lcyIt emVa 1 ue >t rue < IPollcyItemVAl uC'> 
<: IExchangePo] icyElement > 
< / Excl~angePcllcy> 
<RetundPollcy> 
<Re fundPollcyElement > 
<P011CY ItemName>Re fund< IPo 11CY I t emName> 
Chapter 7 - Appendix 
<PolicyItemDescriptlon>Refunds wlll be glven ln f1]ll if package 1S cancelled 3 weeks 1n advance</PollcyItemDescrlptlon> 
<POllcyItemValue>3 weeks from departure date</PollcyItemValue> 
< IRe fundPollcyElement > 
< IRefundPollcy> 
<Securi tyProceduresDescr1pt ion> 
<Secur i tyP rocedureName>NoExt raSecur i ty< I Secur 1 tyP rocedureName> 
<Secur i tyP rocedureDesc r ipt ion>No Ext raneous Securi ty requi rement s 1n place<1 Secur 1 t yP rocedureDescr lpt 10n> 
< I Securl t yProceduresDescr lpt ion> 
< ITermsOfAgreement > 
<Pr 1 vClcyPolicy> 
~PrlvacyPoJ.lcyItem> 
<: P" llCY I t emNamp>P 1 ov loedI n forma t lllnCollect lon < p,)J lCY 1 t emNamp > 
<PCllcyItemDescrlptlon>Wr' collect lnfomntlon thClt lS .suppllrc] tc Ils<:!PollcyIt"OmDescrlptlon> 
<POll ey I temVa 1 ue>t rue< IPollCY ItemVa 1 ue> 
< Ip r 1 vaeyPol icyItem> 
<P r i vacyPc IlCyI t em> 
<PnllcyI temName> Lng In f u rma t 1 C:1<, IPu 11 cy T l <=:>mNCl.mp > 
<POl1cyltemDescrlptlon>We automatlcally log uSdge lnformatlon, lnclud1w1 IF addrf!SS, date c'lnd lLme</Pul1cyItemDescrlptlon> 
<POI1CY I t emValue>t rue< IPol icy ItemVal ue> 
< IP r 1 vacyPo11CY I t em> 
</PrlvacyPoliey> 
<Payment Pol icy> 
<Payment In format lon> 
<Payment In format 10nName>Credi t Cards Accepted</Payment I nf orma t 10nName> 
<Payment In format lonDescr 1pt 10o>We Accept these Crecti t Cards< IPayment I nformat ionDescr lpt lon> 
<Payment In format ionVa I ue>VI$A< IPayment Informat ionValue> 
<Payment Ioformat ionVal ue>MasterCard< IPayment Informat ionValue> 
<Payment In format ionVal ue>Diners Cl ub</Payment rnformat ionValue> 
<Payment I nf ormat ionVal ue>Amer iean Express < I Payment Informat lonVa 1 up> 
<! Paympnt In format 10n? 
<PClyment Informat ion> 
<Payment In format 10nNamp>;,u rqcharges < / Payment III ter mat 10nName > 
<PaymentInformatlonDf'sCrlptlcm>We do not ctldrqe d Lee fo! ,"r,:,dll "arri tran.sac'::.lons<!PaymentTnfc\rmatlonDescrtption> 
<Payment In fa rmat 10nVa 1 ue>None< / Paympnt In format lonVnlue> 
< IPayment In format i on ') 
<Paym~nt I n forma t lon > 
<Payment In format 10nName >Cu r rency< / Pa ymenl In [utmd t 1 unNdme;> 
<Payment In format 10nDescr lpt lon>We accept the f 0110w1ng cur rene les< I Pclyment Informat 10nDescr lpt lon> 
<Payment Informat 10nVa 1 ue,-.ZAR< IPayment I n format 10nVal ue> 
<Payment Informat 10nVa 1 ue>USD< IPayment I n format 10nVCllue> 
</Payment Ioformat ion> 
<Payment In format ion> 
<Payment Info rmat 10nName>PurchaseOrders</Payment Informat ionName> 
<Payment Informat 10nDescr lpt ion> Informat ion regd rding purchase orders< IPayment I nformat 10nDeser ipt lon> 
<Payment Informat 10nVal ue>http://www.suretravel.co.za/FAQ/purchase-orders . html < IPayment Intormat ionValue> 
</Payment Intormat lon> 
< IPaymentPollCY> 
<Pe r sana 1 I n forma t ion ~ 
<BrokerIntormat lon> 
< In format lon Items> 
< It emName >C red i t Cd rd< ITt pmNdmp > 
<.. / :Lr.format lonlt em,i '> 
<PI I> 
<Speclflclnformat lOr.> 
<Per sonal I n format lon Item 1 t emNdme'"''' C redl LCar d"" 
<UsagePol icy> 
<UsagePollCY I tern> 
<POllcyItemName>Not Used< IPo 11 cy ItemName> 
<PolicyItemDescriptlon>CredltCard lnformation is not llsed by SureTravel. When you pay us for a serVIce, we use a mercr.ant 
bank to faciliate payment</PollcyltemDescriptlon> 
< IUsagePollcyI tem> 
</UsagePolicy> 
<StoragePol iey requ i redByLaw'"''' true" > 
<StoragePol1cyItem> 
<Po 1 i cy I t emName > Enc rypt edSt 0 r age< I POll cy I t emName > 
<PolicyItemDescription>SureTravel has to strore transactlon deta~ls as lt lS requlred by law. Credit card informatlon lS 
securely stored us 1 ng appropr late encrypt ion teehnolog les< /Po l1cyItemDescr 1 pt lon> 
<Period>1 year</Period> 
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< / Star agePollCY> 
<SharlngPo11CY> 
< Shar lngPollCY Item> 
<Po 1 ley I temName>NoShar 1ng< /POI1CY I temName> 
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<Pol.:.cy:::temDescrlptlon>SureTravel does not share your credit card details 'n'lth ar.y afflliates or 3.:::-d partles, other than 
':.hose t:=: faClllate the specific transaction</PollcyltemDescrlptlon,> 
( Shar"i:'1gP~I-=-lCY> 
< E~:)ke::-:r,L::,rmc::,: 
<E •. ;::::.C -=- lent I r. f.::: r:1ldc. ::Jr." 
"I" f erma t.:. or:"! ':: ems> 
<::: t E'mt~ame> F 0 ~ 1 !'la,,,e <. / :: temNdffie;-
<.:: ':: er:1t~ame>a.:.:: t I~Da te<. .:: t emNarr e > 
,,-::t emName>(:;en:::le r<, I tem~ame> 
<..,lnformdtlonltems> 
<PI I> 
<Spec 1 f.:. c I n format lon> 
<Fers:Jna 1 I nf 0 rmat lon Item 1 temName= "FullName" > 
<UsagePollcy> 
<UsagePo lle), It em> 
<Po 11e1'::: t ernName> I nterna 1 UseOnly< IPa llCY I temName;. 
<,POllcy:telT,Desc.rlptlon>We collect your full name in order to process ':.hp transdct 
~;sageP:=:llcy> 
< S': -J r a.;;et= -=:: l:.:::y r eq,: ~ re::iByI...d'..J=" YPs" > 
<S,:~-rage?-=::~:-.::,:, ::tern> 
<,?~' ~ l cy I t e['"',~ldf!le>::: nt e.rnd 1 St c, r age< / POll cy I t ernNarne;. 
<-?01:cy:terr::escrlpt l')n>We stor'e all lnfonnatlon ',o,'e tE:'CeiVe tr-JIT; 
<Per year</F-et 
~ / St,_r<lgep::;,.L1CY> 
<ShG1~ :r.j?::;l.'-,-y> 
<Fo':' ley Iterr,Name> Sha re'0;l ': hAf f lllates< IPo 1 icy I ternName> 
< ?Ollcy:::temDescrlptlor.;. 
': r ansa:::t 10n<,' PO.L 1 cy I temDescr ~pt 10:1.-> 
<P011cyIterrJeSCription>From Time to tlme we share information collected about ycu ''''lth our afflllates and slster 
companies in order to provlde better serVlces to you</PolicyItemDescrlptlcn> 
<OtherCompany> 
< CompanyName > Su reHot e 1 s < / Compan yName> 
<Compan yType > T rave I_Le 1 s u re_compa ny< I CompanyType > 
<Cor.tact Oeta lIs> 
<URI> 
<',..'ecs.:. ': e> h+: tp: " '"'"..J'",,. S 'JrehotF' 1 s. C0. za< / Webs 1 te> 
Det a lIs? 




<Pe ::-5C"d ~ -:: c f C nr,at l cr.: t t'r1, 1 r eL,~Jame=" 01 r t hOat e" , 
<.JsageF::::~ 
<F- ,J ~ l:::y,:, t e:n~dr:''''?;- I r.ter,.a 1. CseOn':' l' <-,' POll cy I t emName> 
<?-::':'lcyItemC:;escrlptlcn>We collect your Blt·thOate 1n order to process t;le transactlcn I~y cl~ecklng ~c see ''''hether you \ 
are ellglble for dlscounts based on your aqe.</PollcylternOescrlp':.lon> 
< ! l]sagePo l.:. cy 1 tern> 
<!UsagePol:cy> 
<StoragePo';'l cy requl redByLd· .... =" yes" > 
< St or agePo 1lC1' I terr> 
<POI1CY I t err.Name> 1 nterna 1 Stor age< I Po llCyI temName> 
<Pol::.cyIte:T,CeScrlption>We store all lnformatlon we receive frem 
<Perlod>: year</Per:od? 
< / Stcra'~ePo: 1 cy :::tem> 
<. St~ra~eFo1.:.c,:r' 
<Snarl:,.:jp~ 
<Sho;: r.jF::::'~ ley: ':.e:-:>' 
<Po II ~~y I terrJ~ame>Sno.rp\'Jl thAt f 111 dtes < I POll cy I t emName> 
as a record cf 
<FellC': Item::::es.:r::.ptlon>FL);n Tlme to tlmE' we share lntormat.lor. Collected o.l>.:"lt 
< Corr,po. r: :/t~a["'.e > S'J ren ot t' 1 s <- , c: ~)mpa n yN drne--> 
<. C cIT,par.y-:'ype >Tr a'.:e l._Le 1 su re_company<, CompdnyType' 
<C:):.tactJ"Ota:.ls--> 
<URI> 
<I->ebs 1 te ,http: ! / ',,'W'..J. s'Jrehote 1 s. co, za< IWebsl te > 
</UR:> 
< I Cent actDet a 11 s > 
<CompanyAff111ation>\ri'e are part of the same group of companles<-/CompanyAffl';'latlon> 
</OtherCompo.ny> 
<, S!1o.r:..no,JF::>;"lcy'::tem> 
<. "Shelr In:jFe1::.ey> 
< 'Fe r sC'nd 1':: ,. f c t'mo. t l.:;n:;: tern> 
< Fe rs :lna 1 I n fermat lcn I terr. : temNarr,e== "Gende r" , 
<'JsageF:,'11cy' 
<F:::':'.:.cylt:.emt;ame? :l,:prnai'Jse ;r.1y< Po11cyltemNdme> 
<PC'..1:::-2·Tt""m~pscr::,p'::.1_-'n>',·,re c:11eC"t Gender lnf'HllldtlH. t,~ l-'r~,vlGt" d Oel::.el s"01",'::1::' t~ 
<.. '~lsa~eF, '..:~I·It'=r"" 
'~'sa-=:leF -.:..:. C', ' 
(S::"~!:G1~eF:.~.:.,-· re~:..,.:.!:e:JB\Ld''''=''~·e~lI, 
~ St ~)r aoel',~,~ ~ -==';.' 1 tem.-> 
transact lon< IPolley I t.emOesc t lpt lor . .-> 
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<Po 11 cy ItemName> Internal Sto rage< /POI1CY It pmName > 
<POllcyltemDescrlption:>We store all information we recelve from you as a record of our transactlon</PollcyltemDescrlptlon> 
<Perlod>l year</Perlod> 
< /StoragePo 1 icyI tern> 
< / StoragePol icy> 
<SharingPollcy> 
< Shar ingPollcy I tern> 
<P011CY ItemName>ShareWl t hAf f i 1 iates <iPol icyI temName> 
<PolicyItemDescrlption>F'rom rime to time we share informatl0n collected about you wlth our afflllates And 
slster companies in order to provide better services to yoU(/POllcyltemDescrlptlon> 
<OtherCompany> 
<Compa nyName > Su reHot e 1 s < I Compan yN arne> 
<Compa n yrype> T rave l_Le 1 S U re_company< / CompdnyType> 
<ContactDptalls> 
<URI> 
<Webs 1 te>http://wwv;.surehotels.co.za< /Webs 1 te.> 
</URI> 
< IContactDetalls> 
,<CompanyAfflllat: lon>We Are part of the S~1r"!~ grollp of r::ompanles<I('ompanyAfflllAtlon> 
< /OtherCompany> 
<, iSharlngPollcyltem> 
< I ShAr lngPollcy> 
< IPersonall nformat lonltem> 
< ISpeci f lcI nformat lon> 
</PlI> 
< IEndCl ient In formaton> 
< IPersonal Informa t ion> 
<IConditions> 
</Pollcy> 
7.2 POLICY SCHEMA 
This schema is used to create policy documents for services. 
<?xml verSlon="l.O" encodlng="UTF-8"?> <xs:schema 
t argetNamespace= ''http://dna.cs.uct.ac.za/TrustAssurance'' 
e lementFormDe faul t = "qua 1 i f ied" at t r ibuteFormDef aul t ="unqual i f ied" 
xmln.s : con=" http: I I dna. cs. llCt . ae. za IT rustAssu ranee" 
xmlns : xs=''http://www . w 3. org I 200 I I XMLSehema" > 
<xs: inc I ude schemaLocat lon= "C: \masters \masters \ schpma \contact. xsd" I > 
<xs : incl ude schemaLocat lon= "e: \masters \master s \schema \ In format ion1 tem xsd" I > 





<xs: list itemType="xs: str lng" I> 
</xs: slmpleType> 
</xs:element> 
<xs:element name="LegalStatus" type="xs:string"l> 
<xs: element name="CompanyType" t ype="xs: st rlnC]" I"> 
<xs: element name= "Reqist ra t ionNumber s" mlnOccu rs=" 0" > 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs : element name=" Reglst rat lonDet ai Is" maxOccu rs= "unbounded" > 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs: element name="Descriptlon" type=" xs: str ing" I> 
<xs:element name="Number" type="xs:str1ng"l> 
<xs: element name="Reg i st rat ionAut hor i ty" mlnOccurs=" 0" > 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs : element name""" Author 1 t yName" t ype=" xs: st r lng" I > 










<xs: element ref="con: ContactDetalls" /> 
<xs: element name"''' Jur 1 Sdlct ion In format ion" > 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs: element name=" Jur lsdlct lonlt em" maxOccur s= "unbounded""> 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs : element name=" Jur isdlCt ionDescr lpt 1 on" > 
<xs: simpleType> 
<xs:restriction base="xs:strlng"> 
<xs: enumerat ion vallle="Terr ltoria 1" 1.-> 
<xs: enumerat ion value="Munlcipal" I > 
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< 'xs: rest r lct lon> 
< /X5: slmp':eType> 
<,'xs:element> 
<.xs : element name=",]ur 1 sdlet lonVal ue" t ype=" xs: st ring" /:> 




<... Y.S: seq,lence:> 
< xs: c=!i'F~exType > 
" xs:e:Cement---' 
<.. xs: sequpr.::::e---, 
<. 'xs: cor-:plex~ype., 
<. xs: elerr,er:t > 
" xs: segue"c€'> 
<,' xs: complexType? 
</xs:elemen~> 




<xs: element name=" Regu 1a t oryEadies" maxOccur sO" "unbourJded" > 
<xs: ccmplexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
:elerr,ent na[1le="Name" type="xs:str1ng"l> 
<xs: elemer.t name="Descrlption" type="xs: strlng" /> 
<xs :elernent ref="ccn: :=-or,taetDetails" / > 
< xs: seq'clenee> 
< xs: ~;)mr~exType> 
< xs:e:err,er.t> 
<xs: e~emer.t: name="A2ereCJ~tdt ~onBod:es" r[',dxOccur s="unb'.Jun:::l.eci" > 
<xs : C ~~F. ex :':;~e" 
:e~':":".er'.::: Tl6:""'e="~ame" ~'/pe="y.s:sr-rlr'(:1"/ > 






< xs: eo~.plexType> 
< xs:elerr.ent> 
<xs: e ~ement name=" P r educt In format 1 on" '> 
<xs: 2orr.p~exType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs :element ndme="ProductName" type="xs: strlng" /;> 
<xs: element name= "P roduct Deser 1pt lon" t ype=" xs: st r 1ng" / > 





: s lrnF :i.eCDnt eIlt--' 
<xs:exter,SlCr. oase="x:;:c1eClrnal", 
",xs:attr::.t::utt' ;:ame="currency" type-"xs:str!.ng" use="optlcna':''' 
... xs: slrr,p:eContent;> 
<, xs: ;>xrplexType> 
<"xs:element> 
<xs: e':'~fi,en::: name="T axes" ml nOccu r3=" 0" lDdxOccur s="unbcunded" > 
<xs:::- ))T,p:'exType> 
<xs: seqL:ence> 
:eierr,ent nam<?="TaxName" type="xs: string" / > 
<xs: e':'ernent name="TaxValue" type="xs: str lng" /> 
<xs:element name="TaxCost" type="xs:declmal"/> 
< / xs: sequeLce> 
<-xs:attrlhute name="currency" type"""xs:strlng" use="optlonal" ':> 
< xs: ccrnplex':"ype> 
< xs:e..le.'1':e.'1:> 
<xs :e~em~nt :1dr.'.e="t ransportCost s" mlnCccurs="O" maxOc ... ~urs="l;nbc~lr:de:l" > 
<xs: :::crr,!- :,""X~;.TE:" 
:t:':e;Tie~,t :.dlre="t 1 aLsFJrtDf'scr ltJf lon" tYPf"="x~: st rl:I::1" 
<-xs:a:::trlcu':.;2 :,alT,e="~l.rrency" type-"xs:str tno..J" l~ie="'"';f='':::l-,[.d~'' 
<xs:e:err,ent :1ar:'e="OtherCOSt5" mln()CCurs=-"O" !lldxUccurs="unbo~ln:1ej"~, 
<xs: c~,rrplexType> 
"'-xs; seque.'1ce> 
<-xs: element name'"'"" FeesDescr lpt ion" type=" xs: st r 1 ng" ,I > 
<.xs:eler:lent name="Fees::":ost" type="xs:declmCil"/> 
<. I xs: sequence> 
<xs:attrlbute name="currency" type="xs:strlng" use="optlonal"i> 
< i xs: comr1exType> 
</xs:e':'ement> 
< I xs: seql:er.ce> 
< xs: ccrnplex':"ype> 
"'-X5 ; e ~e',I2:--,:: :ldll.e=" POi -,(:'r.r ')p:' 1 ~ns" Ill: nCc,\~ r s-" (' II" 














<xs:element name="BilnkDetall.s" mlnOccurs-"-"O" rnaxOccurs="unbounrled"> 
c:xs: complexTypf'> 
<xs: sequpnce> 
:elf'ment :lclIllP="Acrnunt_Number" typp=-"xs:strln'1"/> 
:",lpment Ildrnl:-'="Ba:lkNCl.me" type="xs:strlnq"I' 
<XS:01.,ment r.ame-nBran:-r.('ode" tYr""~"x.c.,:st tlnq"/> 
<xs: element name- "BankContdctDetalls" > 
<xs: complexTypp> 
<xs: sequence> 





</ xs : complexType> 
</xs: element> 
<xs :element name=="CreditCardFacLlities" minOccurs="O" maxOccurs="unbounded"> 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs:element name="MerchantName" type="xs:strlng"/> 
<xs:element ref="con:ContilctDetdlls"/-' 
<' /xs: s0qllenCe,' 
<' Ixs: complexTy!='p' 
:plpment'> 
<xs:p;e:'",r:I'- nd:11C.c="P'1'..'rl'en:-MC'tj,( 1" 
<xs;cJl'plF'xTypp> 
<x.c;:sequ""ncE'> 
< X5 : ... lpment name=" Paymen t P 1 'ICPS ~~,j t" !::: ype-" xs: st t 1 ng" /~, 













<xs:elempnt nclmp.="Ccndltlnn~," > 
<xs. cnmp'. exTypp> 
'xs: r:omplpxType,' 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs :element ndme="Gudrant':;cs" mlnOcculS="O"> 
<xs: campI exType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs: element name= "GuaranteeElement" maxOccur s= "unbounded" > 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs : element name= "GuaranteeName" type=" xs: st ring" /> 
<xs : element name= "GuaranteeDecr ipt ion" t I'pe=" xs: st ring" / > 





< I xs : complex Type> 
</xs:element> 
<xs:F:'lement name-""Warrantle:;" mlnO('Cllr 
< xs: ,-omp 1 pxTypp', 
<xs:element name="h'arrantyF.:E'''m'~nt'' 'T'dXOccl:rs-="un!)(lllnded", 
<xs: complexType > 
<xs: sequence'> 
<xs :element na.me="War rdntyName" typv="xs: strlng" I > 
<xs: elemen t name'" "War rant I'Decr 1 pt lon" Lype"''' xs: st ring" / > 







<xs: element name=" ServiceRenderT lmeFrdme" mlnOccurs=" 0" > 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs: element ndme= "CommencmentDa te" t ypp=" xs: date" mlnOccurs=" 0" I > 
<xs:element ndme="ValidUntll" type="xs:da'::.e" mlnOccurs="O"/> 
< / xs: c,eq,IPnce> 
xs:, omp1pxTv!_'P 
xs:e.iF'mpnt' 
<xs : element name=" Use (Account ~ n forma t lon" ff.l nOceu rs=" 0" > 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs :element name="Accesslnformatlon"> 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence maxOcccurs="unbounded"> 
<xs: element name=" Access I n format lonDescr ipt ion" t ype=" xs: st r lng" / > 
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<XS :e':'e::-e:1l cCir:1e="Haln':::erldlJCelnfurmatlufl"-, 
< XS : sequence f'",dXOCCUl S =" unbounded tl > 
<xs: elemen: name="!1dlntenancelnformatlonDescrlpt lon II t ype=" xs: str :.n1" 
<xs: element name="MdlntenanceInformatlonValue" t ype="xs: st r ln~",' > 
<, xs: sequence.> 
<.' xs: complexType> 
</xs :element> 
</ xs: sequence> 
<,' xs: complexType> 
</xs:element> 
<XS : el.ement name= "I ransact lon I n format ion" minOccurs=" 0" > 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence maxO.:curs="unbounded"> 
<xs: element name=" Acees sIn format lon" > 
<)1.5: camp lex Type > 
< xs: sequence rnaxCcclJ rs= "unbounded"', 
: e ':"E::':lle:L t LaDlP=" A,::.:::-ess T n ~ orDld~ lonllf::'sc r L p~ 1 ~ r." !:: ype=" x , : st !:"::. 'L-]" 
"->,.s:e~ement ":1IlIPO"""l\c::::essrn!·~'rlllarlCJnVc\l:"le" ':;"f·e=-"xC';:::;t:-. '0" 
<: xs:element:> 
< xs : e ':"err.e:Lt namp= "l>"1d l n:. E::'nanc-p I r. f urrnd t lUll";> 
"-xs: 2:=:>~,p':"exTypp> 
< xs: seguer.ce rrdxOccur s =" unbounded" > 
<xs: element name= "Ma lntenance In format lonDescr lpt ion" type=" xs: st Llr.g" '> 
"-xs: element name= "Mdlnt enancelnformdt lonVal ue" t ype= II xs : st r lr,g": > 
< I xs: sequence> 
< /xs: complexType> 
</xs:element> 
< ixs: sequence> 
<: / xs: complexType> 
</xs :eleme:lt> 
,,-xs: e lemer.t :lame"''' ExchangePcll cy""> 
<xs: ::::1~mplexTy'Pp..' 
'xs :e':"e~e::t r,afTle="Ex::::nd'lr,]f-"f;)llcyElemeTlt" mc\x:> '~l;;::-s="u[:b()un,j,"ci"', 
. ·::'F~7x-::·~'pe 
:elemer.:: r.d:Tle="f~:lcy~tpmt~dme" type="xs' ;::-:r:'J" 
:e':e;.ter~·_ ram('="F--::~lcy:tE::'rnDescrlptlon" t::'f-'e="Xs;str-l:Io.j" 









<xs: element name=" RefundPo II cyElement" maxOccu rs =" unbounded" > 
<xs: comFlexType> 
,xs: sequence> 
: element :-tarr.e= "Pc~ 11 cy I temName" type=" xS:.'it r lng"!;> 
<X5: elemer.t :-ta:;,e="Pcll cyItemDescr ipt lon" t ype=" xs: st r 1 ~lg" 
:element name="P, llcy:temValup" ,:ype="xs:str1n.:j" 
: S'C'~clence ' 
.. xs: ::-:,mplex~,:~e;> 
, x.s :>?l'?me:1':: > 
<: xs:.s\:<~~,eL::e' 
< x.s: ::,;)rr'F~exTyp,=,-, 
< I x.s: elemer,t ~ 
< XS: eleri,er.o:- nal1lE; =," ~ l spu teReso 1 G t lonCocles" ml nOccurs=" 0" > 
<xs: sequence> 
5 =", ~" '> 
<xs: element naMe= "OisputeResol ut lonDetai 1 s" maxOccur s= "unbounded 11 > 
<xs: ccmplexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs: element name="CodeName" type="xs: strlng" / > 
<xs: elemer.t name="CodeDetalls" type="xs: str lng" /> 
<xs : element re f =" con: ContactDetai ls" / > 
< / xs: sequence> 
< xs: complexTyp,=,> 
<. xs:element> 
< xs: spq:..:er,::e.> 
<:>'.s: ,--'':',"r: c"nt :1a:-:-~=".sf' 'U: 1 t ,:,P 1 ,)cpd\lleS~e':i,' r lpll(jJl" , 
"-X~: ':Ar.~':"ex:~;pe > 
...:xs;",,~erre:-t':: r.ame="SE-curltyP;::-ocedureDesCclptlon" tJ'pe="xs:stclr.?" :> 
<xs:e~e[11e:1':: r.ame'-'''Secllrll_yP;::-ccedureVdlue'' type="xs:strlng" I'1lnCCC '-.l::"s=" ," '> 
xs: seq-le:-tce ~ 
< xs: c:=l:nplexType> 
"- .' x s : e 1 e .. ,e r, t > 














< xs: complexType > 
<xs: sequence> 
<X$: element name=" Pr 1 vacyPo 1 icy I tern" maxOccur s= "unbounded II > 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs : el ement name=" POliCY I temName" type=" xs: st ring" / > 
<xs : element name="Pol icy ItemDescr ipt 10n" t ype=" xs: st J: lng" / > 
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<xs :elpmpnt name="Puyment Intormation" rndxOCCllrs="unhounderl"> 
<xs: complexType'> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs : element name= "PaymfOnt In format lonName" type=" xs: st r lng" I> 
<xs : element name=" Payment 1 n format lonDescr lpt lon" type=" xs: st r lnq" I > 




<- Ixs: sequence> 
<'/xs: complexType> 
</xs:element> 
<xs: element nam,:,,,,"Personal Informat lon" > 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs: element name'" "Broker In format 1 un"--;. 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs; element name=" I n format 10n1 terns" '> 
<xs: complexType'> 
<.xs: sequence/' 
<xs : element name"''' It pmName" mtlXOCCllr S'" "unb0unded'" 
<xs: slmpleType> 
<xs:restrlction base="xs:strlng"> 
<xs : enumera t lon va 1 ue"''' IDNumbe r" I, 
<xs : enumerat 10n va 1 ue= "Unlque 1dent f lerNumber" I > 
<xs : enumerat 10n va 1 ue=" Fu IlName" I > 
<xs: enumerat lon va 1 ue=" F i rstName" I > 
<xs:enumeratlon value="Surname"l> 
<xs: enumerat lon va I ue= "M 1 dd 1 eName" / > 
<xs: enumerat lon value="NameP ref lX" I.> 
<xs :enumerat lon value="Bi rthdate" /> 
<xs:enumto'ri'ltlon value="Gender"l" 
<xs: enumera t lon va I ue=" JobT 1 tIe" I' 
<xs: enume rat ion va 1 ue="MaillngAddress" I> 
<xs: enumera t 10n va 1 up=" HomeTelephoneNumber" I > 
<xs: enumera t 1 on va 1 ue="TelephoneNumbe r" / > 
: enumerd t 10n va I ue= "WorkTelephofleNumber t1 I> 
<xs: enumerat ion va 1 ue= "Ce IlphoneNumber" /> 
<xs: enumerat ion va Iue="FaxNumber" I' 
<xs :enumerat lon value="Emai IAddress" I> 
<xs:enumeratlon value~"LJRL"/> 
<xs : enumerat lon val ue= "Employer sName" I> 
<xs: enumerat lon va I ue= "CompanyDepa rtment" I > 
<xs: enumerat 10n va 1 ue'" "Credl tCardDeta i 1 s "I > 
<xs: enumerat lon va I ue= II BanklngDetalls" / > 
<xs: enumerat 10n va 1 ue= "F inacial Informat ion" I > 
<xs: enumerat lon va 1 ue'" "Computer Informat ion" / > 
<xs : enumerat lon va 1 ue="DemographlcData" I> 
<xs : enumerat lon va 1 ue=" Pol i t icalDat a" / > 
<xs : enumera t 10n va 1 ue=" Heal thData" I > 
<xs : enumerat 1 on va 1 ue= "Transact ionData" I > 







<xs:eIement name","PII" mlnOccurs="O"> 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence.> 
<xs:element name="Specl flcInformatlon" mlnOCCUts="O"> 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs: element name=" Per sana 1 In format lon Item" maxOccurs=" unbounded" > 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs: element name=" ItemName" > 
<xs: slmpleType> 
<xs:restrlction base="xs:string"> 
<xs: enumeratlon value=" IDNumber"l> 
<xs :pnumeratlon value="UnlqupIdent fierNumber" /> 
<xs : enumerat lon va 1 ue-=" Full Name "I > 
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<.xs : enumerat lon va 1 ue'" "MiddleName" / > 
<xs: enUffi€ rat ion val ue= "NameP re f lX" I > 
<xs: enumera t lon val ue=" 81 rt hdate" / > 
<xs:enumeratlon value="Gender"/> 
<xs : erlum€ rat lon va 1 ue=" JobT 1 tIe";, > 
: enume rat l:)n val ue= "Ma lllngAddress" / > 
: enurnerat lon val ue=" HomeTelephoneNumber "/ > 
: en Jrnerat lon val ue= "TelephoneNumber "/ > 
: enumerat lon 'Jd 1 ue= "Wo rk Ie leptlOneNllmbe:-" 
<xs: €:lumerat 10n 'Jalue="CellphoneNumber"! ~ 
:enumerat l on value="FaxNumber"! > 
<xs: enumerat 10n value="EmailAddress" I > 
<xs :enumerat lon value="URL" /> 
: enumerat lon va 1 ue= "EmployersName"'/ > 
<xs : enumerat ion val ue= "CompanyDepartmen t" / > 
< xs: enume rat ion val ue= "Credi t Ca rdDeta 11 s" /"> 
<xs: er:umerat lon value="BanklngDetalls" 1 > 
<xs: enumerat 10]1 value="Flnacial Informat 10n"! > 
<xs : enumerat lon val ue= "Computer I n forma t lon "! > 
; enumerat ion va 1 ue"" "OemographlcData" 1 > 
<xs: enumerat lon va 1 ue= 'I Pol i t lca lOat a" 1 > 
< xs: enume rat lor. val ue=" Heal t hOata" /)-
< xs: enumerat lon val ue= 1, Transact 10nOa t a" /)-
<xs : enumera t 1 On val ue= I, Serv lceUseDat a" 1 > 
res:rlct lon" 
<. xs: s~mpleTypt?--> 
" xs:elprrenc:" 
<xs : e :t:omer,t re f ==" con: USdgl?Po~ 1 cy" ! ') 
:element: Lt:of=o"con:SlUI'dget'ol ;-:y" 
:e:ement ref="corl:ShdrlngPo~lcy" 
< I xs: sequence> 
<xs: att r lbute name="mustProvlde" type="xs: strlng" use=" reqclreci" --> 
< .'xs: c.)mpiexType> 
.: / xs: element> 
< xs: sequence> 
< .. xs: complex~ype> 
< xs:element> 
<xs:elemer.t name="GeneralPGllcy" mlnOCCl.lrs="O"> 
< xs: complt:oxType > 
<xs: sequence" 
<xs :elemer.t ref="con: UsagePollcy" I> 
<xs : element re f -=" can: St or agePollcy" 1 > 
<xs: element re f= "can: Shar ingPollcy" / > 
< / xs: sequenCe~-" 
< xs: complexType> 
< xs: element--> 
< xs:sequen..::e> 
<,' xs: c:Jmplex:ype ~ 
" xs:e:eme:l':' 
<, xs: sequence> 
" xs: complexType> 
"Ixs:element> 
<xs: element name=" EndC llent I n f armat ion" minOccu I' S =" 0" > 
<.xs :c8[f.p':"exType> 
<xs: se:;uence> 
<xs: e :ement namE"=" Inf;)rrr.atlon Items 11 > 
<)o;s: complexType;> 
<xs: sequen::e--> 
<xs: element name= 11 It emName 11 maxOccu rs=" unbounded" > 
<xs: slmp::'e:'ype> 
<xs;restrlctlon base="xs:strlnq"> 
<.xs : enurnel at 10[: va ll.le=" IDNumber" / > 
<xs: enGrnerat ion 'Jalue="Unlqueldent f lerNumber" /;> 
< >:5: enL:rr.<;:'ldtlon vdlue="FullNarne" I:> 
<xs: e:il.::>2~a,:: l'-,~l /illue="F~ [st: Nnme" /,' 
: er.l.;;,erat l:)rJ 'Jalue="Surnarr,e" /-,. 
: ,::r.~:T,e:::-:,t \'all:e="~lddleNdnH?"/-" 
:pr.L.I:T,erat 'la':'uf:'-"Na~ePI-eflx" 
: t:ol.,lmerat :cr, ld':'ue="Blrt_ndate" I> 
<,X5. en'.]meldt !.,~r. value="Gender" 1 > 
<xs :enurner-at lon value="JobTltle" I> 
<xs: enumerat l(~n value="MallingAddress" 1 > 
<xs: enu:;,e I'd t lon val ue=" HomeTelephoneNumber "1 > 
<)0;5: enumer-atlon value="TelephoneNumber" I> 
<xs: enumerat lon val ue="WorkTelephoneNumber"! > 
< xs : enumerat 1 cn va 1 ue="CellphoneNumbe r" 1 > 
<xs: enumerdt ion value="FaxNumber" /> 
<xs: enume ra t lon va 1 ue=" EmallAddres5" / > 
<xs :enumerat ion value="URL" I> 
<xs: enume rat ion val ue= "Employer sName" / > 
<xs: enul"'lera t lon va 1 ue= "CompanyDepartment "! > 
<xs: enume ra t lon val ue= "Credi tCardDeta i Is" / > 
< xs: enume ra t lon val ue=" BanklngDetalls" / > 
<xs : er.umera t 1 nn val ue= "F i naCla 1 I n format lcn" I> 
<xs:enumerdtlcn value="ComputerInformatlon" > 
< xs : en Jmel at lcr. va 1 ue=" Demog r dphicDatd" i 
"Xs:erl c lmeratl:)r. valup="PolltlcalData"l> 
<xs: enL:l"e,a': ')d1 Ut:o="Hp3~thDdld",' ~ 
: en'-":;;,e rat 1 :.,rJ va 1 ue= "T r ansact i0TlLJaf d" 
<xs: er.umerd~ 10:1 value=" ServiceUseDat a" I 
". xs: restrlCt 10:1/ 
<. xs : s :.mpleType" 
< xs:element;> 












< Ixs: complexType> 
</xs:element> 
<xs:element name="PII" minOccurs="O"> 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs: element name=" Spec 1 f ic I n format lon" minOccurs=" 0" > 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs : element name= "Pe rsona 1 I n forma t ionltem" maxOccu rs= "unbounded" > 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs : element nClme=-" 1 t pmNi'lffiP" max()ccu r s=-" unbcunded" > 
: <ilmp]pTYf--lE» 
: enumf'tilt 1 :lrJ \!?ll 'le=" TDNulllb'~~l" /> 
: pn\ltre )"<'J. t l:in V,1; 11P=" (In 1 qUI? 1 dent f 1 e rNumbp r " I 
:enumero.l 'Jdlue="FullName" i> 
<xs : enumerat 10n va 1 ue=" F lrst Name" /;-
<xs:enumeration value="Surname"/> 
<xs : enumerat ion va 1 ue= "MiddleName" / > 
<xs : enumerat 10n val ue= "NamePref ix" / > 
<xs : enumerat 10n val ue=" Bl rthdate" /> 
<xs : enumerat 10n val ue'" "Gender" /> 
<xs : enumerat ion val ue=" JobT i tIe" I> 
<xs: enumerat lon val ue= "Mail ingAddress" / > 
<xs : enumerat ion val ue=" HomeTelephoneNumber" 1 > 
<xs: enumerat lon val ue=" TelephoneNumber" 1 '> 
<xs: enumera t ion val ue= "Work Telephone Number" 1 > 
<xs: enumera t lon valuE'= "e", llphvrJeNumbe e" 1 '> 
<xs: enumerat 10n valuc="FaxNumher" I> 
<xs:enumeratlon value="EmallAddress"l> 
<xs:enumerat Ion value="URL"/> 
:p:lUmer-atl'in VCl.~IlP-"l::mpj-,,/pr:,t~amo'" 
: enume cat l,n va ~ 11P- "':'-)mpanY0epO r t, :-:'er~ t " 
: enumerat 10)' Vi'llllP-"Crpj 1 t Ca 1 rJ[)el d 1 J s" 
:"numprFltl,~n "i'llup=-"B"nklngllelcll L.s", 
:pnumerrt~ 1,)n 'Ji'lll~(,="~"ln'1Clrtl Informdt lon"! ' 
<xs : enumerat lon Vi'll ue= "Comput f'r I n format lon" / '> 
< xs : enumerat lon val ue= "DemographlcData." 1 > 
<xs : enumerat ion val ue= "POll t i calData" I> 
< xs: enumerat lon val ue=" Heal thData" 1 > 
<xs: enumerat lon val ue= "TranC'iact ionData" 1 > 
<xs: enumerat ion value="ServiceUseData" /> 
</xs: restriction> 
< Ixs: simpleType> 
< /xs: element> 
<xs: element ref="con: UsagePollcy" I> 
<xs: element ref="con: StoragePollcy" I> 
<xs : element re f ",," con: Shar lngPollcy" 1 > 
< Ixs: sequence> 
<xs: attribute name="mustProvicJe" type="xs; st ring" use=" requlred" / > 
< / xs; complexTypp> 
:element> 
: s"quencc' 
< / xs: cC',mplexTyp"" > 
'xs:el"'mpnt 
<,xs :element ndme"'-"0en""rdlP()l~cy" 11\1 :1\';ccurc;,,--"O" '> 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs; sequence> 
<xs :element name="UsagePollcy"> 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs: element name="UsagePol icyItem" maxOccurs=" unbounded" > 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
< xs: element name=" POllCY I t emName n > 
<xs: simpleType> 
<xs: rest r lCt lon base="xs: C'it rlng"> 
<xs: enumernt lon value="Current Transact lonOnly" I> 
<xs: enumerat ion val ue= "Not Used" / > 
<xs: enume rat ion val ue=" I nterna 1 UseOnly" / > 
<xs:enl,mer<'ltlon val\lp--"SltpAdmlnlst,at j )rllhp"/ 
:'::'lHlmPldt ':cll\lp="l:lt p rncl.ll;c;r>'" 
<XC'i :pnumerat ~on vAlup="lnteralResearch" I 
'xs :enumerelt 10:1 Vel L\le="Slt""C>~c;tJ)m17>'lt )( [1" 
:pnumeraL V"lIIP--"TJ':.,prTr,]cklnq",' 
:enumprat lon val,10="Harket 1 r.g" I' 
</xs:restrlctlon-> 
< 1 xs: S 1mpleType> 
</xs:element> 
<xs: element name=" P011CY ItemDescr lpt lon" type=-" xs: st rlng" 1 > 
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<xs: element name= "POllCY ItemVal ue" t ype=" xs: st r lng" mlnOccurs=" 0 n maxOccu rs=" unbounded" 1 > 
</xs: sequence> 





<xs: element name=" StoragePollcy" > 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
< xs: element nAme= II StOl-'l.qPP(") 11 ('} I t em" maxOccurs~" unbounded" > 
<x.s: complexType > 
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< xs : element ;'.arne= II Polley 1 temName II > 
<XS: slmpleType;> 
<xs:restrlctlon base="xs:strlng"> 
<xs; enumerat lon vdlue="NoStorage" / 
<xs : enumerat lon val ue= "Current Transact ionOnl y" I > 
<xs : enumerat 100 va 1 ue=" RequiredByLaw" / > 
<xs: enumerat lon value=" Indefinltely" /> 
: enumerat ion val ue= "EncryptedStorage" I> 
<;xs:restrlctlon> 
<,' xs : s impleType> 
<'xs:element> 
<xs:element name="PollcyltemDescrlptlon" type="xs:srrlnq" :rl;.iJC:::t..:ts="C" '> 
< xs: element name=" AcceptableVal ue" t ype=" xs : st: .:. n~" 
<xs:element r;dme="Per10d" type="xs:srrln:;J" mlr:L,C~l LS='" 
<xs:e~eme:1t name="Fro[I''' type=-"xs:date" ml:1'J:::'ccrs=,,:,II > 
:e~f:::'rr.e'l::' r.ame'""'''l'c'' type-"xs:ddt P " mlrl:J" 5="0" 
: e .:.errent name== "Ot herCornpany" m1 n0ccur 5 =" (J" :'".ax::'" :"CC; ::-5=" _ LL;:: .1: 
<-XS: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs:element narne="CompanyName" type=="xs:strlng"l> 
<-xs:e.l.ement name="CompanyType" type="xs:strlnq";,> 
<- xs: element ref=" con: ContactDetall s" m1 nOccur s=" 0";' > 
"xs:element name="CompanyAffillation" type="xs:strELJ" I> 
<- 1 xs: sequence> 
<: I xs : campI exType> 
<-/xs:eIernent> 
< xs: sequence> 
<-/ xs: complexType> 
<;'xs:element> 
<-I xs: sequence> 
<xs:at':.r1bute name="requ1redByLaw" type="xs:st:L·:;.nq" ~se="::-e=;:L::..rej" '> 
<- xs:complpxType;. 
xs:e:emer.t'> 
~xs:e_e~-e;.: tJamp,-"Sndrl:Lj?ol:.., y"~' 
"xs: ccmp:,::,xTyp,-
<-xs:elelT,erll r.a~lIe="Shal:..r:qP, ll~''jlte~'' 
<-xs: 2cmplex~yp,~> 
"':xs: seque~lce> 
<-xs :elemer.t ~lame="PolH.:ylternNdme'" 
<XS: 5:..mpleType '> 
<X5:restrlctlon base="xs:string"> 
: enu[!",erat lon value="NoShar lng";' > 
: enurnerat lon value="SharingWlt hAgents" 1 > 
<xs: enumerat lon value="OeliveryServlces" /> 
<xs : enumerat lon val ue=" Transact 10nServlces" / > 
<xs: enumerat lon value=" 3rdPart les" /> 
<xs: enumerat lon val ue=" Unre lated3 rdPart les" / > 
<x s: enumerat lon va 1 ue= "Genera IPub lle" / > 
</xs:restrlction> 
< J xs: slmpleType> 
<, xs:element:> 
: element name=" P011CyI t emOesc r :..pt '..011" l 'lpe=" xs: s::::::: 1 ~l j" :;:;':-' .• -c Li.cS ==" ~ 
";:.:s:~lement name=".r,c'~f'ptableVa~I.;e" tYPt:';""xs:stt~CJ" l::;=" " ;;,rtX'_ '='-,lS="'~:LD~ :n:=l.ei" ') 
:""lemt-nt r.arre="O'_herC CJmpany" 
'-xs: sequence;. 
:element :ldme="CompanyName" type="xs:stL'll:q" ;-
'xs:element name="CompanyType" type="xs:strlng" > 
"xs : element re f ==" con: ContactDetai ls" rnlnOccur s=" C" 1 > 
<-xs:element name="CompanyAfflllatlon" type="xs:strlnq" I> 
<, xs:sequence> 
< xs: complexType> 
< /X5: element> 
< / xs: sequence> 
< I xs: c0mpl exType> 
</xs :element> 
< 1 xs: sequence> 
"/xs:ccmplexType;. 
'/xs:element> 
< xs: sequenc::E:'> 
< xs:c()mf.Clex~ypp'> 
< xs: elernen: ' 
< xeS: sE<l:Jen.·p' 
xs ~ :-q:;~ex ~!-..,,> 
xs :e ... e:r,er.' ~ 
" xs;seT..len2e~ 
" 'xs: ('cmp1.ex:'ype > 
< xs:e:emer:t---
<- xs;sE<ll:er.ce> 
< I xs: cClmFlexTl'pp~, 
<I xs:e:err.er.t> 
<I xs:se;:::uence'> 
<, xs :complexType> 
<-,xs;elemen':.> 
</xs:seqJence;. 
< I xs: comp':'exType> 
'xs:element> 
<xs :element name="~sagePol'..cy"> 
<xs: c'Jmplex;ype> 
"xs: sequen..:::e> 
<xs :elemer.t na.:.,e="USdQeP:::: :cyTtem" maxUccurs="unbuunded"> 
<xs: ccmplexlYFe > 












"-xs: element name"'- "Po llCY I lemName" > 
<,X5: slmpleType> 
<xs: restriction base"'''xs: string"> 
<xs :enumeratlon 
'Xs : enumerat ion 
<xs : enumprat lon 
: enumerat lon 
<xs :cnumeratlon 
<xs :enumerat lon 
<xs : enumerat lon 
<xs : enumerat lon 
val ue= "Current Transact lonOnly" I > 
value="Notllsed" /> 
value=" InternalUseOnly" /> 
vAlue=" Sl teAdmi n1 st rat 1 onUsp" / '> 
value~" InternalUse" /> 
val ue=" I nte ra 1 Research" I:> 
vrtlue=" Sl teCustom 17.at 10n"! > 
value="UserTracking" I> 
<xs: enumera t 10n val ue= "Ma rket lng" / > 
</xs: restrict lon> 
</xs: simpleType> 
</xs:element> 
<xs: element name="PollcyltemDescr lpt ion" type="xs: string" /> 
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<xs: element name=" POI1Cylt emValue" t ype=" xs: st r lng" minOccurs=" 0" rna xOccurs= "unbounded" / > 
</xs: sequence> 
< / xs: complexType> 
</x.s:plement> 
<!xs:sequence> 
<, / xs: complexType;> 
</xs:element> 





<X5: element name=" POI1CY I t emName" > 
<XS: slmpleType> 
<xs:restrlctlon base="xs:strlng"> 
<xs: enumerat ion va 1 ue= "NoStorage" / > 
<xs : enumerat lon val ue="Current Transact ionOnl y" / > 
<xs : enumerat ion val ue=" RequiredByLaw" / > 
<xs: enumerat ion value=" Indefinltely" /> 
<xs: enume rat lon va 1 ue=" EncryptedStorage II /> 
<xs: enumerat lon val ue="Norma 1St orage" /> 
</xs: restrlctlon> 
<! xs: slmpleType'> 
:e~ement ;> 
: e 1 empnt name=" Poll ey I t emDescr lpt lO~l" l ypp=" xs: st r l ng" mlnOccu rs=" 0" / > 
: element namp=" Accept nhlF;Vnl ue" t ype=" x s : st r lng" mi nOCCtl rs;-" 0" maxOccur 5=" unbounded" / '> 
<xs: element ni'lme="Perlod" type="xs: st r lng" mlnOccllrs="O" /> 
<xs.element name="From" type="xs:dale" mlnOCc_"\Jrs="O"/> 
<xs:elpment name;-"To" type="xs:date" mlnOcc'lrs="O"/> 
<xs : element name= "01' he rC'omp.-lny" rnlnOCCli r s=" 0" mdxOccur so=" unbnunued" > 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs:element name="CompanyName" t:ype="xs:strlng"!> 
<xs: element name="CompanyType" type=" xs: st ring" /> 
<xs: element re f=" can: Cant actDet ai Is" m lnOccu rs=" 0" / > 





</ xs: complexType> 
</xs:elemenl> 
</xs: sequenC0> 
<xs:') t t r lbut p namp=" requl redByLaw" t ype=" xs: s t r lng" use= II requ l ::-ed"! > 
<~ / xs: c:)mplex~ype'> 
</xs :element> 
<xs:element name="ShAtlngPollcy"'> 
<xs: camp 1 exType> 
: spquence" 
< xs: e lemenl ndme=" Shn r lnqPnllcy I tern" ffiaxCkcu r s-,--" unbcll::Lded" '> 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs: element name=" Po llcy ItemName"" 
<xs: simpleType> 
<xs:restrlctlon base="xs:string"> 
<xs: enume rat 10n val ue="NaShar i ng" / > 
<xs: enumerat ion val ue=" Shar ingWi t hAgent s" / > 
<xs: enumerat lan va 1 ue=" Dell very$erv ices" /> 
<xs: enumerat ion va 1 ue=" Transact ionServ ices" / > 
<xs: enumerat ion val ue=" 3 rdPa rt ies" I > 
<xs: enumerat lon va 1 ue=" Unre 1 at ed3 rclPa rt les" / > 
<xs: enumerat ion va 1 ue=" Genera 1 F\lbl i," / > 
</xs: rest r let ion> 
</xs:slmpleType> 
: element> 
<xs: element name=" Polley I t emDesc r 1 pt lon" r- ypP-" xs: st r lng" ml nOccurs=" 0";''' 
<xs: element name=" Accept ableVa 1 ue" t ype=" xs: '3t r lng" mlnOccu rs=" 0" maxOccurs=" unbounded" / > 
<xs: element name= "OtherCompany" mlnOccu r 5=" 0" mdxOccu rs--''' unbounded" > 
<xs: complexTypp> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs: element name="CompanyName" type="xs: st flng" / > 
<xs: element name= "CompanyType" t ype-"" xs: st 11 nq" / > 
<xs : element ref=" can: ContactDeta lIs" min()ccur s= II O"!;> 
<xs: element name= "CompanyAf f llla llon" lype=" xs: st r lng" /;-
</xs: sequence> 
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( xs;se:;:uence-:. 
< xs: corrplexT'l!>2_' 
'-.., xs:e~e;-r,e'.+:::' 
< xs: seq'_le",::e > 
'" xs: ccmp:ex:-y~t:'_' 
( xs:e~erneilt-" 
xs: SCr:e:11d-' 
7.3 PARTNER REQUEST SCHEMA DOCUMENT 
- 137 -
This schema allows for the creation of partnerRequest and partnerRequestResponeList elements 
used in the trust assurance protocol. 
,= " 
tFc'::-rr'~ efa'..;~::' = "qlia..:cl fled" d:' ': 1 '--o'~lt.eFormDe fdU: t ="l.flqual1 f 
:xs="r.::.tp: "'i'i:"'<!.w.3.cu:J =-00: XMLSchema" 
x!",lns: : r.f="ht tp: I :Jna. cs. uet . de. za,' Tn.:stAssuranCe" > 
: import namespdce="http:,' /dna. cs. 'LICt za/TrustAssurance" Sr:t~err,dL" cat .on="C: li'aster:s 'nlaster s schema POliCY. xsd" /> 
:lmpca-t namespace="r.ttp: idr,a .. uct.dc.za/TrustAssurance" schemaLI ,-at.l':"L="~: ni(1Sc-"'::-s'!T,astf:''::'S sr-r.ema C'lntact.xsd"!> 
; e ~emen t na."e==" Pa r ': ne.cReques t "> 
<xs: corr,plexType> 
<xs: element came==" Ser\' 1 cePart ner 5" > 
<.xs: co",plexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs: element name=" Se rVlcesRequest Type" > 
<.XS: slmpleType.:> 
<'xs:restrlctior. base="xs:strlng"> 
<.xs: enumerat lon value=="RecommendedServlces"! > 
<.xs : enumer at 1 on \'c'l. 1 ue==" AllServ lces" I:> 
xs:restrl~tl0n.:> 
<. xs: sl:T,pleTJ'pe> 
xs: element-:> 
<'x~o'p:el1,ent ref="P('strl,-~t:~:I::O" 1111tlU' curs=="'J"/' 
<.xs:e:emer.t ;:ax.e="Rt:'li;rr.lr:f(;cr,rlt:c\n" mln()( ~="( 
<.xs: c8x,p:exType.:> 
"XS: seq'Jf:':'"lCe-" 
<..xs: e~elilE:::r,t ref==" ~nt: Ir.furmat.:.')nltem" /--' 
, xs: seque:lce > 
xs complex Ipe--, 
xs :e:efl'ent > 
xs: sequence--' 
<.1 XS: CO]T,p:exType.:> 
<'/xs:element> 
<.xs: element name==" Serv lcePartner sMetaDa t a" > 
<.xs: complexType> 
<.xs: seqiJence;.. 
<.xs :e~er.lent name="Restrlct lons" ffilnOccurs="O"> 
<.xs: c;:;mplexT). pe> 
<'xs: seqL:ence:> 
,-xs; elernell: ref =" Infurrnat 1 onltemRest r lCt: l~ns II 
,xs:e~ement ret="ServlceRestrlctluns" I) 
xs: se:;uer. =e > 
<. XS:Sf'q:...:e:Lce/ 
<. y's:co:"p~ex:'ype" 
<. xs: e~e",ent) 
<. xs: C:L~ .:.ce> 
,xs:a<-trlbutP name="oept~l" type="XS:lnt" 11se="optlonal"/> 
<. xs: complexT~'pe-' 
xs:elemer.t> 
<.xs:element name="Restrlctlons"> 
<. xs: complexType > 
<.xs: sequence> 
<.xs : e lemen~ re f =" I n format 10n I temRest r lCt Ions" I '> 
<xs: e le:T,ent re f =" Serv iceRest r let lons" / > 
<. /xs: sequence> 
<. 1 XS: cO:T,plexType> 
<. xs:e.iement ') 
<. xs : e :er;)ent ,l"n,,,,==" Se ~-\'l', esGr:Jup" > 
(;':5: C0nL!=-'1.:,x·:-ype/ 
'-xs: se-=juer:-'::t::-" 
:ey.tE::::,s~,~r, CdSe="xs: sl r 1I.q" 
:s~rr'p.ieC:=:r.tL;:':Jt') 
'- Y.S: ~:-rplexType> 
xs: e':'e:re:.'.: > 
:e~eme[lt ret=="Ser\·~=elr.format l'JrJ" max(),-'Cuts7""urlu~)un:1ed" > 
XS: seq'Jecce> 
<'xs:attrlbute narr,e=="groupNumber" type="xS:lnt" use="requlred"l> 


















<xs: element name=" Serv lcesGroup" maxOccu rs= II unbounded" > 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs: element name=" ServicesGroupName" > 
<xs: complexType> 





<xs: element ref="Ser Vlce Informat ion" maxOccurs="unbounded" /> 
</xs:sequence> 
<xs:attrlbute name="groupNumber" type="xs:lnt" u:::;e="requlred"!> 





< xs: element name=" Er rorMessage" rnaxOccu rs=" unbounded" > 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs :element name="GroupNumbpr" type"'-"xs: lnt" I> 






< 1 xs: complexType> 
</xs :element> 
<xs : element name=" ~ n f 0 rrni) t 1 on ItemRest r lct ions" > 
<xs: cornplexType> 
"-xs: sequence> 
< xs: element name=" Info r rna t 1011 r l emNdrne" mlnOCCll r s=" 0" mdxC!ccur .00= "l.lnbnunded"" 
<XS: slmpleTyp('> 
"-xs: restrlctlon base="xs: strlnq"-'" 
<xs: enumerat lon va 1 ue=" I DNumbe r" / > 
<xs : enumer cit ion va 1 ue=" Unlque I dent f le r Number"! 
<xs: enumerat ion val11e="FullNamp" /> 
<xs: enumerat ion valuC'-="FirstName" I" 
<xs: enumerat ion value=" Surname" I> 
<xs: enumerat lon va 1 ue=" MiddleName" /" 
<xs: enumera t lon val ue= "NamePref lX" / > 
<xs: enume rat ion value= "Bi rt hdate" /..,. 
<xs: enume rat ion val ue="Gender" / > 
<xs: enume ra t ion val ue=" JobT i t le" / > 
<xs: enume rat ion val ue=" Mai IlngAddress" 1 > 
<xs: enume rat ion val ue=" HomeTelephoneNumber" / > 
<xs: enumerat ion value="TelephoneNumber" /> 
<xs: enumerat ion va 1 ue= "Work Tel ephonf':Number" / ' 
<xs: enumerat ion val ue="CellphoneNurnber" I> 
<xs: enumerat ion val ue="FaxNumber" I> 
<xs :enumeratlon 
<xs : enumerat ion 
'Xs : enumerat lon 
<xs : enumeratlon 
<xs : enumerat ion 
<xs : enumerat ion 
'Xs : enumerat ion 
val ue=" Emai lAck:lress" 1 > 
valueo;"URL"I> 
va 1 ue=" EmployersName" 1 > 
va 1 ue=" CompanyDepartment" 1 > 
va 1 ue=" BanklngDet rti Is" / > 
value="Finaclal In forrndt ion" /> 
va 1 ue=- "Compllte rIn format inn" 1 > 
"-x s: enumerat lon va 1 ue"''' DemographicOat a" I"" 
: enumerat ion valu0="Poll t icalOC1tCl"'/" 
<xs : enurne ra t lon val ue=" Heal thDa ta" / > 
<xs : enume rat ion val ue= "T ransact ionDat a" / > 
<:xs : enume rat ion val ue=" ServlcetJseDa ta" / > 




<XS:chOlce minC!ccurs="O" maxOccurs"'-"unbr)unded"> 
<xs:element- ref="Exact lyOne"I" 
<xs:element .:::-ef="All"/> 
< xs: element re f=" AllowAllExcept" / > 
<xs: el<:>ment ref="DF'nyAllExcppt"!-' 
: element re f = "Res t r lct lonConril t 1 nn" rndxUl:ClI r s=" \Inb(~\lnd(~d" / 
</xs :choice-> 
</xs: sequence> 
< /xs: complexType > 
</xs:element> 
<xs: element name="Assert ions" > 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs: element name=" AllowAllExcept" / > 
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<xs; corr,plexType> 
<xs: seque:1ce> 
<xs: Cr.-::1Ce rranOccurs=" 0" maxOccurs= "unbounded" > 
<.xs :elernent ref="Exact lyOne" > 
<xs:e.iement ref="All"/> 
<xs: e~err,ent ref= 1t Ai-I owAllExcept "I> 
<xs: element ref="DenyAIIExcept" I > 
<xs: e lemer. t re f = "Rest r lct lonCond 1 t lon" maxOccur soO "unonunded" J > 
< xs: cr,Olce> 
'xs: seqL.ence'> 










<xs : element 
( xs: chence> 
xs: seq'Jence> 
<- xs: complexType'> 
xs:element.> 
ref="Exdct lyOne" I> 
ref="All" I > 
re f=" Al ~owAll Except" / > 
:,ef="CenyAIIExcept" I> 
re f =" Res t r lct lonConctl t lon" maxOccu r s= "unbounded "! > 
<-xs :element :1ame="=:;enyAl ~Except "> 
<xs: comp:ex:ype> 
<xs: sl::'q...:er.ce,> 
"-xs: '~"lC:lce :;lr,C,,>._~,lrs="U" :r,dXOC'~ urs="unbouTlde~i" > 
:e:emer.t ref="Exactlyune" 
:e:err,er.t ref="A::" 
<-xs : e 1 erne:'.t Ie f oo" Al ~ Q' ... '.n.ll Except" 
:elemer.t Ief="DenyAl~Except"/> 
<xs: element ref="Rest I1Ct l0nCondl tlon" maxGccut s="unbounded" / > 
< 1 xs: ::I-'.c::.:::e> 
<- / xs: seqlJence> 
< 'xs: comp:iexType > 
< xs:element> 
<xs :element name="Al:i.oWA'.lExcept ",> 
<xs: comp.iexType > 
<xs: sequer.ce> 
<xs:cnOlce mlnOccurs="O" rnaxOecurSoo"unbounded"> 
<xs:element ref="ExactlyOne"l> 
<xs:elempnt ref="A11". > 
:element ref="Al1owAllExcept" I> 
<xs:elemer.t ref="DenyAlIExcept"l> 
<xs: element .::-ef="Rest rlct lor:Condl t lon" maxOccuC':i="~lr.hounded" > 
1 :e'> 
xs: se::rJer.:::!:::--' 
< xs: ,~~c:mr lexTY~'e-> 
<- xs :e1emer.:" 
<xs :e1eme:1t name-"Restrl.::t ~c:r.l'")n:llt 10n"'> 
<xs: c0mt:lex:yp",> 
<xs: sequen::e,~ 
<xs:e:emer.t r.ame="ItemName" mlnOccurs="O"I> 
<xs : e '.emer.t name=" Res t r lct 1 onName" / > 
<xs :e:ement nameoo"RequlredValue" type="xs: strlng" 1 > 
:e'.emer.t 'Lame="Setvlcevalue" type="xs:stIlng" rnlnOccurs="O" I> 
< xs: seql;ence > 
<xs:attrlbL:te name="ve1~flable" type="xs:strlng" use="optlonal"/> 
<xs:attrlbute name="crltlcalFault" type="xs:string" use="optlonal"/> 
<- xs: comt:'lexType> 
< xs:element> 




"'C"~"'rr,er.t ref="Exa.ctl'yr~r.e" > 
:e~er:,er.t re!=".n.:~Y""A~~E>:,-~ept"l 
<xs :e':'emer.: ret="JenyAllExcep<::" 1-> 
: e:ement re f oo" Res t r let 1 onCondl t lUr." maxOccurs=" ur\bounded" /.> 
<lxs:se=1,JerJ ce> 
< 'xs: ccmpiexType.> 
</xs:e1ement.> 




<xs: element ref=" Serv1cesGroup" / > 
< / xs: sequence> 
< xs: ccmplexType> 
xs :elerner.t-> 





< xs: complexType > 
~ IXS : eleTi.en::: > 

















<xs: element name=" Rest r let lonMatchAs sert 10n" > 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs: element nampoo-u S 19nedAsse rt ion" minOc:curs=" C" /> 
<xs: element nCl.me=" Acknow 1 eciqedAs,3E' rt 10n" ffiln(Jccur s=" 0" / '> 
< ,Ix,,: sequpnce> 
< IXS: cnmrlexType 
ixs:eloment '> 
"xs:,:;,lement narne="Rpstrlct lonMalchFdl JUt"'''-, 
<xs: complexType> 
"xs: sequence> 
<xs: e lemen l re f =" Res t r let lonC.jlld 1 t 1 un" maxOccurs="unh0\lnded" / > 
</xs: sequence> 
< /xs: complexType> 
< /xs: element> 
<xs:element ref="inf:Po11CY" ffilnOccurs="O"/> 
</xs: sequence> 





<xs : complexType name=" Pa rt ner sRequest Type";-
<xs: choice> 
<xs : element name= "0 1 r ect Se rVl res" '> 
'XS: complexType' 
<xs: simp] eType> 
<xs:restrlctlon base="xs:strlng"'> 
<xs: enumerat lon vo.l ue"'"" RecommendedSe PJ 1 ces" 
<X5:enumeration vdlue="All~;ervlres"I' 
</xs: restr lct ion> 
< I xs: simpleType> 
</xs :element> 
<xs: element re f="Rest r lct lons" mlnOccurs=" 0" I> 






<xs : element name=" Rest r lct lons""> 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequencp> 
<xs: element ref="" In fnrmn.~ lonltemRpst ,1 ct 1 on ~" I> 





<xs: element name="" Se rVlcePa rtnersMetaDa t a" t ype=" xs: st r lng" 1 > 
~ Ixs: chOlce> 














<xs : element name=" t,erVi ceEqu J vrllent s" > 
< xs: camp lexType > 
<xs: sequence> 




<xs: element name=" ServiceGroups" > 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs: element ref =" Se rVlceEqui valent s" mi nOccur.<;=" 0" maxOccurs=" unbounded" / > 
< / xs: sequence> 
</xs: complexType> 
</xs:element> 
<xs : element name= "PrtrtnersRequest ResponseLlst" > 
<xs; complexType> 
: sequencE''> 
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: <c.ler:1er,':: ".ame="Ser'}~ceName" type="XS:strlrlg" 
:e~E:::~er,:. r.ameoo"Serv .. ceURL" type="XS:S~rlng" > 
: sequence mlnVC'':::Urs=''O''> 
<xs: element ref="lnf: Informatlonltem" rnaxOccurs="unbcunded" 
<, xs: sequence> 
<, xs: sequence> 
<xs:element ref="inf:Po11CY" mlnOccurs="O"/> 
<xs:element name="ServlceFault" rnlnOccurs="O"> 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: choIce> 
<xs: element ref="Rest r let ionCondl t lOr." maxOccurs=" unbour.aed",''' 
<xs:element name="NoFaults"!> 
< 'XS:chOlce> 
< xs: complexType> 
xs :elemer.t) 




:6ttrlbGte r1ame="ser'/lceNd:'le" t:ype;"xs:stclng" Ll5e="requl::.-ed" > 
<xs:attr:oute narne="se~';~ceIJRL" type="xs:strlng" use="requl::-ed",> 
<xs:at:rlbtlte r.arne="FalledPRRL" type="xs:strlng" use="optlonal" default="nc" > 
< J xs: complexType> 
< I xs: element> 
<xs: e :ement name=" I n format lon I t emDescr lpt lon" > 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: cr.olce> 
<xs: e lerrent re f = "Rest r lct 10nCond 1 t lon" / > 
<xs: eleMent naF.le=o" Ir.foElement Informat 10n" > 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs:element r.a.[T',e="ItemName" type="xs:strlng" mlnOcc',lrs="O" '> 
<xs : e ':'eme:1t r.a"e"''' USdgePollcy" :nl n0ccur s""" 0" > 
--" \" ~1 d /. 
""':'e:,:,,e'Lt name="Pcll~~yltemNdme" ;> 
:e~ement nctme=-"P,:':'lcyltemllescrlp'::l:c" r:1Pt='="Y.s:st~:r . .g" - c--"; 
:element ndrIlP="AcceptableValue" typP="XS:stl~',~" ~l..:rs="r" :'::::..l~-s="·~Jf'.o0ljnde::l" > 




< / xs: complexType> 
< xs: element> 
<xs:element name="StoragePollcy" mlnOccurs="O"> 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 




: e lemer. t name"'"" POll cjd t emDescr lpt lOC" ~ ype=" xs : st::- .. L:j" [T',~ "~""::::"_Jr s =" ':" 
:elemer:t name="AcC'eptdbleVCilllP" t:jpe,-lIx.,,-.:srr~~I;}" .l"S"''' ":-'dX - :::-s="·~r.L,,'.lnCje:j" > 
:plement :ld:ne="F::-CJm" type-"xS:OFl' ..... " s=-"~·" 
:elemen':: name="T~" t'/pe="xs:ddt+:''' 
:elernen'~ ;lar~e="OthE:'rCompany" rnln'JccUr':i="~" rr,a>-:~....:-.:: c-,,··~~ ,;,~le:)" > 
: ,::omplexType> 
<xs: seq'Jence> 
<xs:element name="CompanyNctrne" type="xs:strlng"/> 
<xs:element ndme="CompanyType" type="xs:strlng"/> 
<xs: element re f -=" 1 n f: ContactDet a 11 s" mlnOcc'J rs= II 0" / > 
<xs: element name="CompanyAffi liat ion" type"'''xs: str lng" /> 
</xs:sequence> 
< 1 xs: complexType> 
< / xs: element> 
<- / xs: sequence> 





11"": y." [1: 1 rll lc' ~~ 'J l "' -""," • 
<-xs:elt::lt.e:j':: na.",e="fC:lcylt:~"·r-'." mlnC~-CIJI 
<-xs: 
<- x~,: seq'~Je;'Le ' 
: element : Ld!""f:, = II PC)llCY I t ernNa:-ne" 
<xs:elernent narl'.p="f-'ollcyltemDescf:..ptlon" typ",,="xs:strln-J" J;,lr.:::'-.::curs"''':'' > 
<-xs : E:' lenLent namp;" Accept ctbleVal ue" type"''' xs: st 1 .:r.:j" mln:="ccu:: soo II C" maxC ccu r s == "unbounded II I 
<-xs :element name="0therCompany" rnlnOccurs="Q" maxCccurs="Clr.bc:.1nded"> 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
< xs : element ndme= "CompanyName" t ype=" xs : st r lng" I > 
<xs:element name="CompanyType" type="xs:string"/> 
<xs:element ref="lnf:ContactDetalls" rnlnOccurs"'''O'' I> 
<. xs: element name","CompanyAf f lilat lon" t ype= II xs : st: r lr.g" I > 
<. 'xs: sequence> 
xs: ccmplexType ' 
























<xs: element name"'" "Ver 1 f 1 cat lonRequest" '> 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs:element name="ServlceName" type="xs:strlnq"/> 
<xs: element ref=" inf :ContactDetdlls" mlnOrc-:urs="O" /> 
< xs : element n3me="Ver i [leat ionElement" rnlnOccu rs=" 0" maxOCCllrs= "unbounded""> 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs: element name= "Ve r 1 f leat 1 on I t pmName" type=-" xs : <_,t r J ng" /./ 





< Ixs: complexType> 
</xs :element> 
<xs :element name,,-,"ServlceQuery"> 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: cholce maxOccurs=="unbounded"> 
<xs: element ref="Verl f icatlonRequest" /> 
<xs: element ref="Rat lngRequest" /> 
<Ixs:choice> 
< 1 xs: complexType> 




<xs:element name="ServlceName" type="xs:strlng"l> 
<xs: element re fo;" In f : Cont actDet ai Is" mlnOccu r s "," 0" 1 > 
< xs: element name=" Rat 1 ng~ lement" ml nOccur s=" 0" mdxOccu r s--o "'lnbounded" > 
<xs: comp 1 exType ') 
<xs: sequence-' 
<xs:element name-"!\r)"ln'1lt_0mName" typP-="xs:strlnq'" 
<xs: element name=" Rot ing 1 temDetalls" t ype=" xs: s t L 1 ng" I'> 
</xs: sequence> 
< 1 xs: complexType > 




<xs: element name=" Serv lceQue ryResponse" > 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs:element name="ServlceNdme" type="xs:strlng"I> 
<x.s:elpment ref="lnf:ContactOF;talls" mlnOccurs="O"/> 
<xs :element name="QueryResponseDetalls"> 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: cholce> 
<xs : element ndme= "Qur> ryResponse I l em" maxOCCllrs=" \lnbounded" > 
'-xs: comp lexType > 
<:X5: sequence:> 
<xs :element narne="QueryrtemNrl.me" type=-"xs: st r'inrJ" / . 
<xs: p lement ndme""" Se rv 1 ceQueryDet a lls" t ype-=" xs : sl r lng" / > 
<xs: element name="ServlceQueryVal ue" type="xs: st rlng" I> 
<xs : element name"''' Author 1 t ySlqnat ure" mi nOccur s=" 0" / " 






<xs: element name=" Fall 1 t I tern" maxOccurs=" unbounded" > 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence? 
:element name="QueryItemNil.me" type="xs:strJng"/> 
<xs:element name="FaultDetails" type="xs:strlng"/> 
<xs:element name="FuultValue" type-"xs:string" mlnOccurs="(]"I" 
<xs : element name=" Author 1 t yS lqnat ure" mlnOccu r 5=" (]" / > 
</xs:sequence> 
< 1 xs: complexType> 
</xs:element;. 
'xs: sequence> 








<xs :element narne="RestrictionName"> 
<xs: simpleType> 
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base="xs:strlny"> 
:er.Jme::-at::.:;n '.'a.Ll:e="Usage",> 
<XS; enumerat lOr. va:ue="Storage" /> 





7.4 CONTRACT SCHEMA 
- 143 -
This schema document is used to create valid contracts between the client and the services 
involved in a transaction. 
<-?xm: verSl'2n="1.O" encoolng-="UTF-8"?> <xs:schema 
e ~ementformDe fa u 1 t = "qua 11 ~ led" at t r lbuteFo rmDef aul t = "unquall f led II 
xmlns: xs;-Mhttp://w'n'w.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema "> 
<..xs :element name="PRRLSelectlon"> 
<xs: complexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs : e .:cement name=" Serv 1 ce ~n f armdt lon" > 
<xs: :::omp':"exType~ 
<xs: sequencE''> 
< xs : e lement r~drr.e=" Se r'. lceName" / > 
:p:e'l'en~ :.df',.:-=-"Ser'. :ceURL"/~ 
<xs:attrlDute name=":JRi..." type="xs:strlng" use=-"requlred" 
< xs :c)mplexType, 
<xs:e:e:-e"t na",e="C'E::'S~llptl;~rl" type="xs:strlng"/' 
< ;>..s: e 1 e;'"".e,,':: Tld;T,e=" Ex':: to rl,o 1 Sev lees" rnl nC'CCUI s-,," ()" '. 
'-x s : c r rnp lex Type > 
'->:s: sequence> 
<xs : e :i.ement re r= "PRRLSelect lon" maxOccurs=" unbounded" / > 
<! xs: sequence'> 
< xs :complexType> 
xS:e1ement> 
<xs: element name="\'a IldPer lod" ffilnOccurs=" 0" > 
<xs: corr,plexType> 
<xs: sequence> 
<xs: element r.arr.e="From" type="xs :date" /> 




,xs:elernent name="TransactlDnT[I" rypp="xs:strlnJ" 
<xs:e':'ement ;',ame="-:llen,::10" tYr·A:~="XS:stL·llll::i" mlnC'-, . "urs=":" 
>.s: seqclen-.::t:''' 
X5: ,-c'rnp':'exIYf-C'C' . 
xs: e':'emer.t > 
<xs:eIernen: narne="Slgnat'..lre"> 
<xs: complexType> 
..:: xs: sequence m~ nCccu r3=" 0" > 
<xs: element name= "PubllcCert l f l cateURL" t ype=" xs: s t r lng" / > 
<xs: element name=" S 19nat ureHa sh" type=" xs: s t r 1ng" / > 
< xs: seqL:enc:e> 
<! xs : ;::::xr,p':"exIype > 
<!xs:e::'ement> 
'xs:eIe~er;,::> 
,'X5: el. emer. t r.cirr,e=" F RR':":"e i.E-~ t 1 )r.C(;n f l rma t 1 on" > 
< xs: cc."iplE-xType > 
<xs: se~ue:1::::e> 
<xs:e~emen:. ref="PRRL.s,,=,lf:-'ctl~)n"/ 
<xs :e':'err.e:'1':. ;Lamp="SlcF,ac.·lre" '> 
'-xs: ::::::::,mp':'exType:.. 
<xs: seq~en::::e/' 
(,XS :p':'ement narr.e="F-ubl.:.c r ertlticdteURI" type="xs: st LIn']" / > 
<.xs: e iement narr,e=" Slgnat urpHas h" t ype= "xs: st r lng" / > 
< xs: sequence> 
< 'xc,: cornplexType;. 
< 'xs :element > 
< xs: sequence> 
< 'xs:c:ofT1plexType> 
: eIel1'ent;. 
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